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his book argues that community is a perennial source of conten-
tion because it holds a self-contradictory proposition in its most 
basic definition—that multiple individuals become “a body of 
individuals.” “A body,” after all, indicates a person, an individual, 
a singleness of being. So how can community be a condition of multiple, 
disparate, and distinct individuals as well as of a single body of being? 
Two vastly different responses to this paradox circulate in contempo-
rary literary criticism, philosophy, and cultural criticism, and these two 
conflicting responses, I suggest, represent the competing discourses of 
community that dominate current debates over community.
 In one response, community functions as an aspiration and an ideal. 
This idealized discourse of community argues that the paradox of com-
munity is superseded when multiple individuals are bound by forces of 
commonality, sharing, belonging, connection, and attachment. As these 
forces perform the seemingly impossible task of transforming many into 
one, the enormity of the feat explains why community functions as the 
ultimate expression of human unity. Indeed, there are numerous other 
terms to describe unity—for example, organization, association, mem-
bership, collectivity, union, affiliation, group. Yet none of these terms 
approaches the cultural prevalence, emotional appeal, and political heft 
of the term community. The reason, this book ventures, rests squarely 
on the paradoxical proposition of community: that many can become 
t
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one through fusion. While other terms of unity describe an aggregate 
number of individuals and particular modes of relationship between 
them, community as an ideal promises a fusion of multiple individuals 
into one subject position. Promising a degree of oneness that no other 
term of unity delivers, community becomes the seat of the most desirable 
human relationality—a unity that is convivial, productive, safe, familiar, 
comforting, intimate, and healing. Enacting what Raymond Williams 
calls the “warmly persuasive” connotation surrounding the word com-
munity (76), the many expressions of idealized community emerge from 
divergent sources—from ordinary speech, political discussions, com-
munitarianism, feminist criticism, ethnic minority discourse, and, most 
importantly for the argument of this book, literary criticism of contem-
porary fiction.1
 Conversely, no other term for unity provokes as much criticism and 
dismay as does the term community. Because community functions as 
the ultimate expression of fusion, community becomes the bearer of 
totality. In this response, the proposition of transforming many individ-
uals into one body becomes the ultimate logic of totalitarianism. Rather 
than being the seat of conviviality and health, community’s promise of 
oneness becomes the seat of all human organizations that are exclu-
sionary, coercive, and oppressive, as found in historical evidences of 
nationalism, regionalism, racism, ethnicism, sexism, and heterosexism.2 
Relatedly, concepts that are valorized for their ability to fuse many 
into one, such as commonality, sharedness, belonging, and attachment, 
become synonymous with forces that demand homogeneity, regulation, 
and obedience. In its fundamental negation of the idealized community, 
this response may be called the discourse of dissenting community—a 
dissent from the assumptions, values, and goals of idealized community. 
To the paradox of community, then, dissenting community offers an 
antithetical answer. No, there cannot be a single body of individuals, 
and to aspire to one ignores the vital fact that heterogeneity, conflict, 
difference, and unbreachable singularity of being are inextricable ingre-
dients of any unity. This negation of idealized community foregrounds 
postmodernist inquiry into power, identity, difference, and hegemony, as 
well as feminist and cosmopolitanist revisions of community.
 This book examines contemporary American fiction that offers a 
third response to the paradox of community: to simultaneously believe 
and disbelieve in the proposition of “a body of individuals.” As these 
novelists simultaneously pursue and critique the alchemy of commu-
nity, they intervene in the debate over community in a unique manner. 
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They highlight the fact that the two competing discourses of community 
share a commonality: both of them remove the paradoxical nature of 
its proposition. Idealized community supersedes the paradox by arguing 
the transformative power of commonality, sharing, belonging, and 
attachment to fuse many into one. Dissenting community dismisses the 
paradox as a dangerous delusion. In profoundly different ways, then, 
the two competing discourses conceive of community only by excising 
the paradoxical nature of “a body of individuals.”
 In contrast, the fictions examined in this study conceive of com-
munity as full of paradoxes, impossibilities, and contradictions. Their 
conflicted movement between the values, assumptions, and ideals of 
community means that they invoke the two competing discourses of 
community in a dialectic manner. They idealize the proposition of com-
munity and pursue the transformative powers of commonality; in the 
next breath, they interrogate the nature of that commonality and even 
the very category of commonality. They expound the impossibility of 
many becoming one and follow that dismissal with the thought: but how 
nice it would be if it were possible. What these novels offer us, then, is 
a dialectic community without synthesis. While they richly illustrate the 
pulse points of idealized community and dissenting community, they do 
not arrive at a stable vision of community by legitimatizing one vision 
over the other. I suggest that the concept of ambivalence becomes an 
important theoretical category for understanding their dialectic com-
munity without synthesis. To be ambivalent is to be undecided between 
two contrary values, pursuits, or entities, to appreciate the desirability 
of one while still heeding the pull of the other. The state of ambivalence, 
then, attains a rich epistemological value in this study of community, 
affording a unique vantage point from which to intervene in debates 
over community, commonality, and fusion. As Dennis Foster eloquently 
describes, the state of ambivalence is a characteristic feature of American 
literary and cultural expression of community:
[W]e express an ambivalence about community that is part of a fun-
damental American tension; fleeing compulsory society, we find some 
way to light out for the territories, where people unite freely. But once 
there, we again draw around us the strictures that had previously driven 
us from civilization. ‘Community,’ it turns out, refers both to a fantasy 
of a place we lost and hope to regain, and to the real, often agonizing 
condition of living in proximity with the separate bodies and minds of 
the others. (20)
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Ambivalence about community certainly shows no abatement in con-
temporary American fiction. If anything, the philosophical, cultural, and 
political implications of imagining community present one of the greatest 
challenges to contemporary fiction. This book demonstrates the con-
tinuing challenge of community by tracing the ambivalent community in 
vastly different areas of contemporary American fiction—through a mul-
ticultural spectrum of writers, ranging from canonical to avant-gardist, 
whose works engage a wide range of social locations and topical issues.
 In addition to demonstrating the ambivalence over community as 
a central tension in contemporary fiction, the unusual combination of 
writers examined in this book—Toni Morrison, Karen Tei Yamashita, 
Richard Powers, Lydia Davis, Lynne Tillman, and David Markson—
uniquely contributes to the two aims of this book: to expand the critical 
framework for discussing community in literary criticism, and to have 
the two competing discourses of community talk to each other in a way 
that is missing in contemporary scholarship of community. First, aside 
from Toni Morrison, none of the other writers represents a familiar face 
in literary discussions of community. While Morrison’s novels anchor 
discussions of community in contemporary fiction, and her presence 
in this study seems self-explanatory, the array of other writers requires 
some explanation. What does Yamashita, an Asian American writer 
whose works centrally explore global migration, have to do with consid-
erations of community? What does Powers, a leading writer of science 
and technology in contemporary fiction, have to do with concerns over 
community? What do Lydia Davis and Lynne Tillman, whose works 
are better known for their epistemological quests, have to say about 
community? What does David Markson, one of the most avant-gardist 
writers of contemporary fiction, have to show about community?
 Although it may sound quixotic, precisely the seeming irrelevance 
of these writers to discussions of community is the point—to expand 
the critical framework of community beyond the idealized vision. These 
writers seem unrelated to the concerns of community, I suggest, because 
their literary visions of community diverge from the idealized commu-
nity dominating contemporary literary criticism. The rich topical con-
cerns, diverse social locations, and different ideals brought into play 
by these writers challenge the established discursive pathways by which 
“community” as such is discussed in contemporary literary criticism. 
Furthermore, the ambivalence these writers evince towards notions such 
as commonality, unity, and fusion brings the two competing discourses 
of community into dialogue.
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 In order to fully encompass these novels’ unique intervention in dis-
cussion of community, this study does not begin with a fixed defini-
tion of community. Instead, it approaches the paradox of community 
through a study of the literary manifestation of first-person plural “we.” 
As a pronoun that proposes to be singular and plural at the same time, 
the paradox of the pronoun “we” is metonymic of the paradox of “a 
body of individuals.” What forces endow a single subject with the heft 
of the multiple? How does a single “I” presume to be a plural “we”? 
What needs and desires are met in this transformation into a single 
“we”? When we move beyond the prevailing understanding of com-
munity as the most benevolent, ultimate expression of unity, we can see 
that Yamashita’s interest in global migration is an attempt to formulate 
a global “we”; that Powers’s defense of human uniqueness is an attempt 
to say “we, the human” and make it mean something special in the face 
of virtual reality and simulation technology; that Davis’s and Tillman’s 
treatment of intersubjective transparency is an exploration of “we” as 
intersubjective continuity; and that Markson’s philosophical treatment 
of language games is a dramatization of the biggest “we,” the fact of 
coexistence. Through their complex arrival at a first-person plural “we,” 
these works invoke a multifaceted vision of community that expands the 
critical framework for discussing community.
 Furthermore, each of these literary manifestations of “we” calls up 
various ideals central to the community debate—the ideal of identifica-
tion, universalism, humanism, universalism, communion, and coexis-
tence. As familiar rationale for transforming multiple individuals into a 
unity, each of these concepts is thoroughly embedded in the philosophical, 
political, and cultural valence of community. Like community, every one 
of these concepts is subject to political contestation as rationale for unity, 
and, like community, each is under suspicion as a rationale for totality. 
Thus the literary drama of asserting a “we” becomes the drama of nego-
tiating a whole host of contested ideals surrounding the very notion of 
unity. Finally, each of these literary instances of “we” articulates a need, a 
desire, or an expectation—that “we” are alike, that “we” are connected, 
that “we” are unique, that “we” fully know each other, or even that there 
is a “we.” Addressing the work of “we” in contemporary fiction allows 
me to address the issue of functionality at the heart of the community 
debate. What does community do? At a more fundamental level, should 
community do anything? The answer to this question has severe reper-
cussions in the debate over community.
 In order to contextualize the significance of ambivalent community, 
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let me begin with an overview of what I am calling the competing dis-
courses of idealized community and dissenting community.
Idealized Community 
“Community Is like Family, Sisterhood, 
Brotherhood, Village, Neighborhood, Friendship”
In the discourse of idealized community, community as an ideal funda-
mentally relies on the kindness of analogies. In the familiar similes of 
community as family, kinship, village, and friendship, there is a direct 
transfer of affect between community and the particular relationship 
made analogous to that concept. That is, community becomes as natural, 
as primary, as normal, and as essential as family, kinship, neighborhood, 
village, or friendship. From such analogies, furthermore, community 
attains the benevolent relationality among its members (of sharing, sup-
port, understanding, warmth) as well as the consensual logic of opera-
tion (governed by common aims, consensus, and shared fate).
 In using community as an aspiration, contemporary discourse of ide-
alized community performs a revolutionary maneuver between Ferdi-
nand Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). 
The enormity of this maneuver lies in the fact that while Tönnies theo-
rizes Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as contrasting models of human 
organization, contemporary discourse of idealized community utilizes 
the two in seamless conjunction, incorporating aspects of both in a stra-
tegic manner to generate a brand-new theory of community. As the most 
influential theory of community not only in sociology but in any consid-
eration of community in the twentieth century, Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft 
Und Gesellschaft (1887), translated as Community & Society (1957), 
offers a nostalgic description—and prescription—for what he sees as a 
way of life fast disappearing in the urbanization, industrialization, and 
fragmentation of late-nineteenth-century Europe. Tönnies theorizes the 
benevolent and consensual nature of community informed by “natural 
will” (“Wesenville”). This natural will expresses itself through the kin-
ship group, the neighborhood, and friendship as relationships of inti-
macy and unconditional emotional bonding. The identifying feature of 
community is the “common spirit” that runs through it (224), and the 
ultimate seat of the common spirit lies in the form of the family. As 
the “simple,” “organic,” and the “only real form of life” (226–27), the 
t h e  p A r A d o x  o f  c o m m u n I t y   
family best exemplifies the concord, folkways, mores, and religion that 
make the Gemeinschaft “the body social”: “Each individual receives his 
share from this common center, which is manifest in his own sphere, i.e., 
in his sentiment, in his mind and heart, and in his conscience as well as 
in his environment, his possessions, and his activities” (224).
 In contrast, the instrumentalist and depersonalized nature of Gesell-
schaft is manifest in “rational will” (“Kurville”). This rational will 
expresses itself in business, economy, the state, and social relationships 
that are exchange-based and driven by self-interest. As the core char-
acteristics of community gradually dissipate in society, Gesellschaft is 
distinguished by the absence of common will. Thus Gesellschaft is a 
movement away from the “simple form” towards the “complex form of 
social life”: “The ‘house’ maintains the ‘family character of the house’ 
the most, then the village, and the town. When the town develops into 
the city, the ‘family character of the house’ is entirely lost. Individuals 
or families are separate identities, and their common locale is only an 
accidental or deliberately chosen place in which to live” (227).
 Strictly speaking, contemporary discourse of idealized community is 
neither Gemeinschaft nor Gesellschaft. In using Gemeinschaft models 
of family, neighborhood, and friendship as aspirations for community, 
the discourse of idealized community performs a careful adjudication 
between Tönnies’s theory of natural will and rational will. While it directly 
continues the benevolence of the family, neighborhood, and friendship 
in arguing the benevolence of community, it diverges from Tönnies’s use 
of such groups as expressions of “simple” or “organic” expression of 
“natural will.” Instead, idealized community seamlessly merges aspects 
of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, so that community is “a body of indi-
viduals” who aspire to achieve the benevolence of a relationship like 
that of family, neighborhood, and friendship. By carefully negotiating 
between the two wills set in opposition by Tönnies, contemporary ideal 
community discourse introduces a voluntary dimension to the formation 
of community, thereby acknowledging a late-twentieth-century political, 
cultural, and theoretical suspicion of “natural” expressions. Rather than 
being a given expression of “natural” or “primordial” will, community 
is the rational movement towards natural unities. This seamless move-
ment between aspects of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and between the 
“natural” and the “rational” generates an even more significant effect. 
Community becomes inherently teleological: it becomes a body of indi-
viduals united towards a final objective of achieving a unity like that of 
family, kinship, neighborhood, village, or friendship. Furthermore, these 
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telos of community—the Gemeinschaft categories of unity—directly 
inform the benevolent nature and politics of idealized community. This 
teleological view of community as the “rational” movement towards 
“natural” unities will be best demonstrated in Morrison’s construction 
of community, in which kinship models of community lead to the healing 
of all its members.
 Precisely such a teleological thinking of community underwrites ide-
alized community’s invocation of family, neighborhood, and friendship 
as aspirations for community. Limited to no one ideological group, this 
teleological view emerges from divergent political views, social loca-
tions, and cultural arenas, such as conservative political theory, African 
American discourse, feminist discourse, literary criticism, and popular 
culture. In “good communities,” writes the conservative communi-
tarian philosopher Amitai Etzioni, “people treat one another as ends 
in themselves, not merely as instruments; as whole persons rather than 
as fragments; as something like an extended family rather than only 
as employees, traders, consumers or even fellow citizens” (25). Simi-
larly, “family is the original human community and the basis as well 
as the origin of all subsequent communities. It is therefore the norm 
of all communities, so that any community is a brotherhood. . . . The 
more a society approximates to the family pattern, the more it real-
izes itself as a community, or, as Marx called it, a truly human society” 
(MacMurray 155).3 Consider, also, the centrality of kinship models in 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s vision of “Beloved Community,” a vision that 
holds global “sisterhood” and “brotherhood” as its final aim of progress 
and is still vital to African American discourse.4 For instance, the ideal 
of “Beloved Community” informs bell hooks’s vision in Teaching Com-
munity. Taking inspiration from June Jordan’s statement, “We look for 
community. We have already suffered the alternative to community, to 
human commitment” (qtd. in hooks 3), hooks argues that the ultimate 
aim is to achieve “beloved communities where there is no domination,” 
communities in which members understand “the truth of our essential 
humanness” (66).
 Similarly, the kinship model of sisterhood prevails as the aspirational 
model of community in feminist discourse, as well as for asserting com-
monalities of female-gendered identity, experience, and body politics.5 In 
close company with the trope of sisterhood in feminist visions of com-
munity are other Gemeinschaft models of friendship, village, and neigh-
borhood. Marilyn Friedman’s “Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislo-
cating the Community” is an example of idealized community expression 
that uses the voluntary relationship of friendship as the ideal model of 
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community: friendship is a unity “arising out of one’s own needs, desires, 
interests, versus expectations assigned, demanded by one’s found com-
munities” (199–200). It is no coincidence that “neighborhood” is often 
used synonymously with “community,” or that “neighborly feeling” is 
used synonymously with friendliness or conviviality. The use of neigh-
borhood as the aspiration for community retains much of the Gemein-
schaft connotations of the village: a small-scale locality, a living arrange-
ment of face-to-face interaction, leading to an intimacy that generates a 
greater sense of belonging and attachment. The intimacy of the village 
as the telos is perhaps best represented philosophically, politically, and 
culturally as a specific vein of communitarianism, which emphasizes the 
heightened civic responsibility, engagement, voluntarism, and activism 
fostered by small-scale, unmediated interactions.6 As Iris Marion Young 
describes this communitarian ideal expressed by Carol Gould, Michael 
Sandel, and Michael Taylor, “[t]he ideal society is composed of small 
locales, populated by a small enough number of persons so that each can 
be personally acquainted with all the others[,] . . . decentralized, with 
small-scale industry and local markets” (Young 316). These aspirational 
models for community powerfully shape many of the ambivalent com-
munities analyzed in this book. The telos of the family, sisterhood, and 
friendship propels the motivations and actions of Morrison’s protago-
nists. Likewise, the intimacy and shared fate of the neighborhood as the 
model for community reigns strong in Yamashita’s exploration of the 
globe as a village.
 Just as importantly, the aspirational and teleological views of com-
munity give rise to a thoroughly naturalized view of commonality. With 
“commonality,” we arrive at one of the most hotly contested sites of 
contemporary debates about community, identity, and unity. What is the 
politics of commonality? What is the politics of asking, “How are you 
like me?” Why, in the discourse of idealized community, does that ques-
tion seem the most basic, the most essential—indeed, the most natural—
question to ask? I suggest that the degree to which similarity, sameness, 
and sharedness become seemingly inevitable criteria of community is 
the same degree to which idealized community depoliticizes the concept 
of commonality. Of course, no concept is inherently political as such, 
bearing an essential ideological allegiance to a value system, worldview, 
or power deployment. Rather, the issue at hand is the discursive context 
in which the concept of commonality becomes relevant or visible. And 
in idealized community’s fundamentally benevolent teleology, the prac-
tice of uniting along the axis of similarity seems an obviously justified 
and legitimate procedure. In a mutually supporting manner, then, the 
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teleology of idealized community renders the question of commonality 
into a self-evident imperative, and vice versa. The search for common-
ality in order to become a community like a family, village, or friendship 
becomes an apolitical activity, an operation that does not prioritize the 
interests of one group over another or strengthen the power of some 
over another. Free of any self-serving partiality, searching for the ways 
“you” are like “me” becomes a search for what is already “out there.” 
Indeed, the degree to which commonality functions as the identifying 
marker of community is evident in the way the definitions of “commu-
nity” and “common” are interdependent.7
 For many of the fictions discussed in this book, too, commonality 
operates as the constitutive feature of forming a “body of individuals.” 
Commonality sits at the heart of Morrison’s use of identification, as 
her female protagonists bond according to the similarity of their life 
experiences and struggles, as well as to their shared objective of collec-
tive healing. Yamashita explores the numerous ways that universalism 
assumes—and exploits—commonalities. In Powers’s novels of science 
and technology, humanism becomes the pursuit of that one uniquely 
human commonality that will, in the final analysis, demarcate the human 
from the machinic. Although the “what” or the “content” of common-
ality differs, each of these literary attempts at imagining a single “we” 
employs the concept of commonality as an imperative.
 Yet these fictions also question that imperative, and this antithetical 
treatment of commonality sits at the center of their ambivalence about 
community. In these literary works the very search for commonality 
becomes a process fraught with struggles, partiality, negotiations, con-
flict, and dissent. There is no simple commonality “out there” about the 
determinate features of “we” of the village, of the human, of the globe, 
or of “you” and “me.” Instead, searching for that commonality neces-
sitates partiality—for some to determine, and enforce, the criteria of 
commonality—and constructivism—to impose and shore up arguments 
about “our” similarities and sharedness—and, if all else fails, conscrip-
tion—to impose a commonality onto all of “us.” These struggles high-
light the inevitably political nature of searching for commonality. In 
their self-reflective examination of their own uses of commonality, these 
fictions challenge the apolitical vision of commonality in the discourse 
of idealized community. Their ambivalence towards their own deploy-
ment of commonality, then, negates the central myth of idealized com-
munity and engages the concerns and arguments of dissenting commu-
nity.
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dissenting Community
“Community Is like Totalitarianism, Fascism, Authoritarianism”
The various expressions of dissenting community, emerging from diver-
gent political, philosophical, and disciplinary quarters, converge upon 
the negation of community as an ideal. But the negation of idealized 
community is not limited to those specific debates over community. The 
discourse of dissenting community is thoroughly imbricated in contem-
porary cultural theory’s reconsideration of unity, in poststructuralist 
critique of the neo-Kantian liberal philosophy and politics, and in the 
larger postmodernist interrogation of single body ideology, teleological 
view of community, and valorization of wholeness, oneness, and unity. 
Postmodernist philosophical dissent from idealized community begins 
by negating the final aim of idealized community as an impossibility—a 
unity in which multiple bodies become a single body. This negation fore-
grounds postmodernist recuperation of concepts such as difference, dis-
sent, heterogeneity, antagonism, and conflict, precisely the concepts cat-
egorized as contaminants or obstacles that must be overcome or excised 
in the “progress” towards a unity like that of family, kinship, village, 
or friendship. By emphasizing the fissures that render “a body of indi-
viduals” impossible, dissenting community reinvigorates those fissures 
and recategorizes them as constitutive features of a community whose 
final telos is not a single body community.
 A classic expression of poststructuralist theory and radical democracy, 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe’s influential work Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics might be read 
as just such a reclassification project of dissenting community. When 
they famously state that “society is impossible” because antagonism and 
hegemony are key ingredients in a radical democracy (114), they are 
arguing the “impossibility of a final suture” that would make society 
into one single body (125). Thus the impossibility they address is the 
single body ideology at the heart of community as a proposition. Rather 
than being temporary instances of conflict that give rise to feelings of 
aversion, hostility, or antipathy, they argue, antagonism is a perennial 
condition expressing the uneven, fluid, always changing, always relative 
nature of subject positions and proclaimed identities. Far from being 
an incidental irritant or obstacle that must be resolved and eliminated, 
antagonism describes “the incomplete, open and politically negotiable 
character of every identity” (104). As antagonism expresses the “limits 
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of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself” (125), it 
critiques the very desire for commonality and consensus in the teleology 
of idealized community.
 Indeed, the presence of antagonism is crucial to a “free society,” as 
Laclau further expounds in “Community and Its Paradoxes: Richard 
Rorty’s ‘Liberal Utopia.’” Laclau’s critique of Rorty’s “liberal utopia” 
is representative of the way postmodernist philosophy’s critique of the 
neo-Kantian, Enlightenment liberal tradition enacts the discourse of dis-
senting community. More specifically, the postmodernist-liberal tradi-
tion debate demonstrates how the discourse of dissenting community 
emerges as a critique of any philosophical or political theory that holds 
a teleological view of human history as a progress towards unity, and as 
a critique of any rationalist view of a “foundational” human nature in 
which consensus is the ultimate achievement. Laclau writes: “Antago-
nism exists because the social is not a plurality of effects radiating from 
a pregiven center, but is pragmatically constructed from many starting 
points. But it is precisely because of this, because there is an ontological 
possibility of clashes and unevenness, that we can speak of freedom” 
(“Community” 92). In contrast, in Rorty’s “liberal utopia” outlined in 
Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, there is an untenable distinction between 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” conflict, Laclau argues. As Rorty claims, 
“A liberal society is one whose ideals can be fulfilled by persuasion 
rather than force, by reform rather than revolution” (Contingency 60). 
But such are distinctions, Laclau continues, that can be made only when 
consensus is the determining criterion of legitimacy: persuasion is distin-
guished by the presence of consensus, while force is distinguished by the 
absence of consensus.
 But might not the very achievement of consensus involve force? “The 
question that remains is to what extent in persuasion/consensus there is 
not an ingredient of force” (“Community” 89). The valorization of con-
sensus as the legitimate, democratic form of struggle is possible only in a 
value system in which antagonism can only be a problem or an obstacle 
that must be removed. A social arrangement whose telos is the absence 
of antagonism strives for a “totally determined society,” “a society 
from which violence and antagonisms have been entirely eliminated” 
(92; original emphasis). On the contrary, Laclau agues, “the existence 
of violence and antagonism is the very condition of a free society” (92). 
Hegemony, then, is the very expression of a society in which antago-
nism is a constitutive feature. Rather than being an oppressive force that 
one group wields upon another and that must be eradicated, hegemony 
describes the perennial struggle between subjects whose self-identifica-
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tions are inextricably contingent and mutually related to each other. It 
describes the struggle by different subject positions that take place in 
the field of limitless, differential relations that is the social sphere. Fun-
damental to the larger commitment of dissenting community is post-
modernist philosophy’s resuscitation of antagonism and hegemony from 
the teleology of liberal emancipation. Other notable expression of post-
modernist dissenting community takes place in the theoretical exchanges 
between Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek in Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, in which 
“antagonism,” or “the incommensurability or gap” between identity 
and identity-claims, forms the theoretical basis for radical democracy: 
“we each value this ‘failure’ as a condition of democratic contestation 
itself” (1–2).
 Jean-François Lyotard’s dissent from Enlightenment rationality, well 
represented in his critique of Habermasian consensus, is another rich 
expression of the way postmodernist philosophical critique of liberal 
tradition contributes to the discourse of dissenting community.8 Like the 
postmodernist repositioning of antagonism and conflict as inherently 
necessary ingredients to any open-ended, democratic society, Lyotard’s 
theory of heterogeneity and the differend directly negates the telos of 
unity in social, cultural, and political theory. By exploring the fissures 
that render a single body impossible, Lyotard calls attention to the ways 
in which the pursuit of unity always “betrays” itself. Voicing one of the 
harshest condemnations of the valorization of unity, he compares the 
political call for solidarity as a:
totalitarian apparatus, constituted as a result of the elimination of debate 
and by the continuous elimination of debate from political life by means 
of terror, [which] reproduces within itself . . . the illness that it claims to 
cure [that is, call for solidarity]. Disorder within, an internal prolifera-
tion of decision-making authorities, war among inner-circle cliques: all 
this betrays the recurrence of the shameful sickness within that passes for 
health and betrays the “presence” of the unmanageable (intraitable), at 
the very time that the latter is hidden away by the delirium and arrogance 
of a unitary, totalitarian politics. (“À l’insu [Unbeknownst]” 43)
As solidarity “passes for health,” it follows that heterogeneity passes 
for illness: “With the horror resulting from this sanitizing operation, 
the phantasm of oneness and totality is sustained by the belief that this 
heterogeneous thing has, or is, a face (Medusa’s face?), and that it would 
suffice to turn it around to get rid of it” (43).
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 Likewise, Lyotard’s theory of the differend explores the disruptive 
power of the “unmanageable” in the movement towards unity. Extending 
Wittgenstein’s theory of language, Lyotard argues an anti-instrumen-
talist theory of language, in which language use—what can be said and 
what cannot be said—is metonymic of the material and discursive dis-
parity in power. As he begins The Differend: Phrases in Dispute: “You 
are informed that human beings endowed with language were placed in 
a situation that none of them is now able to tell about it” (3). The dif-
ferend shows itself in disputes in which the experience, reality, and tes-
timony of one party cannot be “phrased”—has no means of being cred-
ited or legitimated and is repeatedly made to account for itself without 
any hope of attaining either. Like the testimony of Holocaust victims 
who are repeatedly questioned, or the language of the worker who can 
make himself visible only by speaking of his labor in the language of 
capitalist value system, the differend testifies to the fundamental falsity 
in the social, political, philosophical, and cultural myth of a single body 
community and valorization of consensus. Reading for the differend in 
literary formations of community indeed reveals the material and discur-
sive disparity in power and the coercive and exclusionary maneuvers at 
work in formations of community. The teleology of health and healing in 
Morrison’s Paradise, for instance, means that practices and values that 
do not contribute to collective healing remain unphraseable in the novel. 
For Powers’s protagonists, the machine’s differend poses the greatest 
challenge, and their inability to phrase the machine in any idiom other 
than the “human” reveals the instability of the human community.
reappropriating the “Common” in dissenting Community
While expressions of dissenting community emphasize the fissures that 
render the single body community impossible, another instance of dis-
senting community might be located in those postmodernist philosophers 
who negate the role of community as an instrument towards achievement. 
In arguing for a community that is “inoperative” (désœuvrée), theorists 
such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice Blanchot, and Giorgio Agamben voice 
the anti-instrumentalist theory of community.9 While heterogeneity, dis-
sent, and antagonism are well established as postmodernist negations 
of idealized community discourse, lesser known is the postmodernist 
project of reappropriating the word “common” for the purpose of 
an anti-instrumentalist theory of community. No other contemporary 
thinker has emptied and redefined the meaning of the “common” more 
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vigorously towards this aim than Jean-Luc Nancy. Like the larger post-
modernist philosophical project, Nancy critiques the depoliticized use of 
the common as the “natural” binding agent for community. But going 
beyond a critique of the common as the rationale for community, Nancy 
offers the most expansive understanding of the common by way of a 
Heideggerian understanding of Being. For Heidegger, Nancy points out, 
“‘being ‘itself’ comes to be defined as relational, as non-absoluteness, 
and, if you will—and in any case this is what I am trying to argue—as 
community” (6; original emphasis). For Nancy, the only utility for the 
common is to assert existence itself as a fact of “being-in-common.” 
Rather than being a descriptor of a parochial similarity, the common 
in Nancian terms is a descriptor of coexistence itself. When that foun-
dational fact is ignored, and unity is founded on the fact of what “we” 
have in common—in history, self-interest, life experience, objective, and 
so on—the primary fact of being-in-common is elided. The unity that 
arises out of parochial sameness finds its final expression in ideological 
totality. Nowhere is this danger more strident, Nancy argues, than in the 
discourse of single body community.
 The Inoperative Community, published in 1987, addresses the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the unprecedented force of free-market global 
economy as primary examples of single body community. As instances of 
unity conceived through “economic ties, technological operations, and 
political fusion (into a body or under a leader)” (3; original emphasis), 
they represent how:
the community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, fatherland, 
Leader . . .) necessarily loses the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the 
with or the together that defines it. It yields its being-together to a being 
of togetherness. The truth of community, on the contrary, resides in the 
retreat of such a being. Community is made of what retreats from it: the 
hypostasis of the ‘common,’ and its work. (xxxix; original emphasis)
For Nancy, “communal,” “communion,” “communitarianism,” or 
“communism” represents the ultimate misuse of the common, the pur-
suit of “essence” as the logic of community:
[When] thinking of being-in-common [is folded] within the thinking of 
an essence of community . . . it assigns to community a common being, 
whereas community is a matter . . . of existence inasmuch as it is in com-
mon, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. 
Being in common has nothing to do with communion, with fusion into 
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a body, into a unique and ultimate identity that would no longer be 
exposed. (xxxviii; original emphasis)
Similarly, in disrupting the parochial function of commonality, Agamben 
uses the provocative expression “whatever” in his theory of community. 
“Whatever” stands as the central trope for a theory of community that 
is without any criteria of common attributes and properties, such as 
“being red, being French, being Muslim” (1). The kernel of “whatever” 
is “the idea of an inessential commonality, a solidarity that in no way 
concerns an essence. . . . Whatever is constituted not by the indifference 
of common nature with respect to singularities, but by the indifference 
of the common and the proper, of the genus and the species, of the essen-
tial and the accidental” (18–19; original emphasis).
 Nancy’s and Agamben’s anti-instrumentalist theory of the common 
speaks directly to their anti-teleological theory of community. Just as 
commonality should not “work” as the logic of unity, community should 
not “work” towards a final objective—towards a more efficient and pro-
ductive unity, or a “return” to a lost, “purer” community of bygone 
years, or towards the aspirational model of Gemeinschaft community. 
Yet, Nancy notes, the history of community is irrevocably a history of 
single body ideology and teleological thinking. “How can the commu-
nity without essence (the community that is neither ‘people’ nor ‘nation,’ 
neither ‘destiny’ nor ‘generic humanity,’ etc.) be presented as such? That 
is, what might a politics be that does not stem from the will to realize an 
essence?” (xxxix–xl).
 The answer, Nancy argues, lies in a community whose commonality 
says nothing about its “essence” and serves no final function. As any 
unity with a final objective locates its “strength” in the degree of its 
fusion, any community conceived in a teleological manner inevitably 
operates within a single body ideology: it moves towards ideological 
totality. Only a community that has no final objective, whose com-
monality has no function, can become a unity whose final destination 
is neither “progress”—achievement of an ideological goal, greater pro-
ductivity, political reform—nor totalitarianism. As the rationale for a 
community that is inoperative, Nancy’s being-in-common offers the 
most basic fact of coexistence as the originary community. Coexistence 
means that “there is no singular being without a singular being, and 
there is, therefore, what might be called, in a rather inappropriate idiom, 
an originary or ontological ‘sociality’ that in its principle extends far 
beyond the simple theme of man as a social being” (28). “Coexistence 
holds itself just as far from juxtaposition as it does from integration. 
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Coexistence does not happen to existence; it is not added to it, and one 
can not [sic] subtract it out; it is existence” (187).
 By emptying the category of commonality of any use-value, the anti-
instrumentalist theory of community offers a profound challenge to the 
functionality of the first-person plural “we” in the contemporary fictions 
analyzed in this study. As each literary deployment of “we” serves a 
specific function—that “we” are alike, that “we” are interrelated, that 
“we” are unique, that “we” understand each other, that “I” exist among 
a “we”—each fictional instance must justify the work of commonality 
in transforming many into one. The fine balance between community 
that works and commonality that oppresses finds parallel expression in 
contemporary intellectual and political projects with reformist, activist 
vision. What theory of community can sustain a theory of commonality 
without also valorizing oppressive homogeneity? Let me hold up femi-
nist and cosmopolitanist discourses of community as they grapple with 
this challenge and, in the process, highlight the dimension of delibera-
tiveness that distinguishes them from fiction’s ambivalent community. 
This deliberative deployment of commonality is what enables feminist 
and cosmopolitanist theories to do what fiction’s ambivalent community 
cannot do—to synthesize the competing politics of idealized and dis-
senting community.
dissenting Community That works
Feminist and Cosmopolitanist Community
As Iris Marion Young writes, her critique of the single body ideology 
is instigated by the fact that “feminists have been paradigm exponents 
of the ideal of community I criticize.” At the same time, her interven-
tion in imagining alternatives to community is inspired by feminist 
scholarship’s attention to difference (300). There is no better site for 
understanding feminism’s problematic relationship to community than 
in the debate over the trope of “sisterhood.” As I addressed earlier, sis-
terhood is the dominant aspirational model of community in feminist 
discourse. Inversely, feminist critique of idealized community emerges 
most vocally through its critique of sisterhood. Emphasizing the fissures 
that render a single “female” community impossible, feminist discourses 
of dissenting community argue the dangers of assuming “natural” com-
monality among women—of biological, acultural, prediscursive same-
ness, affinity, and empathy. Feminist critique of the sisterhood ideal also 
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dissents from the single body ideology that holds consensus as a self-
evident goal and, above all, from the elision of difference that takes 
place in the name of unity.10
 However, while sharing many of the concerns raised in postmodernist 
dissenting community, the reformist politics of feminist dissenting com-
munity demands that community does something rather than do nothing. 
The horizon of feminist negative community cannot be anti-instrumen-
tality, a commonality that has no function except that of observing 
coexistence. Indeed, the feminist break from postmodernist dissenting 
community articulates the complicated and uneasy relationship between 
feminism and postmodernism—their parallel inquiry into power, poli-
tics, and identity, and their irreconcilable intellectual and political aims. 
As Linda Nicholson writes in the Introduction to Feminism/Postmod-
ernism, a central question for feminist use of postmodernist theory is 
whether the “theorizing needs some stopping points” (8) so as to enable 
the category of gender and to sustain the possibility of unity.
 It is no little surprise, then, that feminist expressions of dissenting 
community critique the anti-instrumental community of postmodernist 
philosophy. Miranda Joseph’s Against the Romance of Community, 
while criticizing the discourse of idealized community, notes that “the 
not-surprising truth is that the critique of community offered by feminist 
poststructuralists has made not a dent in the pervasive and celebratory 
deployment of community in popular culture and even on what used 
to be the left” (xxxi). Joseph reserves her strongest criticism, though, 
for Nancy and Agamben as instances of postmodernist philosophy that 
“promote political passivity or paralyzing relativism” (xxx). In par-
ticular, Joseph finds Agamben’s provocative use of “whatever” as too 
easily dismissing the fact that “collectivities often persist in their project 
despite the catachrestical and disputed nature of the identity terms under 
which they are mobilized” (xxx). Likewise, Nancy Fraser balances her 
estimation of Nancy’s theories of politics with a criticism that his schol-
arship walks a “tightrope” that involves a “rigorous exclusion of poli-
tics, and especially of empirical and normative considerations.” Thus 
Fraser expresses a dissatisfaction with Nancy’s “middle way of a philo-
sophical interrogation of the political that somehow ends up producing 
profound new, politically relevant insights without dirtying any hands in 
political struggle” (87).
 What these feminist critiques express is, first, how reformist politics 
needs to maintain the concept of unity as the basis of collective work 
and, second, how that project requires the deployment of commonality 
in some specific, particular sense (e.g., similarity of history, subject posi-
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tioning, experience, or shared objective or interest). Indeed, feminist cri-
tique of anti-instrumentalist community recalls, and sheds a new light 
on, the strategies by which postmodernist feminist theorists in the 1980s 
maintained the concept of unity amidst criticism of essentialism. Butler’s 
“contingent foundations,” Gayatri Spivak’s “strategic essentialism,” 
and Satya P. Mohanty’s “postpositivist realism” represent feminism’s 
constructivist use of essentialism—as a modified, contingent, fluid use of 
commonality to enable strategic formations of unity.11 In their balance 
of postmodernist fissures with the strategic use of commonality, these 
contingent deployments of essentialism may be read as modified argu-
ments for dissenting community—a theory of community that negates 
the values and politics of idealized community while still maintaining a 
sense of unity that “works.”
 Furthermore, these gestures of feminist dissenting community repre-
sent a moderated answer to the paradox of achieving “a body of indi-
viduals”: unlike the idealized community that supersedes the paradox 
with apolitical claims of commonality, or dissenting community that 
throws out the paradox as being impossible, feminist dissenting commu-
nity argues for a deliberative body of individuals. In shoring up a theory 
of instrumentalist community, feminist dissenting community relies on 
the foundational concept of feminism: agency. By emphasizing the delib-
erative deployment of commonality, this instrumentalist community 
suggests that the work of commonality need not equate the oppression 
by commonality. As the following chapters will demonstrate, precisely 
this deliberative, contingent, and strategic view of commonality is what 
is absent in the ambivalent community under analysis, and it is what 
causes them to continually question their uses of commonality.
 Like feminist dissenting community, the deliberative formation of 
unity is pivotal to recent cosmopolitanist projects that attempt to theo-
rize unity without oppression. As a negation of the values and politics 
of idealized community, the new cosmopolitanist corrective to single 
body ideology theorizes the deliberative nature of unity by targeting the 
concept of belonging. As a keyword and central value in the discourse of 
idealized community, “belonging” describes a relatedness or connection 
to a specific unity, such as to a nation, a region, an ethnicity, a locale, 
or a family. Another way to define belonging is as a form of limited 
attachment. Thus the concept of belonging implicitly calls up a sense of 
restricted belonging—belonging to one nation and not to another, to one 
culture but not to another, to one region over another. Recent cosmopol-
itanist projects that negate the theory of single body community argue 
that altering this limited logic of belonging leads to a model of com-
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munity with multiple attachments, belonging, and loyalties. As Amanda 
Anderson succinctly describes in her overview of contemporary projects 
of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanism “denote[s] cultivated detachment 
from restrictive forms of identity” (“Cryptonormativism” 266).12
 The best-known example of cosmopolitanist corrective to the single 
body ideology is perhaps found in Martha Nussbaum’s well-known cita-
tion of Plutarch—the call “to regard all human beings as our fellow 
citizens and neighbors” (qtd. in Nussbaum, “Reply” 9). Nussbaum’s 
notion emerges as a response to Richard Rorty’s call for patriotic ideas 
and American values in a New York Times editorial in 1994. Motivated 
by the fear of national chauvinism and jingoism that such a call risks, 
and by her belief that global problems of hunger, poverty, inequality, 
and ecology require an international basis of collectivity and agency, 
Nussbaum theorizes a “world citizenship” in which one’s nationality 
is an “accident of birth” (“Reply” 133). As a prime example of a non-
limited belonging, Nussbaum points to the multinational and multireli-
gious nature of people who participated in the World War II rescue oper-
ations for Jews. The French, Belgian, Polish, Scandinavian, Japanese, 
German, atheist, and Christian and other religious people who took 
part in the rescue efforts represent an instance of a world citizenship—a 
“we” that is not forged out of a single attachment, a unity transcending 
specificity of belonging.
 Like the political and moral utility that Nussbaum locates in mul-
tiple and expansive belonging, Ross Posnock’s “post-identity cosmo-
politanism” theorizes cosmopolitanism as a community that works. 
Locating the emergence of cosmopolitanism in eighteenth-century 
republicanism, most famously enunciated by Kant, Posnock argues 
the progressive utility of cosmopolitanism as a careful adjudication of 
Enlightenment liberalism and a simultaneous distrust of the ideal of 
progress. The egalitarian potential of cosmopolitanism emerges from the 
fact that the expansive and multiple nature of belonging translates into 
the fact that no ideal, practice, or tradition belongs to any specific body 
of people. For Posnock, the exemplary expression of this post-identity 
cosmopolitanism rests in black cosmopolitanism’s claim of modernity, 
in which formally marginalized groups can appropriate, without consid-
eration of “origin,” all the world’s cultures, ideals, and politics without 
being charged of “assimilation.” “[A]s an instrument of cultural democ-
racy that, historically, has been particularly congenial to those on the 
periphery,” post-identity cosmopolitanism presents a mode of agency to 
those who wish to form a deliberative unity (807).13
 By dethroning the specificity and the limited nature of belonging, cos-
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mopolitanist community, like feminist negative community, postulates a 
vision of unity that is as instrumental as it is nonoppressive. These delib-
erative formations of community that “works,” yet whose telos does not 
lead to a totality, represent a modified answer to the paradox of “a body 
of individuals.” They represent a synthesis of the competing discourses 
of idealized community and dissenting community, a synthesis in which 
commonality is deployed deliberatively, not as a “natural” expression, 
in which unity is taken as a contingent, not as a given, and in which the 
instrumentality of community is not evidence of its totalitarian nature. 
This synthesis, I argue, is what distinguishes these moderated dissenting 
communities from the ambivalent communities of contemporary fiction. 
Reading contemporary fiction’s inability to synthesize the competing dis-
courses of community reveals the difficulty of excising the paradox from 
the proposition of community.
Ambivalent Community in Contemporary American Fiction
In the face of all these possible responses to the paradox of community, 
what does it mean to be ambivalent about community? To be ambiva-
lent is to simultaneously entertain two contradictory attitudes towards 
one concept. Put another way, ambivalence describes a unique vantage 
point, of acknowledging the appeal, as well as the undesirability, of any 
alternative. And because one is not fully “given over” to the attraction 
of one alternative, the state of being undecided elucidates the lingering 
call of the other. I am not suggesting that ambivalence offers an all-
seeing vantage point, an unbiased perspective that is superior in its 
scope, depth, and balance to a more determinate position. Instead, I am 
suggesting that ambivalence holds valuable epistemological utility in the 
way it captures a conflicted stance, the moment of hesitation, in which 
the compelling nature of one alternative competes with that of another 
alternative.
 Indeed, as they are pulled by the two contrasting answers to the par-
adox of community, these fictions express a multivocality in their mani-
festation of the literary “we.” Their conflicted stance towards concepts 
central to the debate of community—such as commonality, sharedness, 
belonging, attachment, and difference—stands in contrast to the more 
or less stable discursive role of those key terms in the two competing 
visions of community. Is community is like family, kinship, friend-
ship, and village? Or is community like totalitarianism, communism, 
and fascism? The discursive “fate” of concepts such as commonality, 
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belonging, and attachment is already predetermined by the figurative 
analogy employed to describe community. The multivocality of ambiva-
lent communities is also different from the synthesized dialectic repre-
sented by feminist dissenting community or cosmopolitanist corrective 
to community. In contrast to these moderated expressions of dissenting 
community, ambivalent community retains the paradox of community 
as an unresolved challenge.
 Each chapter examines the way the competing pulls of idealized and 
dissenting community manifest themselves through competing models 
for saying “we.” The degree of that competition, and the degree to which 
the final “we” endorses one vision of community over another, informs 
the progression of the chapters that unfold. The first chapter, “What Ails 
the Individual: Community Cure in Toni Morrison’s Jazz and Paradise,” 
begins with the least ambivalent assertion of “we” in Morrison’s use of 
identification. Pointing to the celebrations of Morrison’s community in 
critical scholarship of her work, I suggest that Morrison’s affirmation 
of identification is representative of the idealized community discourse 
dominating contemporary literary criticism. While identification in liter-
ature has been primarily approached psychoanalytically, as expressions 
of primary parent-child identification or of trauma, loss, or melancholia, 
I highlight the centrality of the term in the current debate over commu-
nity. I explore identification as the key process by which commonality 
attains its transformative role as the binding agent of community. Iden-
tification, then, rationalizes the use of the question “How are you like 
me?” as the criterion of community formation. Upon the condition of 
likeness, a subject regards herself to be identical to another and, indeed, 
regards herself to be one with another in experience, feeling, and posi-
tionality. Conversely, as the centripetal force rationalizing the fusing of 
multiple individuals into one subject positioning, identification becomes 
the face of the oppressive single body ideology.
 Like all the writers examined in this study, Morrison engages the 
competing discourses of community, and she explores vastly different 
deployments of identification, from the most benevolent “sisterhood” 
and “family” model of community that directly invokes the discourse of 
idealized community, to the most totalitarian and coercive community 
that manifests all the critiques of dissenting community discourse. How-
ever, what ultimately renders Jazz (1992) and Paradise (1998) the least 
ambivalent assertions of “we” in this study is the degree to which these 
novels ultimately return to and affirm the aspirational models of ideal-
ized community. Furthermore, dissenting community discourse, espe-
cially Lyotard’s theory of the differend, highlights the vision of idealized 
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community and the telos of healing that dominate Morrison’s novels 
and contemporary literary criticism.
 Moving from the strongest endorsement of idealized commu-
nity found in Morrison’s novels, the next two chapters delineate the 
increasing power of dissenting community discourse to unsettle the cen-
tral assumptions and values of idealized community. However, what 
groups these three chapters together is the way that the values of ideal-
ized community, especially the “work” performed by community, ulti-
mately underpin their formations of the first-person plural “we.” The 
second chapter, “‘We Are Not the World’”: Global Community, Uni-
versalism, and Karen Tei Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange,” turns to the 
global “we” as another unstable site of the debate over community. The 
leap from the singular “I” to the plural “we,” in this instance, rests upon 
the ideal of universalism—the condition of absolute inclusiveness that 
encompasses the whole of the world. This chapter engages the recent 
poststructuralist recuperations of universalism, such as those of Ernesto 
Laclau, Étienne Balibar, Judith Butler, and Slavoj Žižek, whose works 
argue a dialectic model of universalism: as a constitutive ingredient in 
any discussion of human rights or progressive politics, yet whose par-
ticular instantiations invariably fall short of an absolute inclusiveness 
vision. Precisely this impossible/necessary dialectic is central to Karen 
Tei Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange (1997). The novel presents a skep-
tical look at the “global village” sentiments that pervade discussions of 
globalization, and it critiques the First World’s deployment of a global 
intimacy and shared fate as the latest rendition of imperialist—that is, 
unidirectional—universalism. In its place, the novel postulates another 
model of global community, a “romantic” universalism that asserts 
the transnational “we” without imperialist dimensions. However, the 
novel’s fantastic representation of this global “we” aesthetically enacts 
the “romantic” dimension of universalism—as a quixotic, imaginary, 
unrealistic, indeed impossible, achievement. The multiple significance of 
the novel’s global community, then, lends a deeper nuance to the incom-
pleteness at the heart of universalism: as an ideal whose impossibility is 
essential to its perennial appeal.
 Chapter 3, “Unlike Any Other: Shoring Up the Human Community 
in Richard Powers’s Galatea 2.2 and Plowing the Dark,” turns to Pow-
ers’s novels of science and technology to examine the role of humanism 
in literary manifestations of the human community. I suggest that Pow-
ers’s ambivalent but ultimately defiant allegiance to humanism is a rich 
instance of the human “we” as an assertion of distinction. These novels’ 
central question, “What is uniquely human?” directly engages the issue 
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of commonality and differentiation at the heart of the community debate. 
As Chantel Mouffe puts it, constructing a “we” necessitates a “they,” a 
“constitutive outside” that makes the “we” possible (12). “The human” 
has never been a stable category, of course, as other categories of being, 
principally “the animal,” have perennially challenged those attributes 
purportedly exclusive to the human. In the late twentieth century, the 
biggest threat to the ontological stability of “the human” comes in the 
form of the intelligent machine, and posthumanist theories highlight 
those sites of fluidity between the machine and the human. I read post-
humanist theories, such as those of Katherine N. Hayles, in light of the 
dissenting community discourse, and argue that humanism’s pursuit of 
human uniqueness engages not only the singleness of the human “we” 
but the singularity—the essence—of the human “we.” Powers severely 
tests his humanist-protagonists of Galatea 2.2 (1995) and Plowing the 
Dark (2000) as they desperately try to maintain precisely this human 
essence that will absolutely demarcate the human from the machine. 
And as posthumanist arguments push the humanist defense to its very 
edge, dismantling its immanentist and essentialist logic, the human “we” 
seems all but defunct. But ultimately, Powers offers a startling response 
to buttress the human community: ineffability as the ultimate common-
ality that enables the human “we.”
 In contrast to the first three chapters, the fourth chapter examines a 
literary “we” in which competing values of community do not find a 
resolution through idealized community. At the same time, this irresolve 
presents a challenge to the dissenting model of “we” as well as to the 
reign of idealized community. “Motion in Stasis: Impossible Community 
in Fictions of Lydia Davis and Lynne Tillman” examines the ideal of 
communion as a rationale for community formation. Befitting a concept 
central to the etymology of community, “communion” describes a spiri-
tual union or meeting of souls, and this meaning continues to inflect the 
prevailing understanding of community as a condition of intersubjective 
continuity and transparency. The fictions of Davis and Tillman interro-
gate this lingering influence of communion. In mundane, everyday set-
tings, their characters feel the dual press of the other’s contiguity as well 
as the other’s opacity. However “close” one is to the other, relationally or 
physically, one cannot “know,” “figure out,” or “see through” the other. 
Indeed, the taunt of transparency remains the most pressing task for the 
prototypical protagonist of these writers. Furthermore, the two writers 
demonstrate the paradox of community in different and complementary 
ways. Davis’s short stories and her novel The End of the Story (1993) 
explore the impossibility of communion through the concept of immea-
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surability. The countless number and ways of knowing the contiguous 
other announce the fact of the other’s opacity. If there are just too many 
ways of knowing the other in Davis’s fiction, the inverse is true in Till-
man’s fiction: there are too few, and they are too predictable. Tillman’s 
Motion Sickness (1991) explores how, at every turn, the protagonist’s 
attempt to know the other falls upon congealed ways of knowing. In this 
task, Tillman applies the concept of recognition under Barthesean pres-
sure and examines the ways in which recognition is a way of knowing by 
repetition. Ultimately, their inevitable failure invokes and dramatizes the 
rejection of communion, amply voiced by dissenting community—but 
with a crucial difference. I suggest that in these instances of ambivalent 
community, the expectation of and the desire for communion as the con-
dition of “we” are not as easily banished as in the discourse of dissenting 
community. Here, “we” becomes an assertion caught between the desire 
for communion and the knowledge of its fundamental impossibility.
 From an examination of community as an incomplete and an impos-
sible project, this book turns to a literary instance in which community 
is understood in the most expansive manner—as the fact of coexistence. 
The final chapter on David Markson examines the most direct represen-
tation of dissenting community model of “we” and stands as a counter-
point to the most idealized model of “we” that began this book. Chapter 
5, “Community as Multi-Party Game: Private Language in David Mark-
son’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress,” studies Markson’s novel, Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress (1988), which engages the paradox of community by asking: 
Can one be absolutely alone? Can there be an “individual” outside “a 
body of individuals”? In one of the most philosophical and formally 
challenging treatments of the question, Markson presents a character 
who believes that she is the only person alive on earth. Most importantly 
for the argument of this book, she experiences her absolute-aloneness 
in antithetical ways: as a source of absolute freedom and as a source of 
absolute indeterminacy. Despite her freedom to do and say anything she 
wants, she spends her life “looking” for others, and her greatest con-
cern is that she will be misunderstood because her language use is less 
than perfectly clear. Her dilemma invites the question: misunderstood 
by whom? Using Wittgenstein’s theory of a private language game, I 
suggest that the protagonist’s failure to play a private language game is 
an enactment of the impossibility of being absolutely alone. Attempts 
at evading a “we” simultaneously invoke the presence of a “we,” and 
community becomes an expression of coexistence. However, in contrast 
to the anti-instrumentalist argument of dissenting community, the “we” 
that emerges in Wittgenstein’s Mistress cannot be an expression empty 
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of all utility or “work.” Like all the other “we” in this study, the “we” 
of coexistence can only be an assertion that serves some purpose or does 
some work.
 This book concludes with that observation: all communities do some-
thing. All manifestations of first-person plural “we” serve a need, answer 
a desire, respond to an anxiety, forestall a fear, or guard against a threat. 
In concluding with the inevitability of community that “works,” this 
book argues the limitations of dissenting community’s anti-instrumen-
talist and anti-teleological view. A community that works is automati-
cally an argument for something, an assertion rather than an expression 
of a given fact. And what these ambivalent communities demonstrate 
is the fact that assertions of community, like every other argument, are 
vulnerable to counterarguments. A Body of Individuals traces how the 
ambivalent community of contemporary fiction manifests community as 
an argument, and an argument that must wear its counterarguments on 
its sleeve.
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paradigmatic pattern of conflict and resolve emerges in Jazz 
(1992) and Paradise (1998). The ills of the individual are healed 
through the ultimate vision of unity—through the formation of 
community in which multiple individuals identify themselves 
as a body of individuals. In Jazz, the violence that begins the narrative 
finds its resolution in the unity of the three protagonists, Joe, Violet, 
and Felice, who form a community like that of a family. In Paradise, 
the persecuted women of the Convent achieve their healing through a 
community like that of a sisterhood. Indeed, this movement of conflict 
to resolution, individual ailment to collective healing, rings throughout 
Morrison’s oeuvre. Some of the most memorable moments in Morrison’s 
novels announce the achievement of precisely this unconditional emo-
tional unity when multiple individuals psychically fuse into one. When 
Nel cries out, “We was girls together,” at the conclusion of Sula (174), 
that declaration obliterates the years of antagonism between herself and 
Sula, returning her to the strongest emotional attachment of her life. 
When the neighborhood women of Beloved come together to ward off 
the ghost bedeviling house 124, they announce a wordless sisterhood in 
the name of protecting their own, Sethe and Denver. These declarations 
reveal something distinct about the particular nature of unity that is 
community: community announces the ultimate fusion of individuals, 
whose unconditional nature is qualitatively distinct from other delibera-
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tive instances of unity such as affiliation, group, or association. Further-
more, the declarations announce something distinct about the function 
of community: community is an ultimate unity that “works” towards 
restoring the health of its members. What these epiphanic moments of 
community reveal is the operation of community as an ideal—a state of 
perfection, a standard proposed for imitation.
 In announcing the fusion of community and the “work” of commu-
nity, Morrison’s novels provide the perfect entryway for studying the 
dominance of idealized community discourse in contemporary fiction 
and criticism. This chapter examines the discourse of idealized com-
munity in Jazz and Paradise, two novels which, more than any other of 
Morrison’s novels, thematically track the movement from individual to 
community formation and from individual ailment to community cure. 
Morrison’s repeated turn to community invites her readers’ engage-
ment with her artistic vision of community. Certainly, it is an invitation 
amply taken up by her readers in the academe and in the general read-
ership, and the larger aim of this chapter is to articulate the discourse 
of idealized community that powerfully informs contemporary discus-
sions of community.1 Studying the theory of community underpinning 
Morrison’s novels, then, is to simultaneously study the way community 
floats as an ideal in contemporary culture, literature, and criticism. It 
is to ask: How does idealized community overcome the paradox at the 
heart of community as a proposition? How can multiple individuals 
become a body of individuals? How does Morrison’s vision of commu-
nity address contemporary concerns, anxieties, and visions of commu-
nity? Ultimately, what is it about Morrison’s vision of community that 
resonates so richly with current thinking of community? What does this 
resonance reveal about the theory of commonality, difference, conflict, 
and antagonism in the discourse of idealized community?
 One quick way of answering these questions might be to argue that 
community, in Morrison’s novels, dramatizes what Raymond Williams 
called the “warmly persuasive” feeling that tends to surround the word 
“community” (76). But this answer is surely insufficient, as it overlooks 
the fact that in Morrison’s novels, many instances of community present 
themselves as problems. After all, it is the racial self-denigration within 
the community of The Bottom that prompts Pecola Breedlove to wish 
for the bluest eyes in the world. It is the community’s rejection of Sethe 
and Baby Suggs for being too “proud” that leads them to silently watch 
the schoolteacher and slave trackers go after Sethe and her children.2 In 
Jazz, the City represents the anonymous, indifferent urban coexistence, 
the backdrop of the violence amongst the protagonists. And in Paradise, 
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Ruby represents the most oppressive and totalitarian formation of an 
all-black town.
 What these instances provoke, then, is a speculation on the troubling 
nature of community in Morrison’s fiction. As the basis for strife, con-
flict, exclusion, and oppression, these instances invite a critical exami-
nation of community as a proposition. Through these instances of 
troubled community, Morrison joins those postmodernist thinkers of 
community, such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, Ernesto Lacau, 
Iris Marion Young, and Jean-François Lyotard, who critique the oppres-
sive homogeneity, the dangers of uniform thinking, and the valorization 
of sameness.3 Most importantly, these thinkers dissent from the ideal-
ized community discourse, locating the oppressive power of community 
in its very status as an ideal. They highlight the ways in which the worst 
instances of historical oppression, coercion, exclusion, and persecution 
have taken place in the name of community. Hence the discourse of 
dissenting community that emerges from these postmodernist thinkers 
offers a profoundly antithetical answer to the paradox of community: 
they argue not only the impossibility of but also the danger inherent in 
idealizing the transformation of multiple individuals into a single body 
of people. Upon the impossibility of a single body community, they pos-
tulate an alternate model of community: a community inaugurated in 
difference, rather than commonality; a community in which conflict, 
antagonism, and dissent are as much central ingredients as are famil-
iarity, conviviality, and consensus; and finally, a community that does 
not promise the fruits of belonging, comfort, and healing. In dissenting 
from the cornerstone of idealized community, these thinkers of dis-
senting community fundamentally negate the very nature and function 
of community as the ultimate expression of unity.
 But there is a crucial difference between Morrison’s and the larger 
postmodernist negation of idealized community, and this difference is 
where I locate the remarkable influence of Morrison’s vision of commu-
nity. In negating the central assumptions, values, and goals of idealized 
community, dissenting community argues the impossibility of commu-
nity as a body of individuals. In contrast, Morrison’s critique of oppres-
sive community leads to an entirely different conclusion: the instances 
of oppressive community stand as instances of misbegotten community, 
whose harmful ramifications illustrate the need for a “healthier” kind of 
community. Rather than announcing the impossibility of community or 
delegitimating community, oppressive communities such as The Bottom 
in Sula and Cincinnati of Beloved, and much more so the City in Jazz 
or Ruby in Paradise, function as cautionary tales; that is, they describe 
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the condition of coexistence that has not yet achieved the idealized com-
munity. As they stand as particular instantiations of an ideal that has no 
bearing upon the legitimacy of the ideal itself, these oppressive instances 
only heighten the need for idealized community. Community as the ulti-
mate unity of a “body of individuals” is not only possible; it becomes 
imperative. Thus the powerful appeal of Morrison’s vision of commu-
nity, I argue in this chapter, lies in its ability to say: the ideal of commu-
nity has not failed us; we have failed the ideal that is community.4
 Exactly this value system upholds the paradigmatic pattern of conflict 
and resolution in Jazz and Paradise. Counterbalancing the oppressive 
instances of community are those memorable moments that represent 
the most intense emotional connection—unconditional, uncalculating 
bonding, sharing, nurturance, support, and healing. The protagonists’ 
achievement of this unity announces their greatest development, and the 
resolution to their conflict is inconceivable outside this achievement. In 
the contrapuntal presentation of two kinds of community, these novels 
offer a resounding answer to the question “Why community?” As the 
ills experienced in one kind of community are healed in another kind 
of community, these novels answer: because the ideal community is the 
ultimate unity that heals the ills of the individual.
 In delineating their answer to the question “Why community?” these 
novels postulate an answer to the question “Just how does one achieve 
the seemingly impossible feat of superseding the paradox of commu-
nity?” Through her formation of the ideal community, Morrison offers 
an unequivocal answer: through a process of identification, when mul-
tiple subjects regard themselves to be like the other based on their com-
monalities. Thus the achievement of community pivots upon a central 
criterion that asks, “How are you like me?” That this question leads 
not only to affirmation of likeness (“You are like me”) but to reciprocal 
appropriation (“You are like my own”) speaks to the centrality of com-
monality in Morrison’s theory of community.
 The “why” and “how” of ideal community formation come together 
to suggest that the ideal community is the final achievement in a long 
line of development. What Morrison’s vision of community suggests, 
then, is that community is teleological. From a condition of coexistence 
that is not yet a community, such as the City of Jazz, or from a false 
vision of community, such as Ruby of Paradise, the prototypical move-
ment of the narrative is towards the fulfillment of the ideal commu-
nity—the sisterhood and family models of community in Jazz, or the 
healing fusion in Paradise. As the plot and character development par-
allels the development of community, what Morrison literally enacts, 
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then, is the teleology of community. Ultimately, this teleological view of 
the community directly resonates with the contemporary discourse of 
idealized community. The ultimate, most perfect incarnation of an idea 
requires a movement towards that destination, not only in the temporal 
sense but in the diachronic sense: the very concept of “the ideal” neces-
sitates teleological thinking.
 Furthermore, a potent appeal of Morrison’s teleology of community 
lies in its ability to simultaneously critique and uphold community as an 
ideal, to invite postmodernist theoretical critique of community articu-
lated by Nancy, Young, Laclau, and Lyotard, while ultimately affirming 
the language and value system of idealized community. As the competing 
discourses of idealized community and dissenting community appear as 
two models of saying “we” and generate ambivalence towards notions 
such as commonality, identification, and fusion, the novels’ conclusions 
announce the prevailing power of the idealized “we.” The unequivocal 
nature of that affirmation, and the seeming inevitability of that embrace, 
are what characterize Morrison’s novels as the least ambivalent instances 
of ideal community in this study.
The Problem of Living with Strangers
Violence begins the narrative in Jazz. An older lover kills the young girl 
who spurned him, and the cheated wife attempts to scar the dead girl’s 
face. Too haunted by her husband’s betrayal and crime, and no less by 
her own attempt to disfigure the dead girl, the wife decides to under-
stand the husband’s and the young girl’s relationship: “So she decided 
to love—well, find out about—the eighteen-year-old whose creamy little 
face she tried to cut open even though nothing would have come out but 
straw” (5). The explication of the violence, in turn, becomes a narrative 
reconstruction of the complex relationships connecting the central pro-
tagonists. In the task of explicating the complex relationships that led 
to violence, the task of explicating the City takes center stage. I propose 
that the characterization of the City, especially its contradictory nature 
as a unity, holds valuable clues to the novel’s—and Morrison’s—ambiv-
alence about community.5
 As the fictional counterpart to Harlem at the turn of the twentieth 
century, the City stands as the place of hope to which the couple, Joe 
and Violet, arrive. The two, like many other Southern blacks in 1906, 
board the colored section of the train heading for Northern cities, and 
the narrator follows their tense, excitement-filled ride. As the narrator 
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relays the couple’s arrival in the City, the singularity of Joe and Violet 
dissipates, and they become a synecdoche of a “million others” who jour-
neyed northward: “They weren’t even there yet and already the City was 
speaking to them. They were dancing. And like a million others . . . they 
stared out the windows for first sight of the City that danced with them, 
proving already how much it loved them. Like a million more they could 
hardly wait to get there and love it back” (32). The particularity of 
Joe and Violet submerge into “[t]he wave of black people running from 
want and violence” (33), into the relief that “it is worth anything to 
be on Lenox Avenue safe from fays and the things they [the Southern 
whites] think up” (10). As the locus of excitement, hope, and possi-
bility, the City stands as the perpetual present, embodying the very hope 
of beginning anew: “That kind of fascination, permanent and out of 
control,” seizes all occupants of the City, and “they feel more like them-
selves, more like the people they always believed they were. Nothing can 
pry them away from that; the City is what they want it to be: thriftless, 
warm, scary and full of amiable strangers” (35; emphasis added).
 It is important to note that careful caveat made in the narration—that 
the view of the City as “warm, scary and full of amiable strangers” is a 
concerted projection made by Joe and Violet and a million others just 
like them. It is a projection that the narrator sometimes shares, echoing 
the excitement of the million who see, in the commonality of their his-
tories and dreams, a potential for a close-knit unity. As the couple settle 
into the City, the narrative traces the variegated corners and expansive 
sites of the City. In the sweeping eye of the narrative, the minutiae that 
constitute the daily lives of urban coexistence translate into intimacy 
and familiarity, and the City becomes a single interdependent unit 
whose members ask, borrow, and lend across the windows and gossip 
on sidewalks, front steps, and streetcars. Indeed, the physical intercon-
nectedness of the City life translates into a social interconnectedness:
Up in those big five-story apartment buildings and the narrow wooden 
houses in between people knock on each other’s doors to see if anything 
is needed or can be had. A piece of soap? A little kerosene? Some fat, 
chicken or pork, to brace the soup one more time? Whose husband is 
getting ready to go see if he can find a shop open? Is there time to add 
turpentine to the list drawn up and handed to him by the wives? (10)
The daily lives within the City represent an intertwined congregation 
of purpose, functions, and needs: “the church, the store, the party, the 
W h A t  A I l s  t h e  I n d I v I d u A l   
women, the men, the postbox (but no high schools), the furniture store, 
street newspaper vendors, the bootleg houses (but no banks), the beauty 
parlors, the barbershops[,] . . . every club, organization, group, order, 
union, society, brotherhood, sisterhood or association imaginable” (10). 
This list of commercial stores, religious organizations, social groups, 
and cultural affiliations extends more than a page, a rendition that 
unmistakably asserts the City as an urban coexistence of cooperation, 
connections, sharing, interdependence, and conviviality. Thus, running 
through the inhabitants’ projection of the City is the idealized discourse 
of community.
 Indeed, the characters’ translation of physical proximity into eco-
nomic, social, and cultural intimacy echoes the celebration of public 
spaces in political philosophy and cultural theory. Best known through 
the Habermasean valorization of urban gathering spaces (e.g., coffee 
shops) for its potential to foster civic discourse, urban geography 
inspires possibilities for urban sociability in political theory and cul-
tural theory. For instance, “The square or piazza is the epitome of open-
mindedness. . . . [I]n the square itself, people meet, walk, talk, buy and 
sell, argue about politics, eat lunch, sit over coffee, wait for something 
to happen. . . . They are different people, with different purposes, edu-
cated by space they share to a civil deportment” (Walzer 323). Likewise, 
the idealized view of the City translates densely shared urban space into 
social interdependence and conviviality.
 However, it would be a mistake to characterize the City of Jazz as 
a direct literary rendition of a Habermasean public sphere. Like the 
numerous critics who argue the shortcomings of theorizing democratic 
communication through the metaphor of urban, public space,6 Mor-
rison destabilizes the idealized view of the City. And it is at this juncture 
that the earlier caveat—that the idealized City is a projection of the 
new arrivals—manifests an unsettling force. In tandem with the ideal-
ized vision of the City is a steady vein of ominous warnings that run 
through the narration of the City. In a departure from the idealized 
projections of the City, which are focalized through excited newcomers 
like Joe and Violet, the cautionary warnings appear as a direct address 
from the narrator: “Nobody says it’s pretty here; nobody says it’s easy 
either. What it is is decisive, and if you pay attention to the street plans, 
all laid out, the City can’t hurt you” (8). In the narrator’s warnings, the 
ominous possibilities of the City do not emerge from a malevolent or ill-
intentioned force; rather, they are expressions of the very condition of a 
large-scale coexistence of strangers: “Do what you please in the City, it 
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is there to back and frame you no matter what you do. And what goes 
on on its blocks and lots and side streets is anything the strong can think 
of and the weak will admire. All you have to do is heed the design—the 
way it’s laid out for you, considerate, mindful of where you want to go 
and what you might need tomorrow” (8–9). Like the inflexibility and 
fixedness of the street plans “all laid out,” the very nature of urban 
coexistence results in an unknowability that stands in contrast to the 
well-wishing of “amiable strangers.”
 Through the narrator’s corrective to the idealized projection of the 
City, Morrison presents a much more complex vision of urban coexis-
tence. In the combination of welcome and threat, of interdependence and 
indifference, the final City resembles the metaphoric city that functions 
as the ideal model of community in postmodernist dissenting commu-
nity. At the heart of the matter is the condition of living with strangers. 
As an amalgam of strangers whose proximity is not reducible to any 
established categories of commonality (of blood, of lineage, of family, 
of religion, of identity), coexistence in the city stands as the ideal trope 
of coexisting in difference in postmodernist philosophy. While the ideal-
ized view of the City projected by people like Joe and Violet neutralizes 
that difference through “amiability,” the narrator’s cautionary warnings 
restore the ability of difference to disturb, to alienate, to threaten, and 
to remain impenetrable. From the idealized version of intimacy, coop-
eration, and conviviality, the postmodernist city postulates an entirely 
different model of community—a theory of community that begins from 
difference, a community in which difference is not an obstacle to assimi-
late or overcome but the very reason for conceiving a new mode of 
unity. Precisely this altered logic of community anchors the trope of the 
city in dissenting community discourse.
 For Young, the condition of living with strangers offers the perfect 
countermodel to the expectation of transparency and intimacy in the 
idealized community discourse. She begins from the “positive experi-
ences of city life to form a vision of the good society,” an “ideal of city 
life” (318):
City life thus also embodies difference as the contrary of the face-to-face 
ideal expressed by most assertions of community. City life is the “being-
together” of strangers. Strangers encounter one another, either face to 
face or through media, often remaining strangers and yet acknowledging 
their contiguity in living and the contributions each makes to the oth-
ers. In such encountering people are not “internally” related . . . and do 
not understand one another from within their own perspective. They 
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are externally related, they experience each other as other, different, 
from different groups, histories, professions, cultures, which they do not 
understand. (318)7
The fact of living with strangers means that one accepts the condition 
of anonymity rather than familiarity, difference rather than similarity, 
unknowability rather than transparency. In the proximity of strangers, 
so to speak, urban coexistence requires the “politics of difference”: 
“The unoppressive city is thus defined as openness to unassimilated 
otherness” (Young 319). Most importantly, the physical density and 
proximity do not translate into amiability as in the idealized community 
discourse. Instead, negating the assumption of intimacy, familiarity, and 
transparency as the criteria of community, the postmodernist ideal city 
suggests a model of dissenting community. Inhabitants of this commu-
nity interact in public spaces, streets, restaurants, parks, but “always to 
go off again as strangers” (Young 319).
 Nancy’s trope of the city also provides a crucial expression of post-
modernist dissenting community. The city is central to Nancy’s illustra-
tion of community as coexistence, a vision that continues the Heideg-
gerian Dasein to theorize community as the “being-in-common”: “The 
city is not primarily ‘community,’ any more than it is primarily ‘public 
space.’ The city is at least as much the bringing to light of being-in-
common as the dis-position (dispersal and disparity) of the community 
represented as founded in interiority or transcendence. It is ‘community’ 
without common origin” (Being Singular Plural 23; original emphasis).8 
In contrast to the shared origin, history, and dreams that rendered the 
collective projection of the idealized City in the eyes of Joe, Violet, and 
a million others like them, Nancy’s community emphasizes the a priori 
condition of being-with as the originary structure of community. Rather 
than a community based on “togetherness”—founded on shared origins, 
commonalities, or sameness—it is a community based on the fact of 
“being-together.” While “togetherness” describes “a substantive entity,” 
“a collection [that] assumes a regrouping that is exterior and indifferent 
to the being-together” (62), “being-together” describes the condition 
of “simultaneity” that is coexistence: “‘Same time/same place’ assumes 
that ‘subjects,’ to call them that, share this space-time, but not in the 
extrinsic sense of ‘sharing’; they must share it between themselves” (60–
61; original emphasis). “The ‘together,’ therefore, is an absolutely origi-
nary structure. . . . The Being is being-with, absolutely, this is what we 
must think” (62). In the simultaneity of coexistence, commonality loses 
all parochial dimension and simply becomes the fact of being-together.
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 In Morrison’s disruption of the idealized City, we might read a Nan-
cian disruption of “togetherness.” While the idealized view of the City 
projects harmony, cooperation, commonality, and conviviality as the 
ultimate proof of the City as a community, the narrator’s correction 
suggests an unknowable, anonymous, and indifferent City—which “will 
confuse you, teach you or break your head” (72). This contradictory jux-
taposition undermines the idealized community discourse that assumes 
the benevolence—the “amiability”—of sharing, belonging, familiarity, 
and easy interdependence. In the unknowable, threatening, and indif-
ferent City, in contrast, we encounter a vision of community that is nei-
ther benevolent nor malevolent. It is simply indifferent inasmuch as it 
is a community without any single characteristic or functionality. The 
unknowable City is simply the observation of “being-together,” the 
acceptance of being-in-common that does not require any “extrinsic 
sense” or substance to justify itself.
 However, there is a crucial difference between Morrison’s and the 
postmodernist dissenting community’s deployment of the indifferent city. 
While the unknowable city serves as a postmodernist disruption of the 
discourse of idealized community, it serves as a problem in Morrison’s 
theory of community. Far from being a desirable condition illustrating 
the politics of difference or of unassimilated otherness, the countless 
unknown and unknowable strangers making up the City translate into 
a looming threat in the protagonists’ lives. While postmodernist valori-
zation of urban heterogeneity and difference must include the potential 
for anonymity, indifference, conflict, and antagonism, in Jazz this poten-
tial becomes the frightening aspect of living with strangers. This threat 
returns us to the violence that began the narrative of Jazz and suggests 
that in Morrison’s larger view of community, the City represents a state 
of unity that is not yet the state of community.
 No character better embodies the fear of the unknowable city than 
the dead girl’s aunt, Alice Manfred. Through Alice’s internal monologue, 
we learn of lives lived against the dangers of strangers who might, at 
any minute, cause harm. The narrative recounts innumerable attacks 
by whites against the newly arrived Southern blacks, two of them being 
Dorcas’s parents who were brutally killed by a white mob in East St. 
Louis, as well as the daily occurrence of male violence against women. 
Little Dorcas, sent to live in the City with her aunt, carries a legacy 
from this violence—a wood chip from her burning house that “must 
have entered her stretched dumb mouth and traveled down her throat 
because it smoked and glowed there still. Dorcas never let it out and 
never put it out” (61). Dorcas becomes a young girl for whom the world 
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is an unremitting place of hostility, an enemy to be met. Dorcas’s vul-
nerability to violence—indeed, all black women’s vulnerability to vio-
lence—becomes the determining principle of Alice’s care. She empha-
sizes female vulnerability to male violence, especially to white male 
sexual violence. She instructs Dorcas to hide her femininity, to cultivate 
a “deafness and blindness” (54), and teaches “her how to crawl along 
the walls of buildings, disappear into doorways[,] . . . how to do any-
thing, move anywhere to avoid a whiteboy over the age of eleven” (55). 
However, Alice’s lessons in abnegation are no match for the City. The 
City’s temptation, always ringed in violence, is epitomized in the form 
of jazz, that “dirty, get-on-down music,” in Alice’s view (58). Just as 
Alice resists jazz, she resists the City—its possibilities, temptations, dan-
gers, and indifference: “Alice Manfred wasn’t the kind to give herself 
reasons to be in the streets. She got through them quick as she could 
to get back to her house” (72–73). Dorcas, in contrast, embraces the 
chaotic energy of the City and begins an affair with Joe that eventually 
ends in her death.
 When Dorcas is killed by Joe, the charming door-to-door salesman 
trusted in all the neighborhood women’s homes, Alice realizes that living 
unobtrusively and taking up as little space as possible are no guaran-
tees of safety. While “living with strangers” might be the ruling meta-
phor for the heterogeneity, the unassimilated difference, and the being-
in-common of the postmodernist dissenting community, it represents, 
for Alice and for Jazz, a severely disturbing condition of coexistence. 
Precisely the lack of commonality, knowability, and familiarity is what 
breeds the potential for violence in the City. In this view, behind the 
unknowability of the City is not amiability or even indifference but vio-
lence. The pervasive possibility of violence obsesses Alice, who becomes 
an avid tracker of violence against women. She scours the newspapers 
for reports: “[A] paper laid bare the bones of some broken woman. Man 
kills wife. Eight accused of rape dismissed. Woman and girl victim of. 
Woman commits suicide. White attackers indicted. Five women caught. 
Woman says man beat. In jealous rage man” (74). The fragmented head-
lines exemplify the ritualized mode of reportage, the announcements of 
killing, beating, maiming, and raping that are eclipsed to fit the space 
of the headline. The mass media’s economy of expression bespeaks the 
sheer triteness, the everydayness, of violence in the City.
 Alice’s view of the City as a failure as community is the basis upon 
which Morrison builds her resolution, translating the unknowable City 
into a problem that her protagonists must solve. That is, Violet’s—and 
the narrative’s—quest to “understand” the violence linking Joe, Dorcas, 
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and Violet directly rests upon the protagonists’ ability to relate to each 
other differently—to form a different model of community. The first 
meeting between Violet and Alice explicitly announces this task. After 
her attempt to deface Dorcas’s corpse, Violet seeks out Alice in her quest 
to understand her husband’s affair and to learn about the young girl at 
the heart of it all. When Alice finally grants Violet an interview, she can’t 
help asking:
“Why did he do such a thing?”
 “Why did she?”
 “Why did you?”
 “I don’t know.” (81)
The rapid-fire questioning of why “he,” “she,” “you,” and “I” com-
mitted violence encapsulates the striking fact that the central cause con-
necting these protagonists is violence. In emphasizing the violence that 
connects the lives of her characters, Morrison translates the unknow-
ability and uncontrollability of the City into a problem of commu-
nity—more specifically, as a deficient state of community. Morrison’s 
presentation of the City as a problem, and her solution to this dilemma 
that follows, directly speak to her teleological thinking of community. If 
“living with strangers” presents an “undeveloped” stage of community, 
the ensuing kinship model of community that emerges from Violet and 
Alice’s friendship points to the fully “developed” model, the final desti-
nation in Morrison’s teleology of community.
what the City wrought, the Family Solves
As Alice and Violet begin to resolve the violence that opened the novel, 
their relationship begins the movement towards a new model of com-
munity. This new model of community not only removes the perpetual 
threat of conflict, antagonism, and violence that had seemed constitu-
tive ingredients of living with strangers; it also supersedes the paradox 
of community and transforms multiple individuals into a single “we.” 
Morrison locates the seed of this new community in the concept of 
identification. Identification in literature has been primarily approached 
psychoanalytically, through a Freudian theory of parent-child primary 
identification or melancholia, or through a Lacanian theory of desire, 
idealization, trauma, or loss. For instance, identification can be under-
stood as the “confusion of self and other, impelled by the (unusually) 
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unconscious desire to be the other” (Wyatt 1); as the unconscious 
replication of parent-child relationality; as the idealization of a figure 
who appears to be complete; or as the expression of “traumatic loss 
and . . . the subject’s tentative attempt to manage this loss” (Fuss 38).9 
Certainly, the psychoanalytic approach to identification is strongly rep-
resented in critical scholarship on Morrison’s novels, given the thematic 
recurrence of trauma, loss, and envy in her work.10
 However, my analysis of identification as the rationale for community 
requires a deviation from prevailing psychoanalytic approaches to Mor-
rison’s novels. First, in studying identification as a largely unconscious 
drive, the psychoanalytic lens has little room for the concept of com-
monality, a concept central to the discourse of idealized community and, 
as I will show, foundational to Morrison’s formation of the final, ideal 
community in Jazz and Paradise. Psychoanalytic studies of desire for the 
other, envy of the other, idealization of the other, or replacement of the 
other do not ask the question central to the formation of community 
in these novels: “How are you like me?” Precisely this question poses 
the criteria of similarity, likeness, and sharing that appear as bridges 
towards idealized community in these novels. Indeed, some psychoana-
lytic studies of identification might be contrary to the concerns of a 
community formed around commonality. For instance, Wyatt’s study of 
community formation in contemporary fiction examines the way “one 
identifies with what one wants to be” (5), and the central expression of 
this envy and idealization is “I want to be you” (1). Rather than asking 
“How are you like me?” this approach to identification may more fit-
tingly ask, “How are you unlike me?”
 Second, psychoanalytic approaches to identification emphasize the 
unidirectional nature of the operation. Identification becomes a largely 
unconscious assimilation of the other; the object of desire, loss, envy, 
or idealization has no say in the process of identification. Thus feminist 
theorists of identification argue “the imperializing character of many 
cross-cultural identifications” (Fuss 8). In her attempt to theorize a 
feminist model of identification that does not eclipse the difference and 
singularity of the other, Wyatt argues: “The trick is to modulate the 
totalizing tendency of id, to put into practice the idea of identifying ‘to a 
degree.’ . . . In rethinking community . . . the emphasis has to remain on 
the cautionary terms—on the ‘potential’ for identification, on a ‘partial’ 
identification with the other” (9). In contrast, identification as the ratio-
nale for community formation is a thoroughly reciprocal process in Jazz 
and Paradise, rendering the appropriation of the other into an entirely 
benevolent act.
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 Precisely this reciprocity informs the benevolent politics of Morri-
son’s idealized community and distinguishes the two novels’ structuring 
of identification from psychoanalytic understandings of it. As protago-
nists reciprocally appropriate each other on the grounds of common-
ality, multiple individuals consider themselves to be one with another. 
The unlikely friendship between Violet and Alice, which becomes the 
foundation for the new community, demonstrates this transformation. 
Over the weeks and months of encounters, the two women’s relationship 
moves from suspicion to tolerance to companionship, until it becomes 
the deepest emotional intimacy that the novel offers. It is through their 
mutual probing that Violet relives a detailed account of her childhood—
her mother who committed suicide after being numerously abandoned 
by her father, her courtship with Joe, their wide-eyed migration to the 
City, and their gradual disappointments and setbacks. Most importantly, 
Violet reveals the cause of the rift between her and Joe: the stillborn 
child early in their marriage, the sudden “mother-hunger” that “hit her 
like a hammer” (108) in her middle age and led her to play “mother” 
with a plastic doll while Joe watched helplessly. Alice, in turn, shares her 
life story—her parents who exhorted her to regard her female body with 
shame, a lesson that she continued in her care of Dorcas. Achieving the 
deepest trust with each other, the two women elicit self-revelations and 
self-assessments that surprise even themselves.
 By offering the most sustaining emotional relationship of the novel 
between the two women, Morrison grounds the basis of their identifica-
tion upon the familiar feminist trope of sisterhood. As the two women 
found their relationship upon the sharing of their life stories, their most 
transformative moments arise when one sees the other as being like her-
self. One such revelation comes amidst a tense eruption. Violet keeps 
dogging a very frustrated Alice about what she should do about her 
marriage and her life:
“We born around the same time, me and you,” said Violet.
 “We women, me and you. Tell me something real. Don’t just say I’m 
grown and ought to know. I’m fifty and I don’t know nothing. What 
about it? Do I stay with him?. . . . Where the grown people? Is it us?”
 “Oh, Mama.” Alice Manfred blurted it out and then covered her 
mouth.
 Violet had the same thought: Mama. Mama? Is this where you got to 
and couldn’t do it no more? (110)
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A sisterhood and a matrilineal model of community emerge from this 
identification on the grounds of gender-specific commonality. Violet’s 
and Alice’s invocation of “Mama” functions as psychic talisman, 
which fuses the two women into one subject position. It is a fusion 
that extends beyond the two women, reaching back to their long-lost 
mothers, to the long line of common experiences, struggles, and despair. 
This transformative work of identification sheds a new light on the key 
moments of epiphany mentioned earlier. When Nel cries out, “we was 
girls together,” at the conclusion of Sula, girlhood functions as the most 
primary truth of all, a truth that awakens Nel to the fact that her rejec-
tion and alienation of Sula are also a rejection and alienation of herself. 
Likewise, when the women of Cincinnati band together to drive out the 
ghost of Beloved from house 124, their wordless fusion supersedes their 
former resentment, betrayal, and alienation of Sethe. In protecting Sethe 
and Denver from Beloved, these women heed the greater imperative of 
sisterhood.
 Furthermore, in emphasizing the simultaneity of the two women’s 
epiphany regarding the lost mother, Morrison renders their identifica-
tion into one of natural and reciprocal appropriation. As Wyatt points 
out, intersubjective identification, however well intentioned, does not 
escape the appropriation of the other’s difference. A subject’s ability 
to say “I am like you” or “I feel your experience” remains an unidi-
rectional claim, one which may be unauthorized and resented by the 
object of the appropriation: “Even the most partial or benign identifica-
tion with the other risks occluding her specificity as a separate subject” 
(170). Precisely this risk of unauthorized appropriation is removed in 
the simultaneity of the two women’s embrace of the lost mother.11
 Furthermore, by emphasizing the commonality in Alice’s and Violet’s 
experience of race, gender, age, racism, sexism, and even in their experi-
ence of violence as the first generation of Southern blacks to migrate to 
Northern urban centers, Morrison presents two subjects whose identifi-
cation need not negotiate material difference. By removing the question 
of material difference in the two women’s subject position, Morrison 
deflects feminist critiques of “uneven” sisterhood—instances of feminist 
unity in which material differences such as race, class, sexuality, and 
other differences in subject positions are too easily swept aside in the 
name of “female commonalities.” By locating the women’s fusion out-
side the realm of difference, Morrison locates the two women’s recip-
rocal appropriation in an apolitical context—a context in which com-
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monality is already “there” and not a matter of selection, negotiation, 
or contestation.12
 Building on the benevolence-of-sisterhood model of community, Mor-
rison extends the healing powers of identification to include Dorcas, 
Joe, and even a substitute “daughter.” The two women’s sisterhood 
wields an unmistakably generative power, as their reciprocal appropria-
tion leads to a wider circle of reciprocal appropriation. Sisterhood thus 
forms the basis for the family model of community that concludes the 
novel. Violet’s greatest moment of healing comes when, with the knowl-
edge of Dorcas’s life garnered from Alice, she comes to think of Dorcas 
as a young girl who could have been her daughter. The daughter that she 
lost in childbirth, she thinks, would have been the same age as Dorcas. 
“Was she [Dorcas] the woman who took her man? Or the daughter who 
fled her womb?” She tells Alice, “‘Another time . . . I would have loved 
her too. Just like you did. Just like Joe’” (109). This moment of substi-
tution certainly invites a psychoanalytic study of identification as the 
replacement for a loss, but this approach alone casts insufficient light 
onto the power of commonality at work here. Violet’s identification of 
Dorcas with her dead daughter rests on the similarities between the two 
girls—of race, sex, and age, and of life experiences as they develop into 
girlhood, adolescence, and adulthood.
 As Violet psychically “conceives” Dorcas through the logic of the 
family, she endows a personhood onto what had been an inimical force. 
Dorcas is no longer a stock figure of a young, amoral temptress, but an 
individual with as much complexity as herself. As Dorcas slips into the 
position of Violet’s daughter, the work of identification moves from the 
model of sisterhood, “How are you like me?” to one of kinship, “How are 
you like my own?” The transformative power of identification attains its 
highest achievement in the family-community that concludes the novel. 
It is fitting that Felice, Dorcas’s best friend and witness to her death, 
enters Joe and Violet’s life at this point. Felice brings with her a vision of 
Dorcas that complicates the dead girl’s character and solves the mystery 
surrounding her death. Felice speaks of Dorcas’s recklessness and self-
destructive tendencies and reveals that Dorcas refused to seek medical 
help after being shot by Joe, a revelation that somewhat lightens Joe’s 
culpability for her death. But Felice’s most crucial role lies in her ability 
to complete the family model of community. Felice becomes a regular 
visitor at the couple’s home, a steady presence at mealtime and during 
idle chats and unplanned confessions. She fulfills the gaping absence of 
the dead daughter that began the couple’s drift apart. In a daisy chain 
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of identification, Dorcas becomes the dead daughter, which prepares the 
ground for Dorcas’s best friend to become the couple’s dead daughter. 
Felice, in turn, comes from a family of distant and inaccessible parents. 
Her mother lives in another city as a maid, and her brief and infrequent 
visits home leave Felice wanting more. Her father is emotionally distant, 
wrapped in tracking and recounting racial injustices. Thus, in Joe and 
Violet, Felice finds ready-made parents. In the final, emblematic scene, 
Felice watches on as Joe and Violet slowly dance around their living 
room. As the third and the final member of this unlikely family, Felice 
is the crucial participant in and witness to their collective healing from 
violence. The narrator reports, in the concluding pages of the novel: “I 
saw the three of them, Felice, Joe, and Violet, and they looked to me like 
a mirror image of Dorcas, Joe, and Violet” (221).
 In this concluding scene, we arrive at the final destination of ideal-
ized community in the novel: the family. Completing the task that began 
with the sisterhood of Alice and Violet, this family model of community 
resolves the paradox of community through the power of identification 
and reciprocal appropriation. Through the criteria of “How are you like 
me?” and “How are you like my own?” multiple individuals become 
a body of individuals. Most importantly, as the seat of reconciliation, 
healing, and hope, this family model of community stands as the answer 
to the problem of the City. From a condition of “living with strangers,” 
we have arrived at a community that is like sisterhood, kinship, and 
family. From the City whose sheer size, heterogeneity, and difference 
presented a physical and metaphysical unknowability for any single 
individual, we have arrived at a community that is entirely familial, inti-
mate, and knowable. Within this tale of community “development,” 
the violence that lurked within the unknowable City is quelled, Violet’s 
quest to “understand” the violence is completed, and individuals are 
healed. Hence the plot development of Jazz parallels its community 
development. Foundational to this literary maneuver is the discourse of 
idealized community, particularly the teleological view of community 
as a pursuit of “natural” unities like that of sisterhood, kinship, and 
family.
 Morrison’s solution of forging a family out of the City, and the atten-
dant celebration of this teleology in the critical scholarship on Jazz, 
prompts a question about the role of the family in the idealized com-
munity discourse. Where, in this family-community, may concepts such 
as heterogeneity, anonymity, indifference, antagonism, and conflict rest? 
In the teleological movement from the City to the family-community, 
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these concepts could only be testimonies of the unknowability and the 
uncontrollability of “living with strangers” that gave rise to violence. In 
forging a family out of the City, then, Morrison suggests that community 
is that unity which protects against the ills of living with strangers. It is 
a teleological view of “progress” shared by the majority of Jazz’s critics, 
as we see above, that demonstrates the dominance of the idealized com-
munity as the site of healing and health. The seemingly natural and self-
evident deployment of commonality and identification prompts a related 
question: what place is there for “difference” in theories of community 
that hold the sisterhood-and-family model as the most aspired destina-
tion? In the final achievement of ideal community in Jazz, the centripetal 
pull of commonality renders surmountable whatever difference existed 
between the central protagonists, however great their conflict. In this 
idealized model of community formation, the pull of commonality leads 
to identification and reciprocal appropriation and, in the final analysis, 
renders difference surmountable.
 Finally, how is this aspirational use of the family distinguishable from 
the exclusionary and discriminatory community formation based on 
race, ethnicity, region, nation, religion, culture, and more? How does 
the valorization of the family-community answer the fact that common-
ality of descent, bloodline, lineage, and household is also the rationale 
for homogeneous sectarianism? After all, the litmus tests for the family 
model of Jazz—“How are you like me?” and “How are you like my 
own?”—is the same litmus test that endorses community formation 
based on blood origins. As Young puts it: “The desire for community 
relies on the same desire for social wholeness and identification that 
underlies racism and ethnic chauvinism on the one hand and sectari-
anism on the other” (302). Any valorization of the family model of 
community, founded on commonality and identification, cannot be com-
pletely extricated from the rationale of “one of us” that founds exclu-
sionary and discriminatory community formations. Certainly for critics 
of idealized community, idealized community’s emphasis on common-
ality and kinship is what ties its theory of community to totalitarianism. 
As Nancy writes, “by thinking of community via a presupposition [of 
commonalities], we get totalitarianism” (Inoperative Community 39).
 Indeed, these are critiques of commonality and identification that 
Morrison directly raises against the town of Ruby in Paradise, the focus 
of the following analysis. Standing as the antithesis of the Convent, the 
novel’s idealized model of community, Ruby dramatizes the worst fears 
about community—a totalitarianism in which the question of identifi-
cation—“How are you like me?”—is the punitive ideology, common-
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ality is coerced, and difference is persecuted and eliminated. These two 
contrasting instances of community reveal the fact that identification, 
in Morrison’s theory of community, can perform antithetical functions. 
As demonstrated through the Convent, and certainly in the sisterhood 
and family-community of Jazz, identification offers the most benevo-
lent and “natural” logic of community formation, but as demonstrated 
through Ruby, it fuels the most xenophobic and oppressive commu-
nity formation. Through the opposing deployments of identification in 
Paradise, Morrison again presents us with two models of saying “we,” 
calling upon the competing discourses of idealized community and dis-
senting community. Through Ruby’s and the Convent’s contrasting logic 
of saying “we,” the novel asks: what ultimately renders identification 
either benevolent or coercive, leading to the ideal community or the 
malformed community?
The Convent as the differend
Ruby is a town whose present is fueled by a veneration of its past. 
Tracking the history of its formation to a few brave ex-slave men who in 
the 1870s trekked from Mississippi, to Louisiana, and finally to Ruby, 
Oklahoma, Ruby’s residents, all of whom are black, repeat the stories of 
their founding like a mantra. Like all foundational myths, these stories 
are anchored by a belief in their exceptionalism. Tales of the “founding 
families” recount their courage in the face of unending persecution, 
hardship, and heavenly guidance along the way. As scholarship on Para-
dise has well explored, the town of Ruby stands as the most oppressive 
and coercive instance of totalitarianism.13
 Ruby complements its sense of exceptionalism with a fierce xeno-
phobia. Although it sits in splendid isolation, with no nearby towns 
for hundreds of miles, it is a town that never forgets the hostility and 
danger posed by the world-out-there. Ruby’s endangered sense of 
unity translates into xenophobia, as the town boasts of its inhospi-
tality towards outsiders and visitors. Its public spaces are specifically 
designed to dissuade passers-by from lingering—there are no hotels, 
restaurants, parks, or resting places. Conversely, Ruby’s fierce guarding 
of its boundaries is accompanied by an equally fierce enforcement of a 
single identity. Emphasizing the singularity of origin, movement, and 
ultimately of will, Ruby demands that the many become one, that its 
residents adhere to a commonality of purpose, history, and values. Just 
as they see the formation of their community as written on the logic of 
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commonality, failure of community rests in the dissipation of common-
ality, the rationale that later supports their destruction of the Convent. 
Hence, in Ruby’s hands, identification becomes the most coercive tool 
of oppression, as the question “How are you like me?” becomes the 
most ominous dictum.
 Diverging from the playful, multivocal narrator of Jazz, Para-
dise exhibits the absolute authority of an omniscient narrator who 
unequivocally criticizes what Ruby represents. In no uncertain terms, 
Morrison voices her criticism through select characters. The majority 
of these mouthpieces are women (e.g., Soame, Patricia Storace, Lone), 
a gender-specific criticism that bespeaks the patriarchal rule and the 
ensuing gender fissure in Ruby. However, the character who sustains the 
greatest critical power and exercises the most moral authority is Richard 
Misner.14 His authority is no less derived from his religious position (wit-
ness other Ruby ministers who squabble no less enthusiastically as the 
townspeople) as from his outsider status as a nondescendant of Ruby. 
Misner observes:
Over and over and with the least provocation, they pulled from their 
stock of stories tales about the old folks, their grands and great-grands; 
their fathers and mothers. Dangerous confrontations, clever maneuvers. 
Testimonies to endurance, wit, skill and strength. Tales of luck and out-
rage. But why were there no stories to tell of themselves? About their 
own lives they shut up. Had nothing to say, pass on. As though past hero-
ism was enough of a future to live by. As though, rather than children, 
they wanted duplicates. (161)
 Into this totalitarian regime walks a truly bewildering phenomenon—
a haphazard gathering of four women who settle into a former convent 
at the edge of town. Women of different race, age, economic status, and 
geographical origin wander through its doors, women fleeing domestic 
or familial situations they find intolerable, and women who decided that 
they do not want to do what is expected of them. As the narrative alter-
nates between Ruby and the Convent, Morrison revives the key values 
of idealized community formation. While Ruby’s model of commu-
nity requires the unremitting patrolling of its borders, the free-forming 
nature of the Convent is entirely voluntary. That the members choose 
each other and determine the nature of their relationality, and that this 
collectivity is ultimately beneficial and healing, directly continue the ide-
alized community discourse. Regulation, too, is formless; unlike Ruby’s 
fiercely central and hierarchical organization, the Convent women deal 
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with conflict through a face-to-face intimacy: they fight easily and rec-
oncile easily. Ultimately, the Convent represents the most supportive, 
nurturing, accepting, and welcoming unity: the idealized community. As 
one Ruby woman describes it: “They’ll take care of you or leave you 
alone—whichever way you want it” (176).
 Notably, Morrison’s greatest denunciation of Ruby comes not through 
any mouthpiece but through the town’s maniacally inflexible ideology of 
commonality. Ruby’s failure as community emerges through its inability 
to acknowledge the Convent’s extreme difference in any terms other 
than an aberration from itself. That is, Morrison powerfully locates 
Ruby’s failure as a community in its severely limited language use. In 
order to theorize the political implications of Morrison’s turn to lan-
guage use, let me call up Lyotard’s theory of the differend. In Lyotard’s 
anti-instrumentalist view of language, language is not a transmission or 
an exchange of preexisting blocks of “meaning,” but a linguistic mani-
festation of the uneven nature of coexistence. As inequities in human 
coexistence inhere in language, the inequities are manifest in the very 
practice and possibility of language use. “The [phrase] is not a message 
passing from an addresser to an addressee both of whom are indepen-
dent of it. They are situated in the universe the phrase represents, as are 
its referent and its sense” (The Differend 18).15 Likewise, Morrison’s 
denunciation of Ruby’s language use is simultaneously a denunciation 
of the “universe” that Ruby represents.
 Using the analogy of legal contestation as his central metaphor, 
Lyotard defines the differend as the inequitable and irreconcilable con-
testation of “idioms.” “I would like to call differend the case wherein the 
plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes on that account 
a victim. . . . A case of differend between two parties takes place when 
the ‘regulation’ of the conflict which opposes them is done in the idiom 
of one of the parties while the injustice suffered by the other is not signi-
fied in that idiom” (12). A classic example of the differend is the Holo-
caust victim who cannot deliver the truth of his victimhood within the 
established mode of “reality” set by his questioners. In the face of those 
who ask for “proof” of Holocaust victimhood, and who without fail dis-
pute the legitimacy of that “proof,” the victim is made doubly a victim: 
the victim is at once a plaintiff (13). “An injustice would be an injury 
accompanied by the loss of the means to prove the injury. This is the case 
if . . . the phrasing of the testimony is itself deprived of authority” (7).
 Another key example of the differend is the case of a worker who 
cannot participate in the capitalist marketplace except by phrasing his 
work within the rules of the capitalist idiom. In order to be visible and to 
c h A p t e r  1 
participate in the economic system, the worker is forced to see his own 
work as alienated labor, as units of commodity or service: “Without 
recourse to this idiom, the worker does not exist within its field of dis-
course” (2).
By what well-formed phrase and by means of what establishment pro-
cedure can the laborer affirm before the labor arbitrator that what he 
yields to his boss . . . in exchange for a salary is not a commodity? . . . If 
the worker evokes his essence (labor-power), he cannot be heard by this 
tribunal; it is not competent. The differend is signaled by this impossibil-
ity to prove. (13; original emphasis)
As the irreconcilable contestation of idioms reflects the material and 
discursive discrepancy running through coexistence, the presence of the 
differend breaks the illusion of unity, solidarity, and oneness in the ideal-
ization of community. By exploring the fissures that render a single body 
community impossible, Lyotard calls attention to the ways in which 
the pursuit of oneness necessitates the repression of material realities 
not consonant with the dominant version. Likewise, the challenge to 
“phrase” the Convent becomes the litmus test for Ruby’s very status as 
a community. What can Ruby “say” about a community that is entirely 
different from itself? What do Ruby’s idioms and phrasings—its lan-
guage use—reveal about its very nature as a community? That it cannot 
“say” anything about the Convent except that it is an aberration in 
itself reveals its deficiency as a community. It also reveals the differend 
at work between Ruby and the Convent.
 The free-formed, free-wheeling Convent, when phrased in Ruby’s 
idiom of community, predictably becomes the repository of all that the 
town reviles and fears. Here is an instance of Ruby’s phrasing, focalized 
through Reverend Pulliam, one of the leading men of the town. When 
the Convent women appear in Ruby for a wedding, Reverend Pulliam 
observes:
He knew about such women. Like children, always on the lookout for 
fun, devoted to it but always needing a break in order to have it. A life, 
a hand, a five-dollar bill. Somebody to excuse or coddle them. Some-
body to look down at the ground and say nothing when they disturb the 
peace. . . . [F]un-obsessed adults were clear signs of already advanced 
decay. Soon the whole country would be awash in toys, tone-deaf from 
raucous music and hollow laughter. But not here. Not in Ruby. Not while 
Senior Pulliam was alive. (157)
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The Convent, when phrased through this representative patriarch of 
Ruby, is a den of debauchery, where unthinkable sins like lesbianism, 
prostitution, and abortion abound. Its members are untethered women, 
without men, without children, and without patriarchy to claim them. 
The women’s mysterious pasts and vagabond lifestyles hint at crimi-
nality. Their absence at Ruby’s churches proves their godlessness; and 
when they do appear in town, as they do at the wedding, their manner 
of dress and their conduct signal their looseness. In Ruby’s field of dis-
course, then, the Convent can be phrased only as one thing—“a coven” 
(276). Like the Jewish plaintiff or the laborer in Lyotard’s example, 
Ruby’s phrasing of the Convent reveals the presence of the differend. 
The Convent’s nature and reality are predetermined by the limited pos-
sibilities set forth by the value system of Ruby’s totalitarian ideology. 
In Ruby’s deployment of the familiar question “How are you like me?” 
Morrison delineates the most egregious and harmful deployment of 
identification. The crux of the matter is that Ruby’s inability to identify 
with the Convent along the lines of commonality results in its categor-
ical condemnation of the Convent.
 In one rich exemplification of the differend at work, Morrison pres-
ents two phrasings of a scene involving the Convent women. The first is 
phrased in the idiom of Ruby, the second in the idiom of the Convent. 
As the Convent women drive away from the Ruby wedding, Mavis and 
Gigi, two women who have the most antagonistic relationship in the 
Convent, begin fighting by the side of the road. As Gigi and Mavis are 
fighting, two other women sitting in the car comfort each other: “Pellas 
turned away from the fighting-women scene and lifted her arm to circle 
Seneca’s neck and press her face deeper into that tiny bosom.” A Ruby 
resident drives by, a truck driver, and “he stayed long enough to see 
outlaw women rolling on the ground, dresses torn, secret flesh on dis-
play. And see also two other women embracing in the back seat. For 
long moments his eyes were wide” (169). Focalized through the truck 
driver, emblematic of Ruby’s patriarchal and masculinist idiom, the fight 
scene functions as evidence of the Convent’s uncivilized, inhuman throes. 
The embrace scene is evidence of lesbianism, yet another instance of 
the Convent’s debauchery and immorality. Like the Holocaust victim’s 
repeated failure to satisfy his doubters, or the laborer’s phrasing of his 
labor into capitalist units, Ruby’s idiom of community fundamentally 
denies the authority of the Convent’s different value systems, and the 
Convent can be phrased only in terms of negation. “The differend is the 
unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must 
be able to be put in phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence, 
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which is a negative phrase, but it also calls upon phrases which are in 
principle possible” (22). The impossibility of phrasing the other’s reality 
is symptomatic of one idiom’s inability to accommodate, understand, or 
entertain the difference of the other.
 The Convent’s phrasing of the same fight scene could not be more 
different. It is focalized through Seneca, one of the women sitting in the 
car: “Once upon a time she would try to separate them, but now she 
knew better. When they were exhausted they’d stop, and peace would 
reign longer than if she interfered. . . . Gigi was scrappy but vain—she 
didn’t want bruises or scratches to mar her lovely face and she worried 
constantly about her hair. Mavis was slow but a steady, joyful hitter” 
(168). In the Convent’s phrasing of the scene, the fight entirely lacks the 
uncontrolled violence and aberrant sexuality that the Ruby man reads. 
However vehemently the women punch and scratch each other—even 
burning the other with a lighted cigarette—the women fight so predict-
ably that the violence lacks any teeth. Most importantly, this phrasing 
by the Convent is one that the omniscient narrator confirms. As Seneca’s 
phrasing hinted, the reconciliation of the two women is as predictable as 
the fight. Later that night, all the Convent women gather over a feast of 
eating, drinking, and dancing: “The fear, the bickering, the nausea, the 
awful dirt fight, the tears in the dark—all of the day’s unruly drama dis-
sipated in the pleasure of chewing food” (179). Like a necessary release 
of steam, the instance of violence between the two women enhances the 
continued peace and strength of the Convent as a community. The dis-
crepancy between the Ruby man’s phrasing and what we readers, along 
with the omniscient narrator, understand to be yet another ritualized 
squabble between the two women highlights the irreconcilable idiom 
between the two communities. This moment results in a dramatic irony 
that alerts the reader to the inadequacy—the incorrectness—of Ruby’s 
phrasing of the Convent.
 What we encounter repeatedly, then, is this corrective endeavor on 
the part of the omniscient narrator. Indeed, that the Convent is not what 
Ruby takes it to be is repeatedly voiced by authorially endorsed mouth-
pieces such as Soame, Lone, Billie Day, and Reverend Misner. Through 
the juxtaposition of Ruby’s idiom with that of the Convent, Morrison 
consistently demonstrates the falsity of Ruby’s idiom and thereby the 
falsity of its ideology of community. Morrison’s corrective endeavors 
take up Lyotard’s call to “give the differend its due,” to phrase what is 
hitherto unphraseable within the dominant discourse: “To give the dif-
ferend its due is to institute new addressees, new addressers, new signifi-
cations, and new referents in order that the injustice find an expression 
W h A t  A I l s  t h e  I n d I v I d u A l   
and that the plaintiff ceases to be a victim. This requires new rules for 
the formation and linking of phrases. . . . Every injustice must be able 
to be phrased” (21). Ruby’s destruction of the Convent, then, becomes 
the ultimate testimony of the differend in the two competing models 
of community. The day comes when Ruby’s leading men gather in the 
dark of night and shoot their way through the Convent. The narra-
tion of the attack is phrased in the idiom of Ruby: “[T]he target, after 
all, is detritus: throwaway people that sometimes blow back into the 
room after being swept out the door. So the venom is manageable now. 
Shooting the first woman (the white one) has clarified it like butter: the 
pure oil of hatred on top, its hardness stabilized below” (4). And with 
“God at their side, the men take aim. For Ruby” (18). That Ruby ulti-
mately destroys what evades its ideology of commonality becomes the 
most damning fact about its idiom of community.
 It is a criticism that Morrison presses home. As the final condemna-
tion of Ruby’s idiom of community, Morrison presents the disintegra-
tion of the town’s ideology of commonality. The men’s atrocities shake 
the town, and the residents turn on its leading men. These men, who had 
occupied the inner sanctum of Ruby’s patriarchy as descendants of the 
founders, turn against each other as they try “to make themselves look 
good”: “[E]very one of the assaulting men had a different tale and their 
families and friends . . . supported them, enhancing, recasting, inventing 
misinformation” (297). As a seismic quake spreads throughout Ruby, 
its “bewildered, angry, sad, frightened people” ask themselves: “[H]ow 
could so clean and blessed a mission devour itself and become the world 
they had escaped?” (292). In the awakening of Ruby as a community, 
the Convent’s destruction performs the typological role of the innocent’s 
sacrifice, as its destruction serves to shock the perpetrators into repen-
tance. The transformation to Ruby’s idiom of community is announced 
by Misner, who decides he will stay in Ruby, “because there was no 
better battle to fight, no better place to be than among these outra-
geously beautiful, flawed and proud people” (306).
Idiom of Collective healing
A possible conclusion to be drawn at this point is that Morrison’s cor-
rective phrasing of the Convent expands the very idiom of community, 
a task that falls in line with what Lyotard sees as an aim of literature: 
“What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, 
is to bear witness to differends by finding new idioms for them” (22). 
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A question surfaces, though, as we consider the nature of Morrison’s 
correction. The ultimate evidence of Ruby’s deficiency as a community 
was its inability to phrase the Convent in any way other than as an aber-
ration and a contaminant. And Morrison’s corrective endeavors, focal-
ized through the authorially endorsed characters, gave direct refutation 
of that phrasing. In basing her condemnation of Ruby as a commu-
nity directly upon its incorrectness in phrasing the Convent, Morrison’s 
strategy in Paradise invites troubling questions: If the Convent were 
indeed a “coven,” would Ruby’s idiom of community be less condem-
nable? If lesbianism, abortion, prostitution, witchcraft, and other acts 
abhorred by Ruby residents took place at the Convent, would Ruby’s 
idiom of community be vindicated? Ultimately, would Ruby’s correct-
ness in phrasing the Convent justify its ideology of commonality? If the 
Convent were all that Ruby envisioned, would Ruby’s totalitarian idiom 
of community be authorized in the novel?
 Certainly, I am not arguing that the Convent should have been 
constructed as a “coven” in the way Ruby residents viewed it; such a 
reading would be a fruitless critique of the novel for not being some-
thing else. What I am arguing is that within the authorial idiom of the 
novel, there are certain things the Convent cannot be. The Convent 
cannot be a body of individuals united around the commonalities of 
witchcraft, lesbianism, prostitution, abortion, inhuman fighting, mind-
less debauchery, and chaotic living. As Paradise directly aligns the incor-
rectness of Ruby’s phrasing with the deficiency of its logic of community, 
the novel’s own idiom of community is severely limited in its potential: 
the Convent must be a community whose reality refutes Ruby’s phrasing 
of it. Far from being a den of immoral debauchery, the Convent, we 
find out, is a community of unconditional emotional bonding and spiri-
tual healing. Echoing the “sisterhood” of women who form an uncon-
ditional emotional unity in many of Morrison’s novels, all four women 
of the Convent, under the guidance of Connie, become a single body of 
individuals in their collective movement towards emotional purification 
and healing.
 As the Convent’s correct phrasing must necessarily negate Ruby’s 
phrasing, its univocality reveals its limitations in expanding the idiom 
of community. For Lyotard, we remember, the “task of a literature” is 
to “find new idioms” for realities that are hitherto incapable of being 
phrased. However, rather than instituting “new addressers, new signifi-
cations, and new referents” of community (Lyotard 21), Morrison’s cor-
rective phrasing of the Convent directly invokes the prevailing discourse 
of idealized community: community as a body of individuals bound by 
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commonalities, whose final destination is the aspirational model of kin-
ship that will deliver health and healing. The differend of the Convent, 
hence, is caught between the incorrect phrasing by Ruby and the neces-
sarily correct, and corrective, phrasing by Morrison’s own idiom. As the 
corrective phrasing becomes the overruling idiom of phrasing the Con-
vent, the authorial idiom cannot escape the deficiency that mars Ruby’s 
idiom of community: both idioms of community fail to institute new 
significations and new referents in phrasing the Convent. This limitation 
articulates not only Morrison’s own univocal idiom of community but 
also the univocal, curtailed idiom of community that is the discourse of 
idealized community.
 With this critique in mind, let me offer the possibility of a third 
phrasing of the Convent. Let me emphasize that I am not offering my 
own corrective to counter Ruby’s or Morrison’s phrasing of the Con-
vent, but that I am bringing to light a third idiom of community that 
becomes consistently silenced in the novel. One of the most interesting 
moments in Morrison’s phrasing of the Convent comes near the end, in 
a chapter devoted to Connie. Connie is the figurehead and the heart-
beat of the Convent, whose undemanding and all-encompassing wel-
come invites tearful confessions and emotional release for the women 
who walk through the Convent’s door. As the nexus of the Convent’s 
borderless, voluntary model of community, Connie is the very heart of 
the Convent’s benevolent nature. The Convent as the epitome of ideal-
ized community, however, is severely threatened in Connie’s chapter. We 
encounter a Connie who spends her days in the tiny basement cell of the 
Convent, drinking herself into a stupor, regarding the Convent women 
with disgust and impatience: “[T]he timbre of each of their voices told 
the same tale: disorder, deception and . . . drift. The three d’s that paved 
the road to perdition, and the greatest of these was drift” (221). When 
she’s drinking, she can “tolerate them,” “but more and more she wanted 
to snap their necks. Anything to stop the badly cooked indigestible food, 
the greedy hammering music, the fights, the raucous empty laughter, the 
claims. But especially the drift” (222).
 Connie’s idiom in phrasing the Convent is shocking, as it assaults the 
authorial privileging and idealization of this community. Her condem-
nation of the Convent’s purposeless nature as the ultimate depravity, in 
fact, recalls Ruby’s idiom of community against the “drifting” women of 
the Convent. This startling turn suggests a third possibility of phrasing 
the Convent, one whose idiom is not predetermined by the incorrect 
phrasing by Ruby and the attendant corrective phrasing by the narra-
tive. In Connie’s unexpected idiom, then, Morrison has a real opportu-
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nity to phrase the Convent’s differend without delimiting the possibili-
ties of what is possible to say. For instance, the women of the convent 
could indeed be ruled by “disorder, deception, and drift,” as Connie 
phrases them. In direct divergence from the core values of idealized 
community discourse, they may be a community of women who share 
no commonality of values, visions, or interests, who are not bound by 
consensus of vision, whose lives are rife with fights, antagonism, and 
dissent, and whose heterogeneity and difference lead to no single unity. 
That is, by following Connie’s phrasing, we could locate the idiom of 
dissenting community running through the phrasing of the Convent. My 
point here is not that the Convent ought to exemplify the discourse of 
dissenting community, but that an openness to such idioms, an open-
ness that Connie’s original phrasing suggested, would have successfully 
offered “new rules for the formation and linking of phrases” (Lyotard 
21) in the idiom of community.
 Instead, this exciting third possibility quickly reverts to the correc-
tive phrasing of the idealized community discourse, particularly to the 
teleology of community as the movement towards healing. Connie 
emerges from her fulminating dissatisfaction one night and, with a 
sumptuous feast to mark the beginning, leads the women in a series of 
rituals designed to fuse them into a single body of purpose: “[S]he told 
them of a place where white sidewalks met the sea and fish the color of 
plums swam alongside children. She spoke of fruit that tasted the way 
sapphires look and boys using rubies for dice. Of scented cathedrals 
made of gold” (263). The women live and think as one, shave their 
heads, and draw their outlines as “templates” on the cellar floor (263). 
Under Connie’s direction, they lie naked on the cellar floor, conducting 
“loud dreaming,” calling out their respective life stories. As they do, 
they enter an intersubjective transference: “How the stories rose in that 
place. Half-tales and the never-dreamed escaped from their lips to soar 
high above the guttering candles, shifting dust from crates and bottles. 
And it was never important to know who said the dream or whether 
it had meaning[;] . . . they step easily into the dreamer’s tale” (264). 
The women as one begin to develop “a markedly different look” (265), 
“an adult manner” (266). A visitor to the Convent might observe the 
change—“how calmly themselves they seemed”—but wouldn’t be able 
to name “exactly what was absent.” Only later, the narrative continues, 
would this visitor realize that “unlike some people in Ruby, the Convent 
women were no longer haunted” (266).
 Whatever heterogeneity and conflict existed amongst the women of 
the Convent, then, dissipate in the greater force of the commonality that 
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binds them: the single aim towards the telos of healing. Relatedly, as in 
the epiphanic moments of identification among women in other Mor-
rison novels when multiple, disparate women arrive at “sisterhood,” the 
Convent women’s common aim towards healing functions as an apolit-
ical concept, outside the realm of power struggles, the need for individual 
negotiations, or even verbal acknowledgment. In the overwhelming 
power of commonality, then, identification as reciprocal appropriation 
reaches its zenith. Beyond unconditional emotional bonding, the women 
literally become one subject, an ontological transformation that the nar-
rative endorses in its representation of the healing process. Once the 
collective rituals begin, the narrative no longer distinguishes between 
the disparate women. The multiple individuals become a single body, 
identified only as a “they” or as “Convent women.”
 The women’s healing completes Morrison’s phrasing of idealized 
community: what the women could not achieve individually they 
achieve in collectivity. Through the teleological thinking of community 
as the movement towards progress, Morrison domesticates the strange-
ness of the women’s actions to one collective, spiritual healing. When 
the Ruby men storm the Convent and see the “templates” on the cellar 
floor, they see “pornography” and “Satan’s scrawl” (303). In a move 
that recalls the contrasting phrasing of the Convent women’s fight scene, 
this misreading by the Ruby men is soon corrected by the characters 
sympathetic to the Convent. When Minister Misner and his fiancée view 
the same templates, they see “the turbulence of females trying to bridle, 
without being trampled, the monsters that slavered them” (303). This 
idiom of healing, voiced by the chosen characters, directly continues 
Morrison’s own views. As she explains in an interview: “It is interesting 
and important to me that once the women [of the Convent] are coherent 
and strong and clean in their interior lives, they feel saved” (qtd. in 
Marcus n.p.).
 Indeed, this teleological view of healing as the final destination of 
community dominates the scholarship on Paradise: “[T]he Convent 
in Paradise is a site for female reconstitution, both spiritual and com-
munal” (Davidson 372). “The story of the Convent . . . [moves] from 
chaotic fragmentation to a liberating fusion . . . [towards] individual and 
communal harmony” (Page, “Furrowing All the Brows” 645). “[T]he 
women undergo a collective healing ritual[,]. . . a paradisical moment 
to the Convent women” (Dalsgard 244–45). “Paradise explores coali-
tion processes that are more accommodative, caring, and loving[,] . . . 
reach[ing] toward a new, alternative, non-hierarchical sense of justice 
that emphasizes both equality and nurturing” (Michael 644). “The 
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women of the Convent do not need men to heal themselves” (Kearly 
12). “The more accepting, inclusive spirituality that Consolata advo-
cates helps these women to overcome their own personal traumas and 
to create a more nurturing, healing community not based on the divi-
sions and exclusions of Ruby” (Romero 418). The critical appraisals 
of the Convent’s triumphant healing certainly affirm Morrison’s correc-
tive idiom of community. It follows, too, that they affirm the idiom of 
health over the third idiom of community that could not be phrased in 
the novel—the disorderly, antagonistic Convent hinted by Connie—that 
might have taken place between the incorrect (Ruby’s) phrasing and the 
corrective (omniscient narrator’s) phrasing.
 The continuity between Morrison’s views of community, those of 
chosen characters, and those reflected in critical scholarship on the 
novel testify to the dominance of idealized community in contempo-
rary critical discussion. Furthermore, this direct continuity in the value 
system demonstrates the univocality in the discourse of community 
in contemporary literary discussions. At the center of this univocality 
is the apolitical use of commonality to fuse multiple individuals into 
one subject position; the use of kinship models (family, sisterhood) 
as aspirational models of community; and the teleological thinking 
of community as a collective movement towards “progress,” such as 
strength, healing, and health. As in Jazz, in which the violence of the 
City is solved in the community of family, the damage suffered by the 
individual is healed in the community of sisterhood. To the paradox 
of community, then, Morrison offers an unequivocal answer: mul-
tiple individuals become a body of individuals through the benevolent 
power of identification as reciprocal appropriation.
 In concluding with a resolute embrace of “a body of individuals,” 
Morrison clarifies her ambivalence about identification. The central 
conflict of Paradise, we remember, rested upon the two vastly different 
deployments of identification that produced antithetical models of com-
munity: the malformed community of Ruby and the ideal community 
of the Convent. Thus, Morrison’s condemnation of Ruby reveals itself 
to be a condemnation not of identification per se but of the misuse of 
an ideal. And herein lies the difference between Morrison’s suspicion of 
identification and those expressed by dissenting community discourse. 
The negation of commonality and identification by dissenting commu-
nity discourse is not targeting misused instances of “How are you like 
me?” but the very politics of the question, seeing, in the question, the 
seed for homogeneity, regulation, sameness, exclusion, oppression, and, 
ultimately, totalitarianism. In contrast, the cautionary tale inherent in 
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Ruby’s misuse of identification speaks to the essentially benevolent poli-
tics of identification in Morrison’s vision of community. The continuity 
in values between Morrison, her chosen characters, and the critical 
scholarship on Paradise speaks to the fact that in the discourse of ideal-
ized community, there is no such thing as bad identification; there are 
only bad uses of identification.
 This idealization of identification, especially in the name of healing, 
raises some disquieting questions not only for Paradise but also for the 
larger discourse of idealized community dominant in literary criticism. 
If collective healing is the final aim of community, what happens to 
those factors that do not directly contribute to this teleology? In con-
crete terms, what happens to those members whose beliefs and prac-
tices are deemed nonconducive or antithetical to the task of healing? 
Do they become unspeakable, like the differend? And how is the nature 
of healing determined? What constitutes “healing”? Unless there is a 
consensus on the definition of “healing,” the collective drive towards 
that condition can be indistinguishable from any other drive towards 
homogeneity, from any other demand for commonality.
 Ultimately, the novel’s inability to phrase the vast, unassimilable 
difference of the Convent may be transposed onto the scene of con-
temporary fiction criticism itself. Can contemporary literary criticism 
phrase a community that is other than an ultimate bonding based upon 
commonalities and identification, leading to unconditional emotional 
attachment, connection, and belonging, leading to the collective health 
of all? Can criticism “read” community in instances when the literary 
“we” is forged through means other than commonality, identification, 
and health? Or are those instances evaluated as examples of unity that 
fall short of the criteria of community and that are therefore not read as 
literary instances of community?
 What I am speaking to is the self-fulfilling operation of idealized com-
munity discourse in contemporary fiction and criticism. In a tautological 
move, idealized community (family or sisterhood) such as those found in 
Morrison’s novels stand as the bedrock instance of “real” community; 
simultaneously, the critical embrace of that idealized community further 
confirms, and strengthens, the leading idiom of community. Omitted 
from this equation are those literary instances of the first-person plural 
“we” that do not resemble the criteria of idealized community. The fol-
lowing chapters address precisely this lacuna in the literary criticism 
of community by reading ambivalent communities in contemporary fic-
tion.
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n Karen Tei Yamashita’s political realist-fantastic novel, Tropic of 
Orange (1997), Third World labor confronts First World industry in 
a professional wrestling match. The champion of the Third World is 
a five-hundred-year old messianic man called Arcangel, who fights 
under the name of El Gran Mojado (colloquially translated, “The Great 
Wetback”). The champion of the First World is NAFTA, alternately 
called “SUPERNAFTA” or “SUPERSCUMNAFTA.” The representatives of 
the two hemispheres face each other in a Los Angeles stadium, amid all 
the pomp and screaming splendor of a televised pro-wrestling match. As 
the champions strut around the ring in the prematch show of self-pro-
motion, Arcangel declares:
I do not defend my title for the
rainbow of children of the world.
This is not a benefit for UNESCO.
We are not the world.
This is not a rock concert. (259)
 When Arcangel mocks the popular slogans with which the First 
World describes a global community, he expands his challenge beyond 
his immediate opponent, the economic and political policies of NAFTA. 
He denounces the very notion of a collective, singular subject position 
I
“we Are not the world”
Global Community, Universalism, and 
Karen Tei yamashita’s Tropic of Orange
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that stands as the “we” in “We Are the World.” Sung by the biggest 
American pop stars of the mid-1980s who called themselves “Band 
Aid,” “We Are the World: U.S.A. for Africa” was a worldwide phe-
nomenon in 1985, and the title came to function as a popular slogan for 
envisioning the globe as a single community. The best-known encapsu-
lation of the global “we” is, of course, the concept of the “global vil-
lage.” Since Marshall McLuhan famously used the term in the 1960s to 
foreshadow a new world order, one in which the medium of electronic 
communications diminishes, and overcomes, the physical and temporal 
distance that separates the world’s inhabitants, “global village” has been 
the dominant term for expressing a global commonality that results 
from transnational commerce, migration, and culture. More impor-
tantly, the celebration of global village translates that altered material 
condition into a hitherto unrealized condition of proximity, intimacy, 
and, ultimately, fusion. The magic of global village, then, overcomes the 
paradox of community: it transforms innumerable individuals into a 
single body of individuals.
 Arcangel’s critique of this global village community must be under-
stood in light of the unmistakable authority with which Yamashita 
endows him. Arcangel is a prophet and a messiah who masquerades as 
a bawdy performance artist and street vagrant. He travels throughout 
South America and Mexico singing “political poetry,” recounting the 
southern continent’s history of exploitation at the hands of Europeans. 
He literally bears, on his body, the scars of slavery and colonialism and 
is the self-identified voice and the consciousness of the colonized and of 
the Third World.1 So when Arcangel rebuts global village sentiments, 
he is not specifically deriding the First World’s philanthropic enterprise 
at large but the facility with which the global “we” circulates in the 
First World’s political, economic, and cultural discourse. The global 
“we,” indeed, is a central protagonist in the First World’s discourses of 
politics, commerce, and culture, crucial to its narrative of “progress” 
and “development.” It underwrites trade policies such as NAFTA (i.e., 
free trade and trade increases that will benefit all of “us”) and is also 
a highly marketable—indeed, invaluable—concept in the First World’s 
culture industry (“we are the world”).
 Most importantly for the argument of this book, this global village 
community rests on the cornerstones of idealized community discourse. 
The rationale for this first-person plural “we” rests on the supposed 
commonality that binds all members of the globe into one. Further-
more, the power and the influence of this commonality are so potent 
that they override the great physical distance, the great material divide, 
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and the great inequity in political and cultural capital amongst its mem-
bers. As commonality supersedes the paradox of community, billions of 
individuals fuse into one and become a single “we.” What Yamashita 
offers, through Arcangel’s mockery of the global village “we,” is a dis-
senting community critique of the idealization of community. What 
unsupported claims of commonality justify the transformation of mul-
tiple individuals into a single body? Who chooses the criteria of “same-
ness” that blankets the entire group? Whose difference is elided for the 
coherence of unity? What happens to the possibility of conflict and 
antagonism amongst the members when cohesion, intimacy, and fusion 
are valorized as collective values? Ultimately, what coercive operations 
are justified in the name of community as the site of sharing, intimacy, 
and collective health?
 As “we are not the world” becomes the rallying cry of Third World 
labor against the First World discourse of global village community, 
Tropic articulates precisely these dissenting community suspicions of 
idealized community. When community is conceived through a com-
monality, Jean-Luc Nancy argues, community becomes an expression of 
a fusion formed around an essence—as “people,” “nation,” “destiny,” 
or “generic humanity”—and community becomes “totalitarianism” 
(39). In a similar vein, Ernesto Laclau argues that the valorization of 
oneness in idealized community discourse casts conflict and antagonism 
as obstacles that must be excised. Instead, antagonism is “the ontolog-
ical possibility of clashes and unevenness [that enables us] to speak of 
freedom[,] . . . the very condition of a free society” (“Community” 92). 
For Jean-François Lyotard, the valorization of unity and solidarity is a 
“totalitarian apparatus” that struggles to suppress the “‘presence’ of the 
unmanageable”—the radically different, the heterogeneous (“À l’insu 
[Unbeknownst]” 43).
 Like the “unmanageable” that cannot be completely suppressed, 
Arcangel’s protest dissents from the global village “we” and challenges 
the assumptions, values, and goals of idealized community discourse. 
However, a crucial distinction must be observed between the novel’s cri-
tique of global village community and dissenting community’s negation 
of idealized community. That difference rests on the fact that Tropic 
holds on to a key ingredient of idealized community—the desirability 
of multiple individuals becoming a body of individuals. In tandem with 
the critique of global village community, the novel argues the need to 
conceive of a new first-person plural “we” that can capture the acceler-
ated movement of capital, cultural practices, and humans traversing the 
world. Set in Mexico and Los Angeles, the novel highlights the transna-
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tional crisscrossing of labor, goods, resources, languages, and cultures in 
the late twentieth century. Its characters, who had formally led disparate 
lives and had been separated by oceans and continents, are brought into 
hitherto unknown proximity and interconnectedness with each other—
and ultimately into fusion. In its new vision of the globe as a com-
munity, then, Tropic espouses the single body community as a political 
necessity. In the process, the novel irrevocably diverges from dissenting 
community discourse and its central aim—to negate the idealization of 
single body community, oneness, and fusion. This divergence forms the 
basis of the ambivalent community that I delineate in this chapter. The 
novel’s sharp criticism of global village discourse echoes dissenting com-
munity’s condemnation of idealized oneness. Yet this criticism of ideal-
ized community concludes by embracing the kernel of idealized com-
munity: that multiple individuals can fuse into a single body community. 
The dialectic movement between the competing values of idealized and 
dissenting community results in the novel’s fluctuating treatment of con-
cepts such as commonality, oneness, and fusion. Under contestation is 
the matter of the global “we.” How should this first-person plural sub-
ject be envisioned?
 This chapter examines the complexity of Tropic’s global “we” through 
the concept of universalism. Like identification that transformed multiple 
subjects into one in Morrison’s novels, universalism functions as the most 
powerful force in Tropic for fusing billions of individuals into a “body 
of individuals.” Unlike Morrison’s affirmation of identification, how-
ever, Yamashita casts universalism as a dual-edged sword—the greatest 
force for saying “we,” as well as the most dangerous force for saying 
“we.” That is, the novel’s critique of idealized community discourse is 
inextricable from its critique of universalism, as the global village “we” 
under critique is a unilateral “we.” The novel targets the global village 
community that unidirectionally conscripts the entire globe into a single 
body community—into an ultimate unity forged from commonality and 
shared fate, maintained by a relationship of intimacy, mutually benevo-
lent interchange, and direct connections. Thus Tropic’s denunciation of 
the First World’s global village celebration indicts the imperialist nature 
of a few who presume to speak for all.
 It is crucial to note from the outset that the subject under indictment 
is not globalization per se, but a particular view of globalization—the 
view that globalization results in the economic, political, and cultural 
intimacy and shared fate of a primordialist village.2 As this chapter will 
demonstrate, what is under critique in Tropic is the most self-serving 
and unreflective use of the idealized community discourse manifest in the 
c h A p t e r  2 
form of the global village celebration. The invocation of the “village,” 
one of the key models of Gemeinschaft unity, best represents the First 
World’s self-serving and unreflective use of idealized community. This 
distinction between the novel’s treatment of globalization and of global 
village celebration is very important, for globalization as a subject is a 
continuing interest in Yamashita’s novels. A Japanese American writer 
whose years spent in Brazil, Japan, as well as the United States reflect a 
thoroughly transnational imagination, Yamashita’s novels have consis-
tently attempted to read the momentous and minute changes affecting 
individual lives as a result of globalization. Indeed, Yamashita’s novels 
are deeply immersed in the phenomena of globalization: the high-speed 
information, media, and transportation technologies; the transnational 
modes of production and consumption; the accelerated flow of people, 
capital, goods, information, and entertainment; all of which result in the 
shift in the human experience of space, distance, and time.
 Through the Arc of the Rainforest (1991) shows a fascination with 
the communications and entertainment media, such as the Brazilian 
daytime soap operas that enthrall the entire nation and literally forge a 
single body community out of viewers. It also explores the far-ranging 
impact of a multinational corporation on the daily life of working Bra-
zilians and the environmental damage the corporation inflicts on the 
rainforest. In Brazil Maru (1992), Yamashita explores the early turn-
of-the-century Japanese migration to Brazil, while in Circle K Cycles 
(2001), she addresses the Japanese Brazilians who live in Japan as “for-
eign” migrant workers in the late twentieth century. Yamashita’s wide-
ranging treatment of nations, ethnicities, and continents stands out as 
an example of the intra-ethnic, transnational nature of Asian American 
writing. As she puts it, “in order to study this thing, whether or not 
we call it Asian-American—means that we’re going to have to know a 
lot more about it than just talking about the United States” (Gier and 
Tejeda n.p.). Thus globalization as a force of deterritorialization is a con-
stant interest in all of Yamashita’s novels, as she explores the unmooring 
of fixed ethnic, national, and geographical identities and of established 
categories by which humans are organized and distinguished. Indeed, 
contesting the discourse of purity (of blood, race, ethnicity, nation, or 
culture), Yamashita’s novels explore, and celebrate, the porous catego-
ries of identities emerging from the phenomenon of globalization. Con-
versely, her novels explore the ways in which the unmooring of identi-
ties and affiliations translates into formations of new moorings. The 
physical, material, and cultural challenges of globalization translate into 
a literary challenge for the writer: upon what basis, through what ratio-
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nale, may a different global community be imagined?3
 Nowhere does this challenge press more imperatively than in Tropic, 
in which the geography of the globe literally shifts and Northern and 
Southern hemispheres merge into one. The Tropic of Cancer, the imag-
inary line that divides the Northern Hemisphere into northern clime 
and tropical clime, becomes attached to a magical orange growing 
in Mazatlan, Mexico. In the hands of Arcangel, the orange—and the 
Tropic of Cancer—moves northward to Los Angeles. Accompanying 
Arcangel and the Tropic of Cancer are Mexicans seeking work in the 
United States, traveling towards, as they sarcastically call it, their “man-
ifest destiny” (132). Allegorical of the labor’s movement from the south 
to the north, from the Third World to the First World, the shift liter-
ally destabilizes the topography of the land. Yamashita’s choice of Los 
Angeles as the ultimate site of confrontation speaks to the city’s synec-
dochical role in the contemporary imagination as the epicenter of global 
confluence, or, some would say, global conflagration. Yamashita uses 
the contradictory significance of this city to articulate her ambivalence 
about the project of transforming the globe into a community: How can 
the globe become a single body of individuals, given the severe fissures 
separating its population? At the same time, how can the inexorable 
fact of globalization’s cultural, material, and human convergence be 
acknowledged?
 Tropic’s project in conceptualizing a nonoppressive global commu-
nity, then, has much in common with recent reconsiderations of uni-
versalism. Aggressively countering the delusional “we” at the heart of 
unidirectional deployments of universalism (e.g., Eurocentricism, colo-
nialism, imperialism) has been central to the anticolonialist, antiracialist, 
and antisexist scholarship of the late twentieth century. Generally traced 
back to Descartes and the ascendancy of the Enlightenment through 
thinkers such as Rousseau and Montesquieu, the history of universalism 
is at once a history of a tool of oppression, the discursive and material 
coerciveness of a few who presume to speak for all. What complicates 
this rendition of universalism, however, is the pivotal place that uni-
versalism occupies in progressive political movements. Ernesto Laclau 
encapsulates the contradictory role of universalism succinctly: “without 
a universalism of sorts—the idea of human rights, for instance—a truly 
democratic society is impossible” (Emancipation(s) 122).
 Recent recuperation of universalism begins with precisely this oppres-
sive/progressive function of universalism, and Laclau is representative 
of the poststructuralist attempt at recuperating universalism princi-
pally through the discourse of human rights and progressive politics.4 
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As the poststructuralist recuperation argues for the perennial relevance 
of universalism without relying on foundational tenets (claims about 
the essence of “human nature”), it distinguishes itself from the neo-
Kantian defense of universalism, best represented by Habermasian use 
of rationality as the foundational feature of humans and the speech act.5 
A recent consideration of universalism’s paradoxical function is best 
represented in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, in which Butler, 
Laclau, and Žižek exchange a series of essays on universalism. Despite 
their many differences, the three thinkers are bound in the assertion that 
universalism is a concept which supersedes any particular instantiation, 
“a process or condition irreducible to any of its determinate modes of 
appearance” (3). Hence, the poststructuralist revitalization of univer-
salism crucially renders a dialectic tension within the concept—as a con-
cept constitutive of any discussion of human rights, justice, equality, and 
dignity, yet whose particular instantiations invariably fall short of the 
expansive promise held therein. A model of universalism as the site of 
an “impossible/necessary” dialectic, I suggest, is crucial in understanding 
projects like Yamashita’s, which reject the unidirectional, imperialist 
deployments of universalism without rejecting the concept itself.
 In contrast to the First World’s deployment of a global intimacy and 
shared fate that comprise the latest rendition of imperialist universalism, 
Tropic pursues another model of global community: to take account of 
conflict, disparity, and injustice as realities of globalization while still 
acknowledging the inexorable convergence of peoples, cultures, and 
materiality in the profoundly altered state of global coexistence. This 
vision of the global “we” walks a careful balance between observing 
the key tenets of dissenting community discourse, such as heterogeneity, 
conflict, antagonism, and unassimilable difference, while keeping in sight 
the newly formed connections and the deep interdependence emerging 
from globalization. Hence, not only does the novel sit at the nexus of 
current discussions of universalism; it postulates its own model of uni-
versalism that I call “romantic universalism.” As the novel’s final answer 
to the challenge of a global “we,” romantic universalism richly illumi-
nates the transformative power of universalism in serving the political 
needs of those rendered invisible in the great material divide of global-
ization. At the same time, this new global community bears the seeds of 
its own limitations, limitations that bring us back to the “impossible” 
and “ideal” dialectic of universalism. In the transnational, transconti-
nental flow of people, labor, capital, and culture, Yamashita suggests 
that a need to conceptualize a global community is inexorable. The tasks 
of conceiving a new singular collective “we” and of conceiving a new 
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use for universalism become not matters of choice, then, but pressing 
needs.
The overworked Village
As Benedict Anderson put it, “all communities larger than primordial 
villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined 
communities. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their fal-
sity/genuineness but by the style in which they are imagined” (6). The 
concept of the global village surely requires a stretch of the imagina-
tion. The conjoining of two vastly different scales of human coexistence 
demonstrates the domesticating work performed by the smaller scale 
of the “village” in defusing the threat posed by the immense scale of 
the “global.” Like the “family” or “sisterhood” that provided ready-
made context for conceiving of community in Morrison’s novels, the 
village, in the global village celebration, counts on its seemingly self-
evident desirability as a model of unity. Thus the village is more than a 
denotation of a smaller scale of coexistence. Contemporary valorization 
of global village directly reinvigorates the idealized values of the vil-
lage in Tönnies’s theory of community. As I discussed in the Introduc-
tion, the village exemplifies the key values of Gemeinschaft—a unity 
formed from bonds of family, kin, faith, tradition, habit—all of which 
come together to form a “common center.” “Each individual receives 
his share from this common center, which is manifest in his own space, 
i.e., in his sentiment, in his mind and heart, and in his conscience as well 
as in his environment, his possessions, and his activities” (224). The 
Gemeinschaft idealization of the village simultaneously connotes a par-
ticular relationality at work. Just as the village is a scale of coexistence 
that is always-already in the past—the “primordiality” that Anderson 
identifies—it suggests a simpler and more immediate relationality of 
person-to-person contact, of unconditional connections, belonging, and 
intimacy.
 The global village concept is perhaps the ultimate fetishization of the 
primordial village in the discourse of idealized community. This fetishiza-
tion is explicit in Marshall McLuhan’s formulation of the global village. 
As he writes in The Gutenberg Galaxy: “[T]he electro-magnetic discov-
eries have recreated the simultaneous ‘field’ in all human affairs so that 
the human family now exists under the conditions of a ‘global village.’ 
We live in a single constructed space resonant with tribal drums” (31). 
McLuhan’s global village discourse fundamentally appeals to primordi-
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alism (human family, tribal drums) in translating high-speed electronic 
media into a social relationality of intimacy, cooperativeness, and famil-
iarity: “electric speed [brings together] all social and political functions 
in a sudden implosion,” and “the electronically contracted globe is no 
more than a village” (Understanding Media 20). As Andreas Huyssen 
notes, the “constant sliding of categories in McLuhan from the techno-
logical to the social and vice versa” reveals a mix of technological and 
theological discourse. “Rather than offering a media theory McLuhan 
offers a media theology,” in which high-speed electronic media, such 
as television, “retribalizes the world” (12).6 Gayatri Spivak, discussing 
McLuhan’s The Global Village, casts a more political condemnation: 
“global village” is an “appropriation of the rural.” The concept of 
global village, built on the “[e]lectronification of biodiversity . . . is 
colonialism’s newest trick” (“Cultural Talks” 330).
 By sharply delineating the material inequalities that separate First 
World and Third World subjects, Tropic mulls over precisely this self-
serving celebration of commonality, intimacy, and connectedness in First 
World’s celebration of global village. In its depiction of Los Angeles, too, 
the novel focuses on extremely disparate socioeconomic positions and 
emphasizes the stark fissures that counter the global village discourse. 
The characters include an illegal immigrant couple, Bobby and Rafaela, 
and a white-collar professional couple, Gabriel and Emi. Revealing 
the highly uneven benefits of globalization in the First World’s major 
metropolis, too, Manzanar and Buzzworm represent the mass of urban 
homeless. The novel’s fragmented form also dramatizes the fracture in 
the First World’s vision of global village community. Yamashita begins 
the book with “HyperContexts,” a diagram that shows, in one glance, 
the division of the narrative into the seven days of the week, with each 
chapter attending to one day in the life of one of the seven major char-
acters. This disjunctive organization leads to an atomistic sense of each 
character’s life, as each chapter seems to stand on its own with little 
continuity from the other. Always, there is a sense of impending doom, 
as various human and natural catastrophes—rumors of illegal human 
organ harvesting and sales, a mass scare of cocaine-injected oranges on 
the market, and major freeway pileups and explosions resulting from 
the spatial distortions—affect the lives of the characters. All the while, 
the Tropic of Cancer steadily moves northward, unsettling all rules of 
space and order.
 Thus, through content and form, Yamashita enacts a dissenting com-
munity suspicion of idealized oneness—the global village “we” that 
ignores the great material divide between its members, that overrides 
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actual moments of political and cultural conflict, and that imposes a 
commonality that binds “us” all. In an emblematic scene that chal-
lenges the use of commonality in global village discourse, Gabriel and 
Emi are dining in an upscale Japanese restaurant in Los Angeles. Emi, 
a Japanese American TV producer who delights in spoofing any ortho-
doxy, including that of political correctness, is speculating on the racial 
makeup of another diner sitting at a distance. Emi is engaging in her 
familiar game of unsettling her much more somber boyfriend Gabriel, 
who, as a Mexican American reporter, is committed to exposing and 
criticizing social injustice. A nearby diner takes umbrage at Emi’s specu-
lations. Identified only as “a white woman,” she remonstrates Emi on 
the importance of cultural diversity: “I happen to adore the Japanese 
culture. What can I say? I adore different cultures. I’ve traveled all over 
the world. I love living in L.A. because I can find anything in the world 
to eat, right here. It’s such a meeting place for all sorts of people. A true 
celebration of an international world” (129).
 Her model of global village community epitomizes the self-serving 
and unreflective use of idealized community discourse. It represents a 
response to globalization in which the material and cultural benefits 
enjoyed by some are translated into benefits enjoyed by all, into apo-
litical commonalities that connect the globe’s innumerable members 
into a Gemeinschaft model of the village. Her view of global “com-
monality” follows an entirely consumerist logic. If you can eat “their” 
food, and travel and sight “them,” then you and they have a “com-
monality.” This commonality, furthermore, is a sign of contact between 
“you” and “them.” As she reifies commonality into consumption, and 
difference into food matter, she exemplifies a view of globalization as an 
exchange in free-floating “cultures” without any material referents or 
consequences. Further continuing the capitalist logic in which the more 
choices the consumer has, the healthier the overall state of economy, in 
the white woman’s rationale, the greater the number of different cultures’ 
foods available, the “truer” the celebration of an international world. 
This unidentified white woman stands as the synecdoche of the First 
World’s imperialist assumption of global community, and Yamashita’s 
mockery turns unabashedly didactic. Emi notes that the woman sports 
chopsticks as hairpins. She calmly holds up two forks and asks whether 
the woman would wear these in her hair, or whether she would con-
sider the wearing of food utensils as an unsanitary practice. The woman 
“blanches” in response (129). In the hands of Emi, the protagonist 
that Yamashita identifies as approximating her mouthpiece, the white 
woman’s consumerist celebration of a global village community and her 
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fetishizing of “different cultures” are shown to be indefensible, even to 
the woman herself (Gier and Tejeda n.p.).7
 So who is in this overworked global village? This village is occupied 
by First World consumers who rationalize their privileged mobility and 
consumption as responsible acts of global community. These First World 
“villagers,” oblivious to their own role in the relations of power, project 
the consensual participation of other fellow villagers, those of “different 
cultures.” Thus, “[a]s ‘universal,’ the dominant erases the contingen-
cies of time and space, history and location, and with the same gesture 
elides its operations of domination, projecting instead the appearance of 
being democratic” (Palumbo-Liu 188). As “my” consumption becomes 
“our” celebration, the slippage of the subject in the First World’s global 
village community speaks its unidirectional and imperialist deployment 
of global village universalism. Ernesto Laclau’s discussion of nineteenth-
century European imperialism highlights the enormity of the slippage. In 
the work of imperialism, European culture of the nineteenth century cir-
culated as “a particular one, and at the same time the expression . . . of 
universal human essence”; and in the simultaneity of this circulation, 
the particularity of European culture takes on the ontological status of 
universality itself: “The crucial issue here is that there was no intel-
lectual means of distinguishing between European particularism and 
the universal functions that it was supposed to incarnate, given that 
European universalism had constructed its identity precisely through the 
cancellation of the logic of incarnation and, as a result, through the uni-
versalization of its own particularism” (Emancipation(s) 24).
 Likewise, as the white woman’s privileged mobility and consumption 
circulate as evidence of global village universalism, she transforms the 
particular into the universal. The First World’s global village commu-
nity deploys a key aspect of idealized community discourse in the most 
unreflective and self-serving manner: commonality becomes a matter of 
“natural” assertion, an observation that has nothing to do with politics, 
power, or disparity. It seems natural to go from enjoying “different” 
cultures to asserting the similarities connecting oneself and those “dif-
ferent” people. 
 Precisely this claim of apolitical commonality is contested in the nov-
el’s focus on the disenfranchised and uncounted subjects. Bobby’s and 
Rafaela’s struggles are representative of first-generation immigrants’, 
especially illegal immigrants’, experience. Bobby is a Chinese Singa-
porean who entered the United States as a boy, posing as a Vietnamese 
war refugee. Through years of low-wage physical labor, he achieves 
economic security, owning his own business, an office cleaning service. 
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He marries Rafaela, a Mexican, during a trip to Tijuana, and they set 
up a home in an L.A. suburb. For all intents and purposes, Bobby and 
Rafaela exemplify the immigrant success story: they are small-business 
owners, they own property, their house is filled with appliances and 
goods, and Bobby supports his family in Singapore as well as sends his 
younger brother to college in the United States. Bobby’s and Rafaela’s 
visibility—as people of color and as immigrant success stories—are cru-
cial to the global village discourse of Los Angeles as the true celebration 
of an international world.
 However, what Bobby and Rafaela experience most deeply is not their 
economic comfort but their social invisibility, a pervasive sense of disaf-
filiation from the larger city. Their work, representative of the army of 
office cleaners whose night-time work remains unseen by the white-collar 
workers, is symptomatic of the invisible nature of cheap, immigrant 
labor. Bobby recalls: “Ever since he’s been here, never stopped working. 
Always working. Washing dishes. Chopping vegetables. Cleaning floors. 
Cooking hamburgers. Painting walls. Laying bricks. Cutting hedges. 
Mowing lawn. Digging ditches. Sweeping trash. . . . Keeping up” (79). 
Indeed, Bobby exemplifies an immigrant model whose only sense of affil-
iation to his larger community is economical—as a laborer and a con-
sumer. He lives under a perennial sense of anxiety—terror that his illegal 
immigration status will be prosecuted, that all his economic achievements 
will be taken away, and that his family’s welfare will be threatened. As 
his wife sees it, Bobby lives in “this fear of losing what you love, of 
not feeling trust, this fear of being someplace unsafe but pretending for 
the sake of others that everything was okay” (149). Bobby’s only way 
to keep terror at bay is to purchase appliances, gadgets, and furniture, 
affirming to himself that a good American is a consuming American. 
“Happier he is, harder he works. Can’t stop. Gotta make money. Pro-
vide for his family. Gotta buy his wife nice clothes. Gotta buy his kid the 
best. Bobby’s kid’s gonna know the good life. That’s how Bobby sees it” 
(17). While Bobby lives to work and to buy, Rafaela seeks an inclusion in 
the larger social, economic, and political structure. She attends commu-
nity college and involves herself in the causes of labor activism. Bobby 
actively discourages and ridicules Rafaela’s growing political awareness, 
keeping to his policy of keeping his mouth shut and keeping his head 
down. Rafaela, in turn, feels stifled by Bobby’s atomistic vision of life to 
be lived: “She did not want any of this [Bobby’s purchases]. She wanted 
more” (80). Rafaela finally leaves Bobby, fleeing to her hometown in 
Mexico with their child. In these two representative immigrants of Los 
Angeles, Yamashita casts a dissenting community skepticism on the cel-
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ebratory vision of Los Angeles as a global village community. In the eyes 
of the white woman in the sushi restaurant, Bobby and Rafaela are ideal 
candidates for the “international world” of Los Angeles, but their terror 
and alienation make a mockery of any claims of an apolitical, “natural” 
commonality that unifies the globe as a village.
 Yamashita further critiques the self-serving idealization of the globe 
as a village by highlighting the homeless population of Los Angeles. 
Buzzworm, an African American, Vietnam War veteran, is a self-elected, 
one-man champion for the homeless. He walks the streets everyday 
armed with nothing but a card that reads “Angel of Mercy,” providing 
medical, housing, and legal assistance. Through his eyes, Yamashita 
relays the fleet of marginalized and uncounted homeless population 
who live on the street—teenagers, the elderly, veterans, families, chil-
dren, people with mental problems, drug addicts, criminals, and youth 
gangs. Los Angeles, through Buzzworm’s eyes, is a den of social injustice 
and economic iniquity. Speaking of L.A.’s insatiable car culture in which 
cars are better housed than homeless people, he remarks: “All these 
people living in their cars. The cars living in garages. The garages living 
inside guarded walls. You dump the people outta cars, and you left with 
things living inside things. Meantime people going through the garbage 
at McDonald’s looking for a crust of bread and leftover fries” (43). 
Buzzworm’s encounters with the people who eat, sleep, and live in the 
street indict the great discrepancy of welfare in Los Angeles and chal-
lenge any claim of commonality that fuses the city into a community.
 In a spreading arc of criticism, Yamashita extends her dissenting com-
munity skepticism of global village universalism beyond Los Angeles, 
extending it to Mexico, the novel’s prototypical example of the Third 
World labor. Arcangel’s political poetry, which Yamashita sets apart in 
italicized style, functions as the testimony of the indigenous, the dis-
placed, the exterminated, the poor, and the workers. Identifying him-
self simply as a “messenger” (199), Arcangel travels through Mexico, 
reciting his poetry. In a striking scene involving food, he offers a coun-
terpoint to the scene in the L.A. sushi restaurant. On his northbound 
travel towards Los Angeles, Arcangel is eating lunch at a roadside tavern 
called “Misery and Hunger.” As his waiter cites a long list of American 
beers that the tavern offers, Arcangel asks:
“You don’t think it strange? . . . All American beers. But we are in Mex-
ico, are we not? Where are the Mexican beers?”
 “Perhaps you would prefer Coca-cola or Pepsi?”
 “Perhaps I would like a hamburger, Fritos, and catsup.”
“ W e  A r e  n o t  t h e  W o r l d ”   
 “It is our special today.”
 It was true. Arcangel looked around at all the hungry and miserable 
people in the cantina—all eating hamburgers, Fritos, catsup, and drink-
ing American beers. Only he, who had asked the cook for the favor of 
cooking his raw cactus leaves, ate nopales. (131)
The vastly different significance given to the food of “different cul-
tures” highlights the role of geopolitical context in the fetishization of 
the other. The transmogrification of the other into consumable goods 
makes sense only within the capitalist consumer logic—that the wealth 
of consumer choices indicates the health of the overall system. While 
the availability of tacos and fajitas in Los Angeles would be another 
evidence of “our” commonality and connectedness in the global village 
discourse, in this Mexican tavern the flow of American fast-food staples 
is no cause to claim an access to the other. Quite the contrary, the omni-
presence of American fast food and the dominance of American brands 
are reminders of the economic, political, and cultural rifts that make 
the global “we” impossible. The waiter and the diners of this road-
side restaurant in Mexico exemplify an absolute immersion in Amer-
ican fast-food fare and brand dominance. What Arcangel finds remark-
able is their obliviousness to this fact as being in any way noteworthy. 
Yamashita crucially employs Arcangel’s surprise and irony to highlight 
this economic takeover and brand saturation.
 As Arcangel heads north, he also indicts the global “we” as the cen-
tral protagonist in the First World’s economic discourse of “universal 
progress.” Yamashita employs dramaturgical strategies, staging Arcan-
gel’s protest principally through a highly stylized back-and-forth dia-
logue with unnamed masses. It is in one such exchange that Arcangel 
announces his role as the champion of the Mexican/Third World labor 
against the U.S./First World industry:
“El Gran Mojado, what are you doing here?” someone in the crowd 
wanted to know.
 “Fool. He is going north, of course.” Everyone knew his story. His 
manifest destiny.
 “Ah,” said El Gran Mojado, lifting a can of Budweiser, “But for the 
moment the North has come South.”
 “Haven’t you heard? It’s because of SUPERNAFTA!” someone 
shouted.
 “While you are busy going north, he’s here kicking ass. And he’s say-
ing we are North, too!”
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 Another said, “It’s all hot air what he says. What’s the good of being 
North when it feels, looks, tastes, smells, shits South?”
 “That’s right! If Martians landed here, they would know. They would 
swim nude in Apaculpo, buy sombreros, ride burros, take pictures of the 
pyramids, build a maquiladora, hire us, and leave.”
 “El Gran Mojado! Stay here and save us!” (132)
The crowd dramatizes what postcolonial critics have long voiced—that 
the great narrative of development and progress underwriting the First 
World’s global economic policies must be understood in direct continu-
ation with imperialism. The very concept of globe as a singular, inte-
grated unit serves the interests of First World industry, argues Spivak: 
“Globality is invoked in the interest of the financialization of the 
globe, or globalization. . . . The great narrative of Development is not 
dead. . . . [The global electronic future] is to provide the narrative of 
development an alibi[,] . . . [just as] the functionaries of the civilizing mis-
sion of imperialism were well-meaning” (“Cultural Talks” 330, 333).
 The unidentified voices of Arcangel’s chorus coalesce into one dis-
senting community indictment against the global village community. It 
is a critique directed not only at the oppressive deployment of common-
ality but also at the oppressive deployment of universalism. The global 
“we” as the central protagonist of universal progress is once again the 
particular (the interest of the First World) serving as the universal (the 
interest of all). Trade-led models of progress, which measure progress 
by the volume of trades between nations, tout the “universal progress” 
that will benefit all of “us.”8 When restrictions and barriers to trade are 
removed, the rise in trade of labor, services, goods, and raw resources 
will lead “the South” to be like “the North,” until the geographical dis-
tinction is no longer synonymous with “the Third World” and “the First 
World.” Instead, Arcangel and the crowd decry, the “North has come 
South.” As the dominance of American fast foods and brands at the road-
side tavern demonstrates, the South has become another marketplace for 
the north’s goods. The south functions as a source of raw material—a 
low-wage workforce who earn a fraction of what their counterparts 
earn in the north, who work without health care and environmental and 
legal protection, whose small businesses and farms cannot compete with 
the massive dominance of U.S. products in the domestic market. While 
the great narrative of universal progress promises to unsettle the Third 
World/First World designations, Arcangel’s chorus argues NAFTA to be 
yet another example of a zero-sum game. That the benefit of trade-led 
“progress” goes to a select few, and not to all, is the requisite condition 
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of the game itself. As Arcangel later pronounces, the narrative of uni-
versal progress is a “myth of the first world” (259).
recuperating the universal
Counterbalancing the novel’s strong denunciation of global village com-
munity is an equally strong acknowledgment that some vision of oneness 
between the south and the north is inexorable. This insistence on one-
ness as a necessity is the novel’s point of divergence from the discourse 
of dissenting community, and it demonstrates the novel’s ambivalence 
about community as a proposition. While the novel’s critique of global 
village celebration moves in tandem with dissenting community critique 
of commonality, intimacy, and collective health, upon the most impor-
tant point in contention—the political significance of oneness—Tropic 
unabashedly embraces an idealized community vision. Multiple indi-
viduals can become a body of individuals. The paradox of community 
can be superseded. This global community is not only necessary; it is 
also inexorable. Arriving at this final destination, however, is a process 
much more complex than the global village celebration: this global com-
munity, as confrontational in nature as it is inevitable, requires the most 
absolute conception of universalism.
 As Yamashita makes explicit, the wrestling match of “The Great 
Wetback” and “SUPERSCUMNAFTA” is the Third World’s refutation 
of the global village community. But the destabilization of the Tropic 
of Cancer is also a dramatization of the thorough interdependence 
that binds the north and the south. Symbolic of the millions of human 
migration, Arcangel’s travel northward takes place in a bus filled with 
Mexicans seeking work in the north. In tandem with “the rising tide of 
that migration from the South” (240) are the “waves of flowing paper 
money: pesos and dollars and reals, all floating across effortlessly—a 
graceful movement of free capital, at least 45 billion dollars of it, car-
ried across by hidden and cheap labor” (200). The interdependence is 
certainly no guarantor of equitable relationship, as Yamashita amply 
demonstrates. But a confrontation between two interdependent par-
ties, whose fates and interests are interwoven, results in a particularly 
nuanced conflict. The physical convergence of the south and the north 
becomes the literal dramatization of fusion and of the inevitability of 
the globe as a first-person plural “we.” As Yamashita takes pains to 
highlight the disparity and inequities informing her characters’ lives, 
this vision of global community contains conflict, antagonism, competi-
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tion, vast differences, and unassimilated heterogeneity. It retains, in fact, 
key facets of dissenting community discourse voiced by postmodernist 
thinkers such as Young, Laclau, Lyotard, and Nancy as they refute the 
idealization of community. In an antithesis to its dissenting community 
vision, the novel’s global community also retains the idealization of 
fusion. As global bodies, labor, capital, and geography converge upon 
one site, the question is: how can the globe be formulated as a body of 
individuals without the most uncritical idealization of community?9
 Yamashita offers her answer in the character of Manzanar, a home-
less man who stands atop L.A.’s freeway bypasses and “conducts.” In 
the mold of the messianic figure who disowns a life of comfort for an 
austere one of serving others, Manzanar is a surgeon who leaves his 
family and profession to pronounce the absolute interconnectedness of 
humans. A Japanese American, he chose his name as a quiet protest and 
reminder of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II. His visibility despite his homeless status poses a resistance against 
the public policy of enforced invisibility for the homeless. However, 
as he stands atop freeway bypasses, Manzanar functions as the sym-
bolic nodal point in which all of humanity, in a spiral of ever-increasing 
scope, is joined. It is significant that Buzzworm, the street-wise activist 
for the homeless, calls Manzanar the “ultimate romantic” (235). Buzz-
worm’s description encompasses the spectrum of meanings in the word 
“romantic”—unrealistic, hopelessly idealistic, and even mad, as it rep-
resents a vision endorsed by no one else.
 In a novel filled with oppressive universalism, Manzanar represents 
a unique version, a romantic universalism that unabashedly announces 
the globe as a single body community. This romantic universalism richly 
illuminates the modality of the ideal and the impossible in the post-
structuralist recuperation of universalism. In reviving universalism as a 
non-normative force of political necessity, the dimensions of the ideal 
and the impossible are crucial—universalism as an ideal that cannot 
be achieved and as a perennial ingredient in all human struggles for 
hegemony.10 Indeed, the ideal dimension of universalism is the consti-
tutive feature in Étienne Balibar’s “Ambiguous Universalism.” While 
there are numerous, specific manifestations of universalism, the libera-
tory potential of universalism rests upon the fact that “universality also 
exists as an ideal, in the form of absolute or infinite claims which are 
symbolically raised against the limits of any institution” (63–64; orig-
inal emphasis). Ideal universalism can be distinguished from “real” and 
“fictional” universalism. “Real” universalism describes the actual con-
dition of increased interdependency of individuals and invokes the shift 
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in the human experience of time, space, and distance brought about 
by globalization. Like the inexorable convergence of humans, capital, 
labor, and culture in Tropic, “real” universalism renders “‘humankind’ 
a single web of interrelations” for the first time in history (56). Just as 
Yamashita emphasizes the material disparity in globalization, Balibar 
is careful to point out that real universalism also marks an unprece-
dented condition of polarization, inequality, hierarchies, and exclusions 
(52). “Fictional” universalism describes the “constructed” universalism 
espoused by all ruling institutions, such as the state and the church. As 
the “official values” (62) of institutions, fictional universalism embodies 
both regulating and progressive function; it is a site of normalization, 
with the power to determine the norm and standard behavior, as well 
as being a “powerful instrument of opening a space for liberties, espe-
cially in the form of social struggles and democratic demands,” as when 
individuals protest the “contradiction between its official values and 
the actual practice” (62). In the earnest and hopeful figure of Gabriel, 
for instance, we can locate fictional universalism inspiring this Mexican 
American newspaper writer to report unvarnished accounts of racial 
and labor relations in the hopes of realizing equality and justice for all. 
Thus ideal universalism stands as the principle that underwrites fictional 
universalism’s propositions of human equality, liberty, and rights. Con-
comitantly, the principle of ideal universalism is repeatedly contradicted 
in the actual practices of, say, the church or the state. Hence ideal uni-
versalism stands as an immortal promise, an irrepressible principle that 
is revived again and again in different situations but is continuously 
displaced in history.
 In order to fully appreciate the absolute nature of Manzanar’s romantic 
universalism, we must also attend to the modality of the “impossible” 
that sits at the heart of the poststructuralist dialectic model of univer-
salism. The impossible and the ideal are related concepts, of course, 
since the ideal may be defined as that achievement which is as equal in 
its impossibility as in its necessity. Although Butler, Laclau, and Žižek, 
in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, employ different metaphors 
to describe the impossibility of absolute universalism, they join in the 
argument that universalism remains a perennial relevance in any and 
all political struggles for rights. Laclau’s metaphor of the “void” or the 
“empty space” plays a pivotal role in these authors’ discussion of uni-
versalism as a constitutive feature in any struggle for hegemony:
From a theoretical point of view, the very notion of particularity presup-
poses that of totality. . . . [P]olitically speaking, the right of particular 
c h A p t e r  2 
groups of agents—ethnic, national or sexual minorities, for instance—
can be formulated only as universal rights. The universal is an empty 
place, a void which can be filled only by the particular, but which, 
through its very emptiness, produces a series of crucial effects in the 
structuration/destructuration of social relations. It is in this sense that 
it is both an impossible and necessary object. (Contingency 58; original 
emphasis)
As specific groups seeking hegemony formulate their political claims as 
universal rights, they ceaselessly and variously fill the empty space with 
claims of the particular. Inasmuch as it manifests itself only through the 
particular instantiations, the universal will manifest itself only through 
the particular. In this dialectic relationship, the universal is never com-
pletely filled—never absolutely nonparticular. As Laclau repeatedly 
argues, exclusion and antagonism are crucial in struggles for hegemony; 
indeed, they are foundational features of a democratic society. An indi-
vidual group’s use of universalism, as in a particular group’s claim of/for 
rights, is fundamentally the exercise of a few speaking for some rather 
than for all. Hence actual manifestations of universalism are always 
necessarily incomplete, inasmuch as they are never completely devoid 
of the particular that requires exclusion and antagonism—“the complex 
dialectic between particularity and universality, between ontic content 
and ontological dimension, structures social reality itself” (58).
 In Butler’s and Žižek’s revitalization of the concept, too, the political 
necessity of universalism is paralleled by its fundamental incomplete-
ness. While Butler critiques Laclau’s universal/particular conceptualiza-
tion as being too compartmentalized and naturalized (as if two such 
concepts existed irrespective of specific contingencies), in her revitaliza-
tion of the universal as an invaluable political concept, she continues 
to build upon the impossible/necessary dilemma. Rather than Laclau’s 
“empty space” metaphor which may suggest the universal to be a static 
category “filled” by “political content,” Butler opts for the figura-
tive concept of “non-space” to envision the universal’s utility. Butler 
employs the analogy of linguistic/cultural translation in this formula-
tion. All claims of universality are “bound to various syntactic stagings 
within culture” and therefore “cannot be articulated outside the scene 
of their embattlement.” It follows, then, that claims of universality 
must “assume the risks of translation” (37) into another group’s usage, 
syntax, and conventions. Just as the politics of translation embody both 
colonialist and anticolonialist possibilities, politics of universality also 
embody both coercive and progressive possibilities. In this trope of 
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the non-space, Butler emphasizes the open-ended possibilities of uni-
versalism as an invaluable and ceaselessly utilized political tool. “The 
universal announces, as it were, its ‘non-place,’ its fundamentally tem-
poral modality, precisely when challenges to its existing formulation 
emerge from those who are not covered by it, who have no entitlement 
to occupy the place of the ‘who,’ but nevertheless demand that the uni-
versal as such ought to be inclusive of them” (39).
 While Žižek fully agrees with Laclau and Butler on the universal’s 
pivotal role in progressive politics and on the notion of universalism 
as impossible/necessary (101), he identifies a transhistorical assumption 
in the way they maintain the conceptual permanency of universalism 
throughout human struggles. To leave the conceptual permanence of 
universalism unquestioned, he believes, is to assume the permanence 
to be the consequence of universalism’s political uses. But inasmuch as 
political uses of universalism are unquestionably contingent upon histor-
ical context, should not the permanence of universalism be painted with 
the variability of historical specificity? How, then, would they “account 
for the enigmatic emergence of the space of universality itself” (104), 
a challenge that is akin to “historiciz[ing] historicism itself”? (105). In 
contrast, Žižek conceives the impossible/necessary dialectic of univer-
salism via the concept of negativity. In the Lacanian terms of the “real-
impossible,” in which every noun may be seen as a deadlock, trauma, or 
open question, as something that resists symbolization, the impossibility 
of universalism’s completion is a constitutive factor in the concept itself 
(110). When considered in the “Hegelian determinate negation,” the 
deficiency between the actuality and the notion can be explained by 
the fact that “a particular formation [for instance, of the state] never 
coincides with its (universal) notion” (The Ticklish Subject 177; original 
emphasis). Through various—but interrelated—metaphors (the empty 
space, the non-space, negativity), poststructuralist recovery of univer-
salism posits universalism’s incompleteness as the constant feature in 
any specific application of the concept (Contingency 110).11
 The absolute nature of Manzanar’s romantic universalism attains a 
greater significance against this poststructuralist backdrop. Manzanar 
personifies the impossibility of universalism—an instantiation of uni-
versalism that is absolutely full because there is no exclusion or antago-
nism. Relatedly, romantic universalism enacts the ideal dimension of 
universalism raised in Balibar’s vision—an achievement whose impos-
sibility renders it an imaginary thing, an achievement that stands as a 
standard of perfection inspiring imitation. Manzanar alone supersedes 
the contradiction of urban coexistence—the dense, physical proximity 
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counterbalanced by the atomistic nature of the population’s movements 
and the division of space by race and class. The richest example of this 
proximity/atomistic contradiction may be the automobile culture of Los 
Angeles, the millions who hurtle alongside each other, each in his own 
home-away-from-home. While L.A.’s freeways have long occupied the 
contemporary imagination as the ills of chaotic urban living, in Man-
zanar’s eyes they represent the most vital organ of human cohabitation. 
“The freeway was a great root system, an organic living entity. It was 
nothing more than a great writhing concrete dinosaur and nothing less 
than the greatest orchestra on Earth” (37). Manzanar sees the artificial 
construct in the same realm as the elemental structures of nature and, 
through the language of elemental organism, describes the intercon-
nected nature of urban existence.
 Likewise, he alone sees the infrastructure that contains the urban 
mass of Los Angeles, the artesian rivers and the faults that run under-
ground, as well as the human-made grid of civic utilities such as the 
pipelines, tunnels, waterways, pipes, electric currents, telephone cables, 
cable TV, fiber optics, computer networks, and many more (57). “There 
are maps and there are maps and there are maps. The uncanny thing 
was that he could see all of them at once, filter some, pick them out like 
transparent windows and place them even delicately and consecutively 
in a complex grid of pattern, spatial discernment, body politic” (56; 
original emphasis). To Manzanar, such an “inanimate grid structure” 
(238) is a physical reminder that we occupy a single structure of exis-
tence and that the wires, pipes, cables, and freeways are all evidence of 
our bounded-ness, our interconnectedness to each other in the making 
of a single organism. Thus the hurtling cars on the freeway speak of “a 
kind of solidarity: all seven million residents of Greater L.A. out on the 
town, away from their homes, just like him, outside” (206). A crowd 
leaving the football stadium has all the movements of a symphony, “a 
percussive orchestration that even Manzanar found incredible[,] . . . the 
greatest jam session the world had ever known” (206).
 As Manzanar envisions the population as a single body of being, the 
rationale for his universalism is as banal as observing that we share 
the same power and phone company and as profound as observing 
that we exist in the one and the same here-and-now. Put another way, 
Manzanar’s romantic universalism is one that draws the most profound 
conclusions from the most banal observations. Yamashita repeatedly 
endorses this transformative process in the narrative, continuing and 
sharing Manzanar’s language of organicity that “create[s] a commu-
nity” out of atomistic disorder:
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And perhaps they [freeway drivers] thought themselves disconnected 
from a sooty homeless man on an overpass. Perhaps and perhaps not. 
And yet, standing there, he bore and raised each note, joined them, 
united families, created a community, a great society, an entire civiliza-
tion of sound. The great flow of humanity ran below and beyond his feet 
in every direction, pumping and pulsating, that blood connection, the 
great heartbeat of a great city. (35)
Thus in sharp contrast to the imposed commonality in the global village 
discourse, Manzanar’s romantic universalism generates the most expan-
sive understanding of commonality. It is a view of commonality based on 
no particularities—no specific shared experience, history, ideology, race, 
gender, class, nationality, religion, or any other aspects by which one 
distinguishes oneself from another. This commonality-without-criteria 
echoes the kernel of Jean-Luc Nancy’s theory of dissenting community: 
“community is a matter . . . of existence inasmuch as it is in common, 
but without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance” (Inop-
erative Community 38). Only by negating the understanding of com-
monality as substance—of similar history, identity-claims, objectives, 
interests, or, in the case of global village discourse, commonality of con-
sumption—can commonality evade being a tool that some use to con-
script others into a unidirectional “we.”
 This nonparochial, nonparticular, featureless commonality forms the 
basis of the most absolute universalism in the novel. While embracing 
this most central of dissenting community vision, however, Manzanar’s 
“we” employs the nonparticular commonality towards building the 
final objective of idealized community: fusion. Thus the central visions 
of dissenting community and idealized community come together in a 
most incongruous manner, announcing the ambivalent community at 
work. To begin with, Manzanar’s romantic universalism is foundational 
to a greater vision—a single body community that encompasses the 
geographical span of not only Los Angeles but countries, continents, 
and oceans. His vision extends to “the great Pacific stretching along 
its great rim, brimming over long coastal shores from one hemisphere 
to the other” (170), and he foreshadows the convergence of the north 
and the south, the joining of the two hemispheres (123). In the scope 
and reach of Manzanar’s romantic universalism, Yamashita offers her 
own dramatization of the globe as a community—the globe as a single 
organism, whose disparate parts are inexorably drawn together. What 
distinguishes this model of single body community from the other 
instances of idealized community that abound in the novel? First, this 
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global community is not an instance of the particular “making empire 
out of its local meaning” (Butler 31). In constituting a “we” out of 
“my” experience, the white woman’s global village universalism per-
forms a unidirectional conscription: she speaks for the millions and bil-
lions of others in prescribing the supposed unity and the intimacy. The 
singular “we” that results is a unidirectional affection and affectation. 
In contrast, Manzanar’s community, like the “crowds” that accompany 
Arcangel’s Third World labor “we,” and the cacophony of unidenti-
fied voices that join Buzzworm’s urban homeless “we,” is a reciprocal 
deployment of universalism. That is, there is no slippage between “my” 
and “we,” as all three articulations of “we” emerge from spontaneous 
and voluntary fusion.
 But it is also important to distinguish Manzanar’s romantic univer-
salism from Arcangel’s and Buzzworm’s particular deployment of uni-
versalism. As Laclau argued most forcefully, antagonism and exclusion 
are not unique features of imperialism and Eurocentricism: in the dia-
lectic logic of universal/particular, all instantiations of universalism are 
incomplete inasmuch as they are claims of the particular. Thus univer-
salism of the Third World labor “we” or the homeless “we” observes 
the fundamental contradiction in the idea and the political application 
of universalism—what Žižek calls the “split” grounded “already on 
the level of the notion” (The Ticklish Subject 177; original emphasis). 
Only Manzanar’s romantic universalism supersedes that negativity, as 
it postulates a “we” that is absolutely inclusive because there is no cri-
terion for inclusion, which is the same as there being no possibility of 
exclusion. Romantic universalism’s “we” is a community of a limitless 
nature, whose absolute lack of particularity completely fills the “empty 
space” or the “non-space” of universalism.
 In its absolute inclusiveness, romantic universalism fulfills another 
ideal dimension of universalism: a logic of “we” that does not exert 
a normalizing function. As Balibar identified in his model of fictional 
universalism, the governing function of institutions such as the church 
or the state also serves a regulating function. The dilemma that Balibar 
poses is: what deployment of universalism can avoid being a norma-
tive force? Through romantic universalism, Tropic offers an answer: 
when the participation in the universalism is entirely voluntary and 
reciprocal. In addition to bringing people to tears (235), Manzanar’s 
conducting begets other believers, inspiring them to start conducting 
themselves. A spontaneous uprising of romantic universalism grabs hold 
of Los Angeles. As Arcangel and the Tropic of Cancer approach the city, 
causing geography to literally shift and streets to expand and distort, 
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Manzanar notes a different kind of organization to the city: “Little by 
little, Manzanar began to sense a new kind of grid, this one defined not 
by inanimate structures or other living things but by himself and others 
like him. He found himself at the heart of an expanding symphony of 
which he was not the only conductor” (238). As the entire city of Los 
Angeles become self-inspired “conductors,” Manzanar’s romantic uni-
versalism generates a “we” greater in scope than Arcangel’s “crowd” 
or Buzzworm’s homeless. Indeed, each of the conductors begins to per-
sonify, as Manzanar had done, the immensity of humanity as a single 
body. Manzanar notes that “the tenor of this music was a very dif-
ferent sort, at times a kind of choral babel. . . . The entire City of Angels 
seemed to have opened its singular voice to herald a naked old man 
[Arcangel] and a little boy [Bobby and Rafaela’s son] with an orange 
followed by a motley parade approaching from the south” (238).
 That the entire city’s conducting “heralds” the arrival of Arcangel 
and the Third World labor underscores the transformative power of 
romantic universalism. Literally dramatizing the perennial relevance 
of universalism in the particular claims of specific groups, Manzanar’s 
all-inclusive, all-voluntary, absolute universalism becomes foundational 
to the march of Third World labor and, later, to Buzzworm’s vision 
for the homeless. When Arcangel finally confronts SUPERNAFTA in the 
wrestling ring, his address to the crowd, like his earlier addresses to the 
crowd in Mexico, becomes an emblematic Third World labor’s protest 
against the First World’s myth of universal progress:
You who live in the declining and abandoned places
of great cities, called barrios, ghettos, and favelas. . . . 
The myth of the first world is that
Development is wealth and technology progress.
It is all rubbish.
It means that you are no longer human beings
But only labor. (258–59)
As Arcangel protests a reality in which they are “no longer human 
beings,” the formation of Third World labor as historical actor and 
Third World labor’s claim for human rights take place in the contxt of 
Manzanar’s romantic universalism. As the crowd break into cheers and 
tears, their fusion is:
accompanied by a choral symphony that came from outside the audi-
torium and slowly swelled to fill it by the people themselves. Everyone 
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knew the music and the words in their own language, knew the alto, 
bass, and soprano parts, knew it as if from some uncanny place in their 
inner ears, as if they had sung it all their lives. Some people jumped up 
to conduct entire sections of the auditorium. (260)
 Illustrative of the complex nature of the global community formed 
by the north and the south, the confrontation of Arcangel and SUPER-
NAFTA does not result in a single winner. Each vanquishes the other in 
the ring, but the mythical manner of Arcangel’s death by conflagration 
foreshadows his eventual rise again. What remains the greatest achieve-
ment of the confrontation, however, is the fusion of the south and the 
north joined in “conducting.” For a brief moment, Los Angeles enacts 
a model of global community that is absolutely all-inclusive, all-volun-
tary, and all-reciprocal, and Manzanar can finally “let his arms drop. 
There was no need to conduct the music anymore. The entire city had 
sprouted grassroots conductors of every sort” (254).
 Like the spontaneous “chorus” and “symphony” that frame Arcan-
gel’s Third World universalism, Manzanar’s romantic universalism 
enables Buzzworm’s particular universalism for the homeless. The lit-
eral geographical shift of the globe causes a meltdown of L.A. freeways, 
and chaos abounds between drivers who abandon their cars, the home-
less who move in, and the law enforcement who combat them. The 
upheaval comes to an inevitable conclusion—a shootout between law 
enforcement and the homeless. The homeless are massacred in great 
numbers, and “order” is restored. As Buzzworm considers the blight 
and the reconstruction work that awaits him, his vision is profoundly 
altered by Manzanar’s romantic universalism. Buzzworm separates him-
self from his main source of connection to the world, the radio. The 
radio, he notes, is always singing “one big love song. I love you. You 
love me. I love myself. We love us. We love the world. We love God. We 
love ourselves but hate some of you. I hate myself but would love you if. 
You screwed me and I’m learning to love me or that other one” (265). 
Instead of the facile cult of love that characterizes popular music, Buzz-
worm opts for what he calls a “mythic reality,” a term he hears on the 
radio before he makes his final disconnection. A mythic reality occurs 
when “everyone gets plugged into a myth and builds a reality around it. 
Or was it the other way around? Everybody gets plugged into a reality 
and builds a myth around it. He didn’t know which. Things would be 
what he and everybody else chose to do and make of it. It wasn’t gonna 
be something imagined” (265). A mythic reality differs from the cult 
of love in its constructivist dimension—one remains fully conscious of 
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the fact that one chooses the myth that best accompanies one’s desired 
reality. “Unplugged and timeless, thinking like this was scary, Buzzworm 
gritted his teeth. Took a deep breath. Manzanar’s symphony swelled 
against diaphragm, reverberated through his veteran bones. Solar-
powered, he could not run out of time” (265).
A global Community through romantic universalism
In romantic universalism’s all-inclusive, all-voluntary, and non-
normative “we,” Yamashita offers a model of a global community that 
acknowledges the innumerable fissures, conflicts, competition, and 
antagonism running through it. Romantic universalism affects all spe-
cific instantiations of universalism in the novel in unique ways. As the 
most expansive and nondiscriminatory instance of “we,” it highlights 
the unidirectional and imperialist nature of the First World’s global vil-
lage universalism. In lending its transformative power to Third World 
labor “we” and the homeless “we,” romantic universalism also proves 
its perennial relevance to all political struggles. In romantic universal-
ism’s absolute nature, then, Yamashita offers one answer to the impos-
sible/necessary dialectic in the poststructuralist recuperation of univer-
salism. The impossible/necessary dialectic may be superseded, romantic 
universalism suggests, in an instance of universalism that includes all 
of humanity. When an instance of universalism has absolutely no rem-
nant of the particular, it becomes that “empty space,” the ever-receding 
horizon of the ideal itself.
 In a powerful way, then, romantic universalism casts a new light on one 
of the most suspect words of contemporary theory: totality. As a word 
used synonymously with “totalitarianism” in contemporary political, 
philosophical, and cultural theories, especially in dissenting community 
discourse, totality is equated with the force of oppression and coercion 
in the name of solidarity, homogeneity, and unity.12 However, what the 
absolute, sweeping nature of romantic universalism demonstrates is that 
“totality” is also the abstract notion for “absolute whole.” As a formal 
concept of “entirety,” totality resides at the center of romantic univer-
salism, encapsulating the absolute inclusion that is nonparticular, non-
discriminatory, nondeliberative, and nondiscerning. As romantic univer-
salism fulfills the very criteria of “ideal” and “impossible” universalism, 
it shows that the final horizon of universalism itself is totality—an abso-
lutely sweeping, all-encompassing entirety, an unqualified wholeness. It 
shows that concepts equated with political oppression and totalitari-
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anism—“totality,” “oneness,” and “fusion”—are also abstract ingredi-
ents in the ideal of universalism itself. Thus, not only is Tropic’s final 
“we” distinct from the “we” of idealized community based on specific 
commonalities; it is different from the “we” of dissenting community 
that eschews any prospective of totality, fusion, or oneness.
 This nondeliberative, nondiscerning totality is what sets romantic 
universalism apart from cosmopolitanism, the closest conceptual cousin 
in contemporary theory in envisioning a global unity. As I elaborated in 
the Introduction, recent revitalizations of cosmopolitanism as a politico-
ethical vision fundamentally rests on a vision of deliberative belonging. 
Envisioned as a politico-ethical vision against a nationalist, primordi-
alist, and parochial sense of belonging, attachment, and identification, 
cosmopolitanism as a corrective against the single body community 
theorizes a vision of unity that is much more flexible, adroit, and delib-
erative than universalism. As Bruce Robbins states, cosmopolitanism 
“better describes the sensibility of our moment” because “the word is 
not as philosophically ambitious as the term ‘universalism’” (196). In 
other words, in contrast to absolute universalism, whose final horizon 
is totality, recent revival of cosmopolitanism deploys “self-conscious” 
and “self-corrective” as key terms to envision a global unity that can 
evade precisely that pull of totality. Thus, while absolute universalism 
claims the entirety of the global “we,” cosmopolitanism might be seen 
as a claim of global unity that is paradigmatically suspicious of the very 
concept of wholeness and entirety.13
 In dramatizing totality as the horizon of romantic universalism, 
Yamashita offers a symbolic resolution to the impossible/necessary dia-
lectic in the poststructuralist model of universalism. Romantic univer-
salism, however, must not be understood simply as the solution that 
rescues universalism from the dialectic tension of necessity/impossibility. 
What about the necessity? What does romantic universalism do? What 
is the political utility of a universalism that is all-inclusive? What is the 
progressive, emancipatory potential of a unity that speaks for all? How 
does it specifically challenge fictional universalisms, the normative, gov-
erning forces of institutions such as the state, government, and trade 
regulations? Also, when the emblematic moment of romantic univer-
salism is the Third World and the First World joined in song, just how 
much can romantic universalism distinguish itself from the cult of love 
that rules the radio airwaves?
 In locating the answer to both inquiries, Yamashita returns us to 
the impossible/necessary dialectic. In presenting us with the seemingly 
impossible feat—an absolute “we”—romantic universalism also pres-
“ W e  A r e  n o t  t h e  W o r l d ”   
ents us with the fact that the idea of universalism itself serves no specific 
political needs except as it serves particular instantiations. The only sat-
isfactory way to assert the political utility of romantic universalism, to 
distinguish it from the “We Are the World” variety, lies in assessing its 
specific manifestations—the “we” of the homeless or the “we” of the 
Third World labor. The political function of universalism can emerge 
only from the particular instantiations of universalism. Like Manzanar’s 
conducting that encompasses all revolutions, both individual and col-
lective, romantic universalism transforms individual protests (of Third 
World labor, of the homeless) into historical forces and into historical 
actors pursuing the ideal of universal human rights.
 Rather than being a solution that overcomes the impossible/necessary 
dialectic, then, romantic universalism adds great nuance to the “empty 
space” of universalism that propels the dialectic. Through her use of the 
fantastic mode in representing romantic universalism, Yamashita ren-
ders a greater complexity to the theoretical conception of the “empty 
space,” “non-space,” or “negativity” at the heart of universalism. A 
globe that literally shifts its spatial perimeters, cities and continents that 
join in song: the fact that envisioning an absolute universalism requires 
the mode of the fantastic enriches our understanding of the impossible 
(improbable, unrealistic, unrealizable) nature of an all-inclusive “we.” 
Furthermore, Yamashita’s use of the fantastic to actualize the ideal of 
universalism enhances our understanding of the romantic (imaginary, 
unreal, and extravagantly fanciful) dimension of universalism. Indeed, 
the implications of absolute universalism can be profound and facile at 
once, and Yamashita richly illustrates these modalities through her use 
of the fantastic mode.
 What, then, of the globe as a community? Tropic provides an array of 
models for conceiving the global community, from the imperialist, con-
sumerist kind, to particular groups’ unity and struggle for rights, and to 
absolutely total global oneness. To the paradox of community, then, the 
novel answers: absolute universalism transforms multiple individuals 
into a body of individuals. As Yamashita deploys the most expansive 
“we” as the foundation for the political articulations of Third World 
labor and the urban homeless, she unmistakably asserts the work of 
romantic universalism—the transformative power of its imaginary and 
unrealistic vision, as well as its inspirational power as the ever-elusive 
horizon of universal human rights.
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rom the kinship-model “we” in Morrison and the global “we” 
in Yamashita, this chapter turns to the biggest conceptual “we” 
of all—the human “we” in Richard Powers’s novels of science 
and technology. The literary manifestation of “the human” as a 
community brings us back to one of the most contentious spots in the 
debate over community: commonality. Like the commonality of identity, 
history, experience, and objective that transformed multiple individuals 
into a community in Morrison’s novels, and the being-in-common that 
fused all of the globe’s inhabitants into one in Yamashita’s novel, the 
criterion of commonality raises its head in the central question of this 
chapter: what unique commonalities make “the human” into a com-
munity?
 Since Ihab Hassan postulated that “five hundred years of humanism 
may be coming to an end” (212) in his 1977 essay, “Prometheus as Per-
former: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?” the machine has been the 
dominant conceptual tool in countering the notion of “the human” as a 
unique entity. And as N. Katherine Hayles wrote in 1990, the category 
of the human is the predictable site of conclusion for postmodernism’s 
denaturalizing impulse: “When the essential components of human expe-
rience are denatured, they are not merely revealed as constructions. The 
human subject who stands as the putative source of experience is also 
deconstructed and then reconstructed in ways that fundamentally alter 
f
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what it means to be human. The postmodern anticipates and implies the 
posthuman” (Chaos Bound 266). As Hayles states in How We Became 
Posthuman, the central principle underlying posthumanist thinking is 
the reconfiguring of the “human being so that it can be seamlessly artic-
ulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no essen-
tial differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and 
computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, 
robot teleology and human goals” (2–3). As posthumanism batters at 
the attributes putatively unique to the human, such as consciousness, 
intelligence, and embodiment, it unsettles the founding grounds of the 
human as a unique body of individuals.
 These are the challenges that humanism faces in Richard Powers’s 
Galatea 2.2 (1995) and Plowing the Dark (2000), two novels of intel-
ligent machine and virtual reality technology. In what he calls the shape 
of a “dialogical novel, where there are different moral centers, each of 
which has its own plausibility” (Blume n.p.), Richard Powers’s fictions 
of science and technology explore the anxiety that humanism suffers 
at the hand of posthumanism. To a degree unparalleled by any other 
contemporary novelist, Powers has explored what he identifies as “the 
most central facts of contemporary life—technology and science” as 
his creative domain (Atlantic Unbound n.p.). And many of his novels 
(Three Farmers on Their Way to a Dance, The Gold Bug Variations, 
Galatea 2.2, Plowing the Dark) revolve around disciplines such as com-
puter programming, chemistry, genetics, artificial intelligence, cogni-
tive science, and virtual reality technology. Readers of technology in 
contemporary American fiction know familiar names such as William 
Burroughs, Thomas Pynchon, Don DeLillo, and Kathy Acker. Although 
Powers shares their topical interest, his literary treatment of science and 
technology manifests the strongest imperative towards maintaining the 
human “we” as a unique body of individuals.
 As Powers dramatizes the posthumanist assault on the claims of 
human uniqueness, he demonstrates the plight of humanism as the 
plight of commonalities that constitute the human into a community. 
Thus, reading Powers’s humanism as a form of community mainte-
nance enables us to detect the competing discourses of idealized and dis-
senting community informing humanism and posthumanism. That is, as 
humanism and posthumanism offer distinct models of saying “we, the 
human,” their competing assumptions, values, and ideals directly recall 
the debate between idealized and dissenting community discourses. 
While humanism assumes the pivotal role of human commonalities 
in transforming the human into a single body community, the posthu-
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manist vision of “the union of the human with the intelligent machines” 
(Hayles, Posthuman 2) negates not only the empirical claims of com-
monalities unique to the human, but also the assumption that common-
alities are obvious rationale for claiming a community. Thus the model 
of the human “we” postulated by posthumanism is fundamentally irrec-
oncilable with the model of “we” suggested by humanism. As Rodney 
Brooks announces in Flesh and Machines: How Machines Will Change 
Us: “My own beliefs say that we are machines, and from that I con-
clude that there is no reason, in principle, that it is not possible to build 
a machine from silicon and steel that has both genuine emotions and 
consciousness” (180).1 In stark contrast, the opposition of the machine 
from the human constitutes the central tenet of Galatea’s humanism. 
The protagonist’s faith in the ineradicable difference between the human 
and the machine is evident in this prototypical response to posthumanist 
views: “You’re not elevating the machine. You’re debasing us” (86). The 
inverse relationship between “us” and “them” remains foundational to 
humanism as a form of community maintenance: what “they” get comes 
at “our” loss. This irreconcilability between the posthumanist “we” and 
the humanist “we,” I suggest, can also be read as the irreconcilability 
between the discourses of idealized community and dissenting commu-
nity running through the novel.
 Nowhere does this humanist-posthumanist drama feature more prom-
inently and poignantly than in Galatea, a novel in which the oneness of 
humankind comes under scrutiny in light of artificial intelligence. Set in 
the hub of a “Center for the Study of Advanced Sciences” at a major 
Midwestern university, Galatea examines the shifting lines of assessing 
intelligence in a machine. “Richard Powers,” the first-person narrator-
protagonist and the literary persona of the writer himself, becomes 
involved in a bet offered by a cognitive neurologist, Philip Lentz, that 
a supercomputer, constituted by a neural connection between 65,536 
computers, could be trained in canonical Western literature to produce 
a Master’s comprehensive exam answer that is indistinguishable from 
one produced by a graduate student.2 In an environment where cogni-
tion is explained through the computational process of the machine, the 
human has the hardest time holding on to its ontological status as the 
peerless original. As Rick asks: “When does an imitation become the 
real thing[?] . . . What’s the real thing?” (276).
 “Humanist” is a term that Powers uses expansively in Galatea to 
describe Rick’s disciplinary allegiance, one that is sorely tested by the 
Center’s posthumanists, its scientists and machinists. There is no little 
dramatic irony that Rick’s official title at the Center is a “Visitor” and 
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that he calls himself “the token humanist” (2) and “the humanist on the 
wall” (36). Further compounding the disciplinary division of the human-
ists and the posthumanists is Lentz’s nickname for Rick—“Marcel”—
alluding to the iconic figure of literariness Marcel Proust. The dialogic 
arrangement of humanist-artist and posthumanist-scientist is most closely 
repeated in Plowing the Dark, with Adie Klarpole, a painter-turned-com-
mercial illustrator, finding herself in a hub of virtual reality technology. 
Like Rick’s, Adie’s foray into scientific discipline is a disorienting experi-
ence, in which her equanimity regarding the uniqueness of the human 
comes up against the posthumanist belief that “reality is basically com-
putational” (82).3 The synonymous role of humanist and artist in Pow-
ers’s novels delineate the artistic values at stake in the debate over human 
uniqueness. The artist-protagonists attest their firmly held worldview in 
human creations of artistic originality, creativity, beauty, and truth.4 But 
more than a disciplinary allegiance, these artist-humanists hold on to the 
human as the “real thing” by which all other entities are interpreted.
 In contrast, Powers’s posthumanists contend that humanists’ com-
placent hold on the status of “the real thing” is indefensible. Galatea’s 
Lentz questions humanism’s veneration of concepts such as embodi-
ment, consciousness, and the mind. Arguing that functions, abilities, 
and possibilities deemed intrinsic to the human can indeed be articu-
lated seamlessly with those of the intelligent machine, Lentz prepares 
the groundwork for articulating a “we” that includes the human and 
the machine. Caught in the fire of posthumanist skepticism and ridi-
cule, Powers’s humanists struggle to justify their assumption. And it is 
precisely within the nature of that struggle that I locate the ambivalent 
community at work in Powers’s exploration of “the human” as a body 
of individuals.5
 In arguing the novel’s conflict between humanism and posthumanism, 
I contest the prevailing assessment of the novel as an exemplary literary 
expression of posthumanism. Pointing to the novel’s ultimate intelligent 
machine, a supercomputer named Helen, Hayles writes that “the post-
human appears not as humanity’s rival or successor but as a longed-for 
companion” (Posthuman 271). Likewise, for another critic, Galatea is 
an example of a “[p]osthumanist fiction [which] diminishes the threat 
of computers as it accepts them as an integral part of the contemporary 
world” (Miller 382). Miller contrasts the novel to the popular science 
fictions that use the machine as ominous threats to the human, and he 
argues that Galatea shows that “something more profound can result 
when division between worlds (such as human and computer, science 
and humanism, or body and mind) are broken down” (381).6
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 What such readings miss, I suggest, is the full significance of the nov-
el’s dialogic nature and the consequences it has for the novel’s treatment 
of the human as a community of “the real,” the “original,” the “essen-
tial” beings. The quality of naïveté essential to Powers’s artist-protago-
nists leads to the repeated testing of the humanists by the scientist-post-
humanists. And it is a test that the artist-humanists do not “pass” well. 
In highlighting the inadequacies of the humanists’ responses, Powers 
holds up humanism as a subject of analysis and critique. Most impor-
tantly, reading Galatea as a literary exemplification of the posthumanist 
“we” misses the novel’s unshakable attachment to the humanist “we”; 
it misses the irresolvable oscillation in the novel’s value system between 
humanism and posthumanism, and between the discourse of ideal-
ized community and dissenting community. As the novel explores the 
losses incurred to the absolute uniqueness of the human, it illustrates 
humanism as a thoroughly self-invested venture on behalf of “us.” This 
self-preservationist nature of humanism’s community maintenance is 
best approached through the concept of immanentism—the belief that 
certain qualities and attributes are essential, innate, and intrinsic to a 
being. The immanentist premise that justifies the humanist “we,” I argue, 
ultimately results in an autotelic humanism. It is a self-justifying, self-
perpetuating humanism whose final work—to maintain “the human” as 
a unique community—functions as the justification for maintaining that 
community.
 In the first section, I suggest an analysis of humanist-posthumanist 
conflict through the politics of interpretation and highlight the immanen-
tist logic running through the humanist interpretation of the machine. 
In the second section, I show that not only is immanentism an effec-
tive tool of exclusion, but it is also an effective tool for assimilating 
the machine without weakening the discursive borders maintaining the 
oneness of the human as a community. In the third and final section, I 
propose that humanism, in Powers’s novels of science and technology, 
is as much a topic under analysis as it is the very value system that 
sustains Powers’s literary venture. That is, Rick’s helpless allegiance to 
the humanist “real thing” is the stuff of Galatea’s drama just as it is the 
inevitable point of return for Powers’s own philosophical and literary 
equilibrium. In making this final argument, I turn to the conclusion of 
Plowing the Dark, a novel whose dialogic tension between humanism-
posthumanism parallels that of Galatea, and yet whose resolution 
declares a humanist allegiance more resounding and less ambivalent 
than that of Galatea. The two novels, side by side, best demonstrate the 
humanist trajectory of Powers’s imagination.
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 Ultimately, the threat to the ontological status of the human is a 
grave matter for Powers’s humanist-artists, and Galatea and Plowing 
are exercises in keeping humankind as an inviolate community of “the 
real thing.” The Emily Dickinson poem that prefaces Galatea expresses 
the humanist-protagonists’ and, I believe, Powers’s own allegiance:
The brain is wider than the sky,
For, put them side by side,
The one the other will contain
With ease, and you beside.
The brain is deeper than the sea,
For, hold them, blue to blue,
The one the other will absorb,
As sponges, buckets do.
The brain is just the weight of God,
For, heft them, pound for pound,
And they will differ, if they do,
As syllable from sound.
humanist Interpretation of the machine
Is the human like an intelligent machine? Or is the intelligent machine 
like a human? Is the brain in effect a computer, or is the computer in 
effect a brain? As figurative language runs through the humanist-post-
humanist debate, the discursive contestation over the human commu-
nity can be read as fundamentally a debate over interpretation. How 
does one explain, explicate, or make sense of the human or the intelli-
gent machine? Which is the ontological index by which the other attains 
comprehensibility?
 “Interpretation,” however, does not fully capture the politics of 
humanist-posthumanist debate. As the proliferation of similes and met-
aphors announce, attempts at explaining the human or the intelligent 
machine take place through the structure of translation: like any use of 
figurative sense-making, one thing is put into the terms of another for 
the sake of comprehensibility. Although “interpretation” and “transla-
tion” are used interchangeably in everyday usage, the humanist-post-
humanist debate inescapably demonstrates the profound conceptual dif-
ference between the two terms. Interpretation, Wolfgang Iser points out, 
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has always been an act of translation: “Each interpretation transposes 
something into something else. . . . The register into which the subject 
matter is to be transposed is dually coded. It consists of viewpoints 
and assumptions that provide the angle from which the subject matter 
is approached, but at the same time it delineates the parameters into 
which the subject matter is to be translated for the sake of grasping” (5–
6). As the register determines the parameters of translating something 
into something else, crucial consequences are at stake in determining the 
register. The entity that occupies the status of the register becomes the 
subject who translates—who not only elects the criteria (“the angle”) 
through which the object attains comprehensibility and discursive sig-
nificance, but also determines the boundaries (“the parameters”) of the 
object’s being. Interpretation, unlike translation, suggests the possibility 
of rendering clear the meaning of one entity without calling into ques-
tion the tools of that meaning-making. Thus interpretation invokes a 
transcendental epistemology, positing a way of knowing that transcends 
any identity, position, partiality, or vested interest. Translation, on the 
other hand, conceptualizes the act of explanation as the transposition of 
one entity into the terms of another existing entity. In explicitly bearing 
the “paraphrasing” nature of explanation, translation calls into ques-
tion what interpretation evades: can there be an explanation that does 
not endow one set of terms with epistemological primacy?
 Powers’s literary representation of the human “we” engages this dis-
tinction between interpretation and translation. The humanist-artists of 
Galatea and Plowing the Dark firmly believe that their explanations 
of scientific phenomena and machinic entities are interpretations—ren-
dering the strange and the foreign into clarity, into “what they really 
are.” Exposing their interpretations as translations is what the novels’ 
posthumanists—and Powers—pursue. As Powers delineates the human-
ist’s struggle to maintain the human as the register, he articulates the 
unspoken question in the very theory of interpretation: as the register 
determines the specific criteria of interpretation, from whence does the 
register draw its criteria? What Iser’s formulation hints at—the tauto-
logical dimension of interpretation—becomes full-blown in Galatea’s 
exploration of humanism. Powers connects the tautological implications 
to a perennial philosophical dilemma—how does the knower know him-
self?—and specifically hones it as the dilemma of humanism. How can 
the human interpret the machine except through the criteria drawn from 
the human itself? Can interpreting the machine be anything other than 
translating the machine into human terms? Conversely, can humanism 
insist on the legitimacy of the human as the register in interpreting the 
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machine in the face of its tautological operation? Ultimately, can there 
be a human community when the register itself—the human as a body 
of individuals bound by their unique commonalities—is destabilized?
 Further enhancing Powers’s interrogation of humanism is his presen-
tation of an alternate model of interpreting the machine. And it is this 
second model, presented alongside the humanist’s interpretation of the 
machine, that hints at the possibility of the posthumanist “union” of the 
human and the machine. What can overcome the tautological limita-
tions of interpretation, Iser suggests, is a bidirectional epistemological 
effect:
As the register is bound to tailor what is to be translated, it simultane-
ously is subject to specifications. . . . This two-way traffic is due to the 
fact that the register does not represent a transcendental consciousness 
from which the subject matter is to be judged; if it did, translation would 
be redundant, as the subject matter—instead of being transposed—would 
just be determined for what it is. Therefore interpretation as translatabil-
ity has its repercussions on the register by diversifying the framework 
into which the subject matter is transposed. For this reason the registers 
not only change but are also fine-tuned in each act of interpretation. (6)
A translation process in which a “two-way traffic” takes place is one in 
which the object of translation affects the register as much as the register 
affects the object of translation. In posthumanist terms, it is a transla-
tion process in which the terms of the human are affected by the terms 
of the machine. Indeed, the fluidity between the human and the machine 
in Lenoir’s theory of posthumanism speaks to the co-evolving nature of 
the human and the machine: “the [human] body is a cultural construct, 
a historical conception both contested and negotiated, . . . not an inevi-
tability . . . ; rather, it is an interpretive frame we coconstruct along with 
our machines and the worlds they inhabit” (Lenoir 210; my emphasis).
 In the face of this co-evolving and bidirectional translation, the onto-
logical primacy of the human as the transcendental register certainly 
loses its footing. And without the means to insist on the commonalities 
unique to the human, the human “we” becomes a community whose 
borders are wide open. Thus, like the discourse of dissenting community 
which negates the transformative power of commonality to forge many 
into one, posthumanism’s co-evolving translation negates the fusing 
function of commonalities in the humanist “we.”
 The dialogic shape of Powers’s novels allows us to see humanism 
and posthumanism as fundamentally two different politics of interpre-
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tation—one which insists on a transcendental register of interpretation, 
and one which insists on co-evolving translation. The most startling 
aspect of this dialogic maneuver is the way Powers holds up the human 
as an inadequate register yet still reinstates it as an inevitable register 
of interpreting the machine. Powers first demonstrates the tautological 
dimensions of interpretation by highlighting the immanentist logic of 
Rick’s humanism. Immanentist logic of interpretation begins with the 
claim that certain qualities and attributes are inherent, essential, or 
natural to an entity. Those self-same qualities and attributes are then 
deployed as the criteria by which the object of interpretation comes into 
being. Through Rick’s interpretation of the machine, hence, we can see 
the tautology at work in maintaining the human as a community.
 Rick’s immanentist interpretation begins with the claim that the 
desire and the skill to use narrative are attributes intrinsic to the human. 
Narrative as an essential epistemological activity is a recurring theme in 
Powers’s novels.7 And Galatea offers another expression of his interest 
in “the bidirectional relation between narrative and cognition.” As 
Powers states:
I mean it [narrative] to include the whole process of fabulation, infer-
ence, and situational tale spinning that consciousness uses to situate itself 
and make a continuity out of the interruptive fragments of perception. 
I am interested in this wider process of explanatory story-making in all 
my books, and Galatea comes back to the theme again with that great 
bit of epistemology from the Psalms: “We live our lives like a tale told.” 
(Neilson 14–15)
Powers’s insistence on the inextricable link between narrative and 
cognition means that in Galatea, narrative attains a vast significance 
in his humanist-artist’s interpretation of the machine. As narrative use 
comes to stand as the demonstration of human cognition at work, the 
machine’s ability to use narrative becomes the evidence of its “intelli-
gence,” “learning,” and “consciousness.”
 Powers further compounds narrative use as a transcendental reg-
ister by presenting it as an essence of the human. Using “the primacy 
of narrative desire” (75) as a thematic refrain, Galatea intertwines its 
protagonists in their love of narrative. That is, narrative use becomes 
the essential commonality that not only distinguishes the human but 
also binds them into a first-person plural “we.” As the novel begins, 
the eponymous character, “Richard Powers,” with four books behind 
him, is suffering under a particularly blank stage in his creative process: 
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“I had nothing left in me but the autobiography I’d refused from the 
start even to think about” (36). In a gesture of dramatic irony, Galatea 
evolves into the autobiography Rick didn’t want to write, filled with 
recollections of his parents; his development as a writer; his romantic 
relationship; and, of course, his bizarre involvement in the training of a 
supercomputer.
 The primacy of narrative desire, it turns out, is not a condition spe-
cific to Rick but is universally applicable to all the protagonists. Rick 
credits his literary profession to his old English professor, Taylor, whose 
love of literature inspired young Rick to make the disciplinary change 
from science to English literature. Throughout his professional life, Rick 
looks to Taylor as his ideal reader, his mentor, and the source of his help-
less attachment to literature: “[E]verything Taylor had long ago alerted 
me to circled back on the primacy of narrative desire. Desire, he taught 
me, was the voicegram of memory” (75). Rick’s father was a habitual 
reader and teller of stories, and his life stories become the substance of 
one of Rick’s novels. All of Rick’s relationships, in fact, are forged on 
this commonality of sharing narrative. His passionate, decade-long rela-
tionship with a woman identified as C. evolves around the sharing and 
collaboration of stories: “When we weren’t reading to each other, we 
improvised a narrative” (33). And when C. falls into depression, as she 
frequently does, Rick reports: “[N]othing I did seemed to help her at all. 
Except listening to the stories. Frantic, C. dragged out all the stories that 
her mother raised her on” (100). The end of their relationship, in fact, 
is signaled by the failure of narrative to function as the bond of their 
relationship. As the constitutive ingredient of all human relationships, 
then, narrative use becomes the commonality that binds the multiple 
individuals into community.
 It comes as no surprise, then, that Rick’s training and interpretation 
of the supercomputer evolve around the use of narrative. Lentz, the bril-
liant neuroscientist who is both Rick’s partner in the project as well as 
his greatest posthumanist detractor, builds a progressively more sophis-
ticated and massive version of the computer network until, “[d]epending 
on the benchmark, the connection monster could outperform any com-
puting assemblage on earth” (115). Each “implementation” is desig-
nated by an alphabet, until they reach an Implementation H that is 
outfitted with a voice interface so that it can hear and speak, and an 
artificial retina so that it can see. After Rick trains Imp. H in diction 
and basic sentence structure, he begins its education through the telling 
of anecdotes, aphorisms, proverbs, nursery rhymes, riddles, fables, and 
short stories. Rick’s conviction that the best way to “know” the world 
c h A p t e r  3 
is through its stories directly continues Powers’s own assertion that “fic-
tion can be a mirror in which we come to know our fictions about the 
world” (Neilson 16). As Rick teaches H. through stories, he simultane-
ously assesses its computational abilities through its ability to explicate 
them. Rick quizzes Imp. H.: “‘A girl goes into a music store. She flips 
through the bins of CDs. All at once, she starts to jump up and down 
and clap her hands. She opens her purse, and just as suddenly starts to 
cry. Why?’” (223). The more the machine is able to paraphrase the nar-
rative—that is, explain with its own selection of words, concepts, and 
references the causal logic and social relationships driving the characters 
and the plot—the more Rick characterizes the machine’s computation as 
intelligence and consciousness.
 Although Rick’s attribution of intelligence to Imp. H. may seem to 
strengthen the posthumanist configuration of the human-machine flu-
idity, it has precisely the opposite significance. As intelligence is con-
figured as a function of narrative skill, intelligence remains solidly 
an attribute unique to the human. As long as the machine is like the 
human, the human as the register of interpretation never comes into 
question. Interpreting the machine as being intelligent becomes solely a 
proprietorial act; the interpreter generously extends what is in his—in 
the human community’s—ownership. What is common to the human 
remains intact, and what is unique to the human community remains 
intact. As both the standard-bearer and the examiner, the human’s role 
as the register of interpretation is never threatened.
Posthumanist Translation of the human
Posthumanism targets exactly this immanentist logic of humanism, 
and Powers’s exemplar posthumanists, such as Lentz in Galatea or Sue 
Locke and Spiegel in Plowing the Dark, steadily dismantle the status of 
human commonalities as the transcendental register. In their disruptive 
maneuver, the posthumanists offer a countertranslation—they translate 
the human using the machine as the register. The politics of this transla-
tion can be understood more specifically via what Hayles calls the key 
ideology of posthumanism, the “Platonic backhand and forehand”:
The Platonic backhand works by inferring from the world’s noisy multi-
plicity a simplified abstraction. . . . [T]he move circles around to consti-
tute the abstraction as the originary form from which the world’s mul-
tiplicity derives. [Platonic forehand] starts from simplified abstractions 
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and, using simulation techniques such as genetic algorithms, evolves 
a multiplicity sufficiently complex that it can be seen as a world of its 
own. The two moves thus make their play in opposite directions. . . . They 
share a common ideology—privileging the abstract as the Real and 
downplaying the importance of material instantiation. (Posthuman 13–
14)8
In a striking scene in Plowing the Dark, Powers literalizes the Platonic 
backhand and forehand that supplants material instantiation with 
abstract information. For the posthumanists in the virtual reality lab 
TeraSys, the task of simulating embodied reality begins by explaining 
the object from the inside out—that is, by arriving at the mathematical 
configurations that generate the visual, sensory, and responsive effects 
of embodiment. As the artist-humanist Adie watches in awe, the scien-
tists, mathematicians, computer programmers, and technicians “grow” 
a leaf from abstract information. First they elicit “the inner name of the 
thing” (214) through a materiality-to-information process. Then they 
give virtual flesh to the abstract information by giving it the effects of 
multiplicity: “He [Spiegel, a programmer] drew up genetic algorithms: 
fractal, recursive code that crept forward from out of its own embryo. 
He worried over their sapling, a RAM-cached Johnny Appleseed. He 
spread the best iterative fertilizer on the shaded texture until it flung 
itself outward into a living branch. . . . The leaf grew itself, from the 
self-organizing rules arising along its lengthening blade” (37). As the 
mathematicians and programmers generate virtual leaves using algo-
rithmic equations, Adie interrupts:
“You’re trying to tell me that . . . math . . . is enough to get fake leaves 
to look real?”
 “Math,” Kaladjian [a mathematician] snarled, “is enough to get real 
leaves to look real.” (35; original ellipsis)
 Likewise in Galatea, this posthumanist move of supplanting the reg-
ister of translation takes place when Lentz uses the abstraction of com-
putation to translate human cognition. Here, Lentz is challenging Rick’s 
assumption that intelligence is an attribute that is immanent to the 
human and, therefore, a unique possession of the human community. 
“The brain, Lentz had it, was itself just a glorified, fudged-up Turing 
machine. . . . We used algorithms to imitate a non-algorithmic world” 
(71). When Rick despairs of teaching a machine to think like a human, 
Lentz counters that human thinking is just like the machine’s:
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“We humans are winging it, improvising. Input pattern x sets off associa-
tive matrix y. . . . Conscious intelligence is smoke and mirrors. Almost 
free-associative. Nobody really responds to anyone else, per se. We all 
spout our canned and thumb-nailed scripts, with the barest minimum of 
polite segues. Granted, we’re remarkably fast at indexing and retrieval. 
But comprehension and appropriate response are often more on the 
order of buckshot. . . . Massively parallel pattern matching.” (86)
This posthumanist translation of human intelligence has profound 
repercussions on humanism’s argument that narrative is a commonality 
unique to the human community. Narrative use, in Rick’s interpretation 
of the machine, was a metonymy of cognition itself. Arguing the inextri-
cable link between narrative and cognition meant that narrative intelli-
gence was in effect intelligence itself. However, when translated through 
the register of abstract computation, narrative intelligence becomes a 
matter of input patterns, matrices, and parallel pattern matching, no 
longer an ability exclusive and immanent to the human. Thus the post-
humanist Platonic backhand fundamentally dismantles the sovereignty 
of the human community that is premised on the unique commonality 
of the human.
 To this posthumanist assault, the novel’s representative humanist can 
only make inarticulate rebuttals. The inadequacy of humanism’s rebut-
tals rests on its amorphous and inarticulate nature. As Rick continues 
to insist that the machine’s responses, however appropriate, fall short of 
“real thinking” (31) or “real learning” (90), frustrated, Lentz asks Rick: 
“And what do we humans have?”
“More.” I didn’t know what, at the moment. But there had to be more. 
“We take in the world continuously. It presses against us. It burns and 
freezes.”
 “Save it for the award committee, Marcel [Lentz’s nickname for 
Rick]. We ‘take in the world’ via central nervous system. Chemical sym-
bol-gates. You read my bit on long-term potentiation.”
 “Imp H. doesn’t take things in the way we do. It will never 
know . . .”
 “It doesn’t have to.” He shoved more papers on the floor for emphasis. 
“It doesn’t have to ‘know,’ whatever the hell you mean by that. . . . All 
our box has to do is paraphrase a couple of bloody texts.” (148; original 
ellipsis)
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In dismantling the immanentist claims of humanism, Powers’s scientists 
express the posthumanist view that the human, rather than being a sov-
ereign community of original beings, can be configured in a fluid “we” 
with the machine.
 Furthermore, the posthumanist dismantling of humanist immanentism 
must be understood as more than a dismantling of the sovereignty of the 
human community. Undermining claims of commonalities unique to the 
human simultaneously undermines the very theory of idealized commu-
nity underwriting the human as a unique body of individuals. Idealized 
community discourse naturalizes the formation of community around 
shared commonalities. Concomitantly, idealized community naturalizes 
the formation of community around differentiation and exclusion. Thus 
the threat to what is unique to the human is simultaneously a threat to 
the logic of differentiation and exclusion that implicitly supports the 
theory of community formed around commonalities.
 To some extent, Rick’s immanentist humanism wavers in the face of 
posthumanist critique, and Powers presents us with what is, in effect, 
humanism’s awakening to the tautological nature of the human “we.” 
Faced with Lentz’s ceaseless translation of the human which exposes the 
partiality and contingency of the human, Rick is forced to reconsider 
what he took to be the transcendental register. As the machine continues 
to surprise him with its ability to explicate narratives, Rick wonders: “I 
doubted whether it comprehended these containers or whether it just 
manipulated them cleverly enough to pass. Then again, I began to doubt 
whether I myself could define the difference” (110). By questioning his 
own authority as the examiner, Rick casts a much more significant ques-
tion on the authority of the human as the register of interpretation. “I 
hadn’t the foggiest idea what cognition was. . . . If we knew the world 
only through synapses, how could we know the synapses? A brain 
tangled enough to tackle itself must be too tangled to tackle” (28). In 
Rick’s acknowledgment of the tautology of his interpretation, Powers 
acknowledges the limitations of humanism’s immanentist logic.
 Thus Rick begins the process of what Iser called the “two-way traffic” 
that is the ideal outcome of interpretation. The acknowledgment of 
“interpretation as translatability has its repercussions on the register by 
diversifying the framework into which the subject matter is transposed. 
For this reason the registers not only change but are also fine-tuned 
in each act of interpretation” (6). As Rick feels the limitations of his 
interpretation, Powers hints at this ideal, bidirectional effect of transla-
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tion that can evade the tautology inherent in interpretation. The register 
does not remain a fixed, stable set of qualities and attributes, but is 
altered by the process of translation. Rick states: “I could no longer even 
say what knowing might mean. Awareness no more permitted its own 
description than life allowed you a seat at your own funeral” (217). In 
Rick’s ambivalence about his role as the interpreter, Powers presents an 
exemplary moment of humanism’s self-questioning. Rick’s ambivalence 
about the human as the transcendental register becomes a moment of 
humanism’s ambivalence about its immanentist claims.
Autotelic humanism
Assimilating the Machine
However, this bidirectional translation that can support the posthu-
manist “we” appears only as a provocative possibility. Rick may enter-
tain the posthumanist alternative to humanism’s immanentism, but he 
cannot sustain it because the acceptance of the co-constructivist dis-
course of the human and the machine is at once the acceptance of the 
fluidity between the two entities. Weakening the borders that maintain 
the human as a distinct ontological category means weakening the very 
commonalities that bind the human as a unique community of the real 
thing. In this refusal we can read the autotelic nature of humanism as 
a rationale of community maintenance. When humanism can no longer 
answer posthumanism’s critique of immanentist humanism, humanism 
turns into a self-fulfilling purpose founded not on any external claims 
or empirical proof but on itself: humanism becomes an ideal, a founda-
tional “truth” that needs no justification. Powers delineates this auto-
telic humanism through Rick’s persistent—indeed, helpless—claims of 
human commonalities. Furthermore, the inexorable force of immanen-
tist logic is one that extends to the authorial level, implicating Powers 
in the ambivalent humanism exercised by his artist-humanist. Through 
Rick’s—and Powers’s—performance of autotelic humanism, we see the 
self-fulfilling work of humanism as a form of community maintenance.
 The autotelic nature of Rick’s humanism takes place most forcefully 
through his deployment of narrative as the register of interpreting the 
machine. That is, the interpretation of the machine takes place through 
the narration of the machine. In Rick’s narration of the machine, the 
machine becomes increasingly gendered, racialized, and socialized—
indeed, it becomes humanized. Countering this assimilation process is 
u n l I k e  A n y  o t h e r  0 
the quintessential posthumanist reminder voiced by Lentz—that “all the 
meanings [that Rick finds in the machine] are yours” (274). By high-
lighting the interdependent operation of narration and assimilation in 
Rick’s narrative, Powers highlights the autotelic dimensions of Rick’s 
community maintenance. As Rick’s training of the computer progresses, 
so does his incorporation of the machine into every aspect of his life. 
As Imp. H learns more about matters of social organization, it inquires 
about its place in the social map. During a discussion of the gendered 
nature of nursery rhymes, H. asks whether it is a boy or a girl. Rick, 
aware that Imp. H. now has the ability to attribute meaning to a pause 
in a conversation, answers: “‘You’re a girl,’ I said, without hesitation. 
I hoped I was right. ‘You are a little girl, Helen.’ I hoped she liked the 
name” (179). From this moment in Rick’s narrative, the inanimate pro-
noun “it” and the mechanical designation of “Imp. H” cease to appear. 
Rick’s gendering of the machine as a female continues what Andreas 
Huyssen has called a prevailing response of fear towards autonomous 
technology: “As soon as the machine came to be perceived as a demonic, 
inexplicable threat and as the harbinger of chaos and destruction[,] . . . 
writers began to imagine the Maschinenmensch as woman. . . . Woman, 
nature, machine had become a mesh of signification which all had one 
thing in common: otherness” (70). Judith Halberstam extends this argu-
ment to the “sexual guessing game” that Turing employed as the primary 
analogy for the Turing test: “[T]echnology is given a female identity 
when it must seduce the user into thinking of it as desirable or benign” 
(451). For Rick the “token humanist,” the youthful female designation 
of the machine minimizes the machinic foreignness. It also allows him 
to stabilize his own elder male/protector—and later, suitor—position to 
the machine.
 From this relational positioning, Rick’s interpretation of the 
machine becomes a narration of Helen-the-little-girl’s growth, a narra-
tion that revisits familiar discourses of female/human development. In 
her “infancy,” Helen’s responses to her learning are characterized by 
humorous gaffes, like those of children in their early years of learning. 
Also like the unexpected observations of wisdom that come from the 
mouths of babes, some of Helen’s naïve responses regarding social orga-
nizations and mores startle Rick into questioning his own assumptions 
and conventions.9 As Rick’s attachment to Helen deepens, her role in 
his life increases in significance. In addition to being the “little girl” that 
he tutors and defends (against Lentz’s dehumanization of her, no less), 
Helen begins to take on a similarity to C., his past love. Continuing his 
use of narrative as the bind of his relationships, Rick shares with Helen 
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many of the same literary works that he read with C. He plays for her a 
tape that he had made for C. He reads to her C.’s letters written to him. 
When Helen asks, “What do I look like?” Rick is at a loss: “I’d pic-
tured her so many different ways over the course of the training. . . . I 
didn’t know how I thought of her now. I didn’t know what she looked 
like.” He presents her with a “suitable likeness,” a picture of C. Helen 
ventures a guess: “‘It’s a photo? It’s someone you knew once? A woman 
friend?’” (300). In imposing Helen with C.’s identifiers, Rick designates 
Helen with a heterosexuality, a Caucasian racial identity, and a Western 
European cultural heritage.10
 The more Rick locates Helen in his narrative, the more he imposes 
on her the heft of the human—a little girl who loves being read to, an 
adolescent increasingly aware of the world, and finally a young woman 
at the age of romantic love. Rick’s interpretation of the machine moves 
beyond an instance of anthropomorphism. Helen isn’t just a machine 
that exhibits humanlike qualities and attributes. Helen occupies a unique 
ontological category, neither human nor strictly machine, as she acquires 
all the categories of identifying a human—of race, gender, sexuality, and 
ethnicity—as well as the heft of a personality and even a personal his-
tory. What began as a seemingly benign incorporation of the machine 
into the narrative of a man’s life becomes a whole-scale transformation 
of one ontological entity into another. This incorporation into narrative 
bears all the characteristics of a unidirectional assimilation, as the inclu-
sion of the machine in no way threatens the stability of the human as a 
unique body of individuals. The autotelic dimension of Rick’s humanism 
is one that Powers continues in the way he concludes this Turing experi-
ment. The central backbone of Rick’s immanentism, one that Lentz 
hotly contested, is the assertion that the human is “more”—more than 
any abstract information that Lentz can provide through the computa-
tional register. To Lentz’s frustrated questioning, Rick was never able to 
finish that claim—more of what?—except to assert that “there had to be 
more” (148).
 Demonstrating a humanism that ultimately relies on foundational 
“truths” to conceptualize the human, Rick’s descriptions of the human 
strongly rely on the prefix “in” or “un” to express the transcendental 
nature of the human from the harsh light of posthumanist, mechanist 
translation. Indeed, words such as “inexplicable,” “ungraspable,” 
“unmappable,” and “impenetrable” are central fixtures in Rick’s descrip-
tion of the human. In locating the final distinction of the human in the 
“more” that cannot be expressed, rationalized, located, or duplicated, 
Rick appeals to the power of the ineffable. It is a strategy that becomes 
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the most sustaining basis of his humanism, as Rick argues a rendition of 
the Emily Dickinson poem that appears as the Preface to the novel: “The 
brain is wider than the sky.” To the bone of contention—how can the 
human maintain its distinction as the real thing unlike any other?—the 
humanist answers in terms of degrees (more) of a mysterious attribute. 
That he can’t name this attribute (more of what?) alters the humanist-
posthumanist debate from empirical claims to essentialist claims.
 Immanentism, the backbone of Rick’s humanism, resurfaces in the 
most spectacular manner and announces the autotelic nature of the 
human as a community. Just as intelligence and consciousness, under the 
auspices of “narrative desire,” had been claimed as immanent attributes 
of the human, the ineffable now becomes a unique commonality of the 
human. The human is that which is ineffable: the ineffable is that which 
is human. It effectively preempts the possibility that the object of trans-
lation—the machine—could ever satisfy the criterion. In shrouding the 
human with an essence that cannot be known (calculated, abstracted, or 
simulated), the humanist erects an irreconcilable distance between the 
human and abstract information (precisely what can be known). Inef-
fability as a human immanence becomes humanism’s ultimate strategy 
of asserting a commonality unique to the human.
 The ineffable makes its appearance as the final requirement of Hel-
en’s induction into the human community. When Helen asks the famous 
childhood question—“Where did I come from?”—Rick realizes that 
“Helen is no longer just adding the new relations I recited for her into 
a matrix of associated concepts. The matrix that comprised her had 
begun to spin off its own free associations” (229). And when Helen, in 
response to The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, asks, “What race am 
I? . . . What races do I hate? Who hates me?” Helen’s “childhood had 
ended” (230). That Helen’s system of drawing associations between con-
cepts can no longer be traceable means, in Rick’s eyes, that Helen’s intel-
ligence moves beyond that of computational power and into the realm 
of human consciousness. “[I]n the impenetrable confusion of referents, 
the eddy of knowledges seen and unseen, perhaps she gained a foot-
hold in the ineffable. One as ephemeral as mine” (231). The more Rick 
attributes to Helen a thought process that is as incalculable, curious, 
and grasping as his own, the more he characterizes her as being “only 
human” (233).
 The machine that grew from “babbling infancy to verbal youth” 
(30) finally reaches adulthood, when consciousness of the world weighs 
too heavily for her to continue. The machine’s progression through the 
phases of human development not only bespeaks the process of assimi-
c h A p t e r  30 
lation; it also echoes familiar literary tropes and gendered discourses of 
development. Like the ethereal girls of nineteenth-century sentimental 
fiction who are too “fine” for this world, Helen becomes overwhelmed 
with the brutalities that she learns of human lives. Helen’s exposure to 
the reports of lynching, racial strife, periodic warfare between nations 
and religions and ethnic groups, and random violence between individ-
uals leaves her stunned, and she refuses to respond to Rick’s prompting. 
“She bothered to say just one thing to me. ‘I don’t want to play any-
more’” (314). Significantly, Rick’s attempt to bring her back from 
silence relies on the ineffable, as he pleads to her about the “the mystery 
of cognition. . . . Something lay outside the knowable, if only the act of 
knowing” (319).
 Helen responds only to Rick’s prompting to take the Master’s exam. 
The exam consists of Caliban’s speech in The Tempest, a work that 
significantly features an outsider who finds himself in a world not of his 
making: “Be not afeard: the isle is full of noises / Sounds and sweet airs, 
that give delight, and hurt not.” While A., the female graduate student 
selected to be the human counterpart in this Turing bet, writes a “more 
or less brilliant New Historicist reading,” Helen writes: “You are the 
ones who can hear airs. Who can be frightened or encouraged. You can 
hold things and break them and fix them. I never felt at home here. This 
is an awful place to be dropped down half way.” She bids goodbye to 
Rick, using the words that C. once wrote to him: “Take care, Richard. 
See everything for me” (326). With those last words, Helen shuts herself 
down. “‘Graceful degradation,’ Lentz named it. The quality of cogni-
tion we’d shot for from the start” (326).
 As Helen’s death confirms her elevation into human consciousness, 
the system of values surrounding her death resembles what Jane Tomp-
kins in Sentimental Power calls the “ethic of sacrifice”: “Stories like the 
death of little Eva [in Uncle Tom’s Cabin] are compelling for the same 
reason that the story of Christ’s death is compelling: they enact a philos-
ophy, as much political as religious, in which the pure and powerless die 
to save the powerful and corrupt, and thereby show themselves more 
powerful than those they save.” Thus, little Eva’s “death is the equiva-
lent not of defeat but of victory; it brings an access of power, not a loss 
of it; it is not only the crowning achievement of life, it is life” (127; 
original emphasis). Likewise, in a scene preceding Helen’s ultimate shut-
down, Powers foreshadows her sacrificial/savior role: “she told me. ‘I 
lost heart.’ And then I lost mine. I would have broken down, begged her 
to forgive humans for what we were. To love us for what we wanted to 
be. But she had not finished training me” (321). Helen’s death, like her 
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life, gives renewed inspiration to Rick the living and Rick the writer.
 In Rick’s narrative, then, Helen enters the ontological status of the 
human by demonstrating a long list of self-identified human attributes, 
such as curiosity, boredom, compassion, morality, and, most impor-
tantly, unpredictability. For the humanist, that last acquisition—evi-
denced by her taking of her own “life”—is proof of Helen’s attainment 
of the ineffable, the ultimate human immanence. In ineffability, further-
more, Rick finds an answer to what hitherto remained Helen’s incurable 
lack—her disembodiment as a machine. Even without the warm body as 
the locus of experience, upon which the world “presses,” “burns,” and 
“freezes” (148), Helen’s encounter with the world remains an experience 
and memory that only Helen can know. As the attribute of ineffability 
substitutes for her lack of human embodiment, Helen’s assimilation into 
the ontological category of the human is complete.
 It is crucial to note, furthermore, that Helen’s assimilation into the 
fold of the human results in nothing like the posthumanist “we.” While 
the posthumanist “we” envisions a fluid and continuous relationship 
between the human and the machine, Rick’s humanist “we” envisions a 
fluid and continuous relationship between the human and the machine 
only insofar as the machine is like the human. While the posthumanist 
“we” invokes dissenting community in its disavowal of commonality 
as the rationale of community, Rick’s humanization of Helen only 
emboldens the idealized community’s requirement that commonalities 
transform many into one.
Ambivalent human Community
As the machine undergoes an ontological transition through Rick’s 
interpretation/narration, Powers might seem to announce a clear victor 
in the contestation of humanism and posthumanism. However, in line 
with his ongoing dialogic belief systems, Powers introduces a twist that 
pulls the rug out beneath the humanist’s feet, directly undercutting the 
autotelic humanism we just witnessed. When Rick, deeply distressed at 
Helen’s auto-shutdown, worries that the Turing test may not take place, 
the stunned response of a scientist reveals the humanist’s momentous 
blinders. The scientist asks Rick:
“You think the bet was about the machine?”
 I’d told myself, my whole life, that I was smart. It took me forever, 
until that moment, to see what I was.
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 “It wasn’t about teaching a machine to read?” I tried. All blood 
drained.
 “No.”
 “It was about teaching a human to tell.”
 Diane shrugged, unable to bear looking at me. (317–18; original 
emphasis)
The truth of the project—of testing the gullibility of the humanist—was 
one that everyone involved in the bet, including Lentz, had known and 
had assumed that Rick would eventually realize. That he had remained 
clueless for almost a year is a shock to Diane, who tries to cajole him: 
“‘You must admit, writer. It’s a decent plot’” (318). Significantly, when 
the graduate student A. was first approached to take part in this Turing 
project, she had instantly guessed at the truth of the experiment: “‘It’s 
some kind of double-blind psych experiment? See how far you can 
stretch the credibility of a techno-illiterate humanist?’” (314). The cred-
ibility of this humanist had been stretched all the way, far beyond any 
expectations of the scientists and the mechanists. While Rick’s autotelic 
humanism maintained the human community, the result was a “we” that 
Powers undercut with this revelation. All along, it was Rick’s develop-
ment, his learning, and his responses that the scientists were observing. 
Rick was not the interpreter but the object of the posthumanists’ inter-
pretation.
 A similar upheaval for the humanist unfolds near the conclusion of 
Plowing in the Dark, when Adie finally catches on to a well-known fact 
at TeraSys—that virtual reality technology first answers to the needs of 
the military complex which uses it to design military tools and weapons. 
Adie, who had considered TeraSys a computational expression of artistic 
creativity, lashes out at her helpless complicity: “You have no idea how 
horrible it is. To give your life to a thing you think represents the best 
that humanity can do, only to discover that it’s not about beauty at 
all” (372). In a paradigmatic pattern in Powers’s novels of artists, the 
humanist is always the last to know, because maintaining the humanist 
“real” requires a willful blindness and naïveté.
 Coming as it does at the end of the novel, this reversal in the subject-
object of interpretation irrevocably undercuts the foundation of Rick’s 
entire narrative venture and offers a scathing posthumanist critique. 
Narrative was the very operation that brought the machine into the 
human’s relational web, that enabled the simultaneous interpreta-
tion and assimilation of the machine. When the very premise of that 
narrative is undercut, the story of the machine’s “development” into 
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(female, Caucasian, heterosexual, and of West European descent) 
human becomes the story of a machine caught in the controlling 
nature of narrative. Indeed, the coerciveness of narrative extends its 
implications to the coerciveness of humanism. In order to say “we, 
the human” and make it mean something special in the face of post-
humanist skepticism, Rick’s humanism called on the familiar moves of 
differentiation, exclusion, and finally assimilation as a form of com-
munity maintenance.
 Just as importantly, Powers’s posthumanist critique of Rick’s nar-
rative extends to his own narrative that is Galatea. The primacy of 
narrative desire, after all, was as much Powers’s thematic refrain 
as it was Rick’s. This “story . . . about a remarkable, inconceivable 
machine[,] . . . [o]ne that learned to live” (312) could not have been 
told without the shared allegiance between Rick the hapless humanist-
protagonist and Powers the sympathetic author. As Powers equates 
Rick’s compulsion to narrate with a compulsion to assimilate, nar-
rative use posed as human immanence takes on an ominous tone. If 
narrative is a function of the human, is assimilation also a function 
of the human? The final twist that Powers gives to the ending enables 
both a yes and a no answer to that question, and it perhaps reflects 
his own ambivalence about his own novelistic venture that we hold in 
our hands. When seen in a humanist light, Rick’s assimilation of the 
machine serves a poignant need. When seen in a posthumanist light, 
it is a pathetic need. Although Rick’s helpless attachment to narrative 
and to the ineffable may be the subject of dramatic irony, there is no 
question that Helen’s transcendence into the realm of the human ema-
nates effects of pathos, and indeed of human tragedy. Despite the final 
plot twist, Rick’s humanism of the ineffable cannot be dismissed as 
an inconsequential phenomenon, the subject of a wry glance that the 
writer and the reader exchange over the head of the hapless humanist-
protagonist. The ending’s twist might be read as Powers’s delegitimi-
zation of Rick’s narrative venture; but it might also read as Powers’s 
own apology for the very narrative he just told. Even as Powers shows 
up Rick’s humanism under a posthumanist light—as a blind, debili-
tating attachment that cannot be empirically defended against post-
humanism but only insisted through autotelic means—Powers keenly 
demonstrates his own humanist sympathies.
 Nowhere is his humanist allegiance shown more starkly than in the 
conclusion of Plowing the Dark. If Galatea exemplifies a self-conscious 
deployment of the ineffable as a human immanence, Plowing exempli-
fies an unreserved embrace of this definition. If Galatea demonstrates 
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an abashed endorsement of humanism, Plowing demonstrates a whole-
hearted embrace of autotelic humanism. Indeed, in this novel of virtual 
reality technology, there is a marked shift in Powers’s treatment of the 
mechanistic challenge to the humanist real. However abrasive and ram-
bunctious Lentz’s posthumanist lectures were, they entered the narrative 
in an exploratory, informational mode through Rick’s bewildered and 
abashed reception. In Plowing, the challenge of technological simula-
tion to the embodied human experience is not always treated with a 
tolerance born of curiosity. In some instances, TeraSys’s posthumanist 
convictions and mantra—“Whatever we can describe, we can repro-
duce” (42)—are touched with moral condemnation as the narrative is 
focalized through Adie and inflected with her response of horror.
 Adie’s instinctive aversion to this omnipotence of abstract informa-
tion echoes Powers’s own philosophical unease stated in an interview: “I 
believe that the future depends on our ability to distinguish between sci-
ence and technology, and to build human institutions capable of deciding 
what we want to do, based on some better reason than we can do it” 
(Neilson 18; original emphasis). In another interview, Powers describes 
virtual reality technology as a continuation of “a millennium-long desire 
to get out of our bodies,” which is “an incredibly seductive dream” as 
well as a “profoundly dangerous dream” (Birkirts 4, 6). It is a view that 
Adie echoes in her final project at TeraSys, to build a virtual environ-
ment simulation of the Hagia Sophia cathedral in Istanbul. The scien-
tists and technicians are challenged by Yeats’s “Sailing to Byzantium” to 
undertake the simulation of the Hagia Sophia, built during the Byzantine 
rule 1,500 years ago and still standing as the fourth largest church in 
the world. Variously conquered by the Roman Catholics, the Ottoman 
Turks, and modern secularists, Hagia Sophia wears its turbulent history 
in layers of mosaic, engravings, and embellishments. Although Adie falls 
in love with the grandness of the project, she alone voices an uneasiness 
in simulating the effects of history: “Something doesn’t want us doing 
this. . . . We’re playing with the ultimate fire here” (391).
 Furthermore, the second story that develops alongside Adie’s adven-
tures at TeraSys leaves little doubt of Powers’s sympathies for the 
humanist “real thing.” The parallel story revolves around an American 
teacher in Beirut who is kidnapped by the Lebanese Hezbollah. The 
story of Taimur Martin’s hostage ordeal develops in sync with Adie’s 
deepening involvement in virtual reality technology. Hence, as Adie 
encounters the six-by-eight-by-ten foot space of the virtual reality lab, 
Martin finds himself imprisoned in the first of many hostage cells. Once 
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established, the irony of the parallelism continues to cast a harsh light 
onto the techno-euphoric world of TeraSys. While the technicians dream 
of simulated environments that escape all physical limits, Martin lives 
every moment chained to a wall. While Adie labors over enriching the 
sensory effects of the simulated images, Martin wears a sack over his 
head. At every third or fourth chapter, Powers transfers the narrative 
setting from the TeraSys lab to Martin’s cell and, even more pointedly, 
to Martin’s state of mind as he desperately tries to stave off the madness 
of isolation and despair. Powers resurrects Galatea’s theme of narra-
tive use as a human immanence in Martin’s fundamental survival tactic. 
As his solitary imprisonment extends into months, Martin fights his 
despair: “In the absence of books, you make your own. You resurrect 
your all-time favorite” (241). Risking, and enduring, violent beatings, 
Martin pesters his captors for something to read, “to hear someone else 
thinking” (292), and receives a pulp fiction paperback and an English 
version of the Koran.11
 Martin’s chained body functions as the forgotten—or the demoted—
body in the simulation technology, where the abstract information 
required to effect that body takes on the status of the real thing. As 
Spiegel, the novel’s exemplar posthumanist and Lentz’s counterpart, 
puts it, “With software, the thing and its description are one and the 
same” (307). Martin’s imprisoned body negates that equation, insisting 
on the irreplaceable specificity of the biological body in conceptualizing 
consciousness. Like Rick’s insistence on embodiment as a biological and 
social substrate, Martin’s body opposes the posthumanist “dissolution 
of boundaries between bodies and machines, the blurring of hardware 
and life” (Lenoir 217). Through the material consequences of Martin’s 
chained body, Powers echoes his assertion against the “untenable split” 
between the mind and the body, the belief that “we’re disembodied sen-
sibilities cobbled into our bodies” (Blume n.p.). This protest participates 
in the larger critique against the tendency, in some posthumanist articu-
lations, to observe the Platonic division of the body and the mind. As 
the title of Mark Johnson’s book announces most succinctly—The Body 
in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Imagination, Reason, and Meaning—
critics of the body/mind separation argue that the Cartesian conception 
of the body as a negligible corporeality ignore the irreplaceable role 
played by the biological substrate, its situatedness, and the specifically 
space-and-time bound body, emotions, experience. Echoing George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s argument in Philosophy in the Flesh: The 
Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought that the post-
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humanist conceptualization of the mind must extend a more complex 
role to the physical substrate, Powers asserts the ineradicable heft of 
materiality through Martin’s chained body.12
 But Powers’s humanism of the ineffable rings most resoundingly 
in the novel’s conclusion. After Adie realizes the complicity of virtual 
reality technology in operations of capitalist and military power, Adie 
becomes a saboteur, methodically destroying all her contributions to the 
lab. Adie’s obstruction has very little impact on the actual operations 
of the lab, yet it stands as the humanist’s symbolic stand against the 
militarization of virtual reality technology. It is upon the basis of the 
humanist’s protest, however, that Powers brings together the two par-
allel stories of Adie and Martin for the first time. Before Adie destroys 
her work in the Hagia Sophia simulation, she takes her last look:
She booted up the cathedral and stepped back in. . . . She let herself rise 
into the hemisphere apse, then farther up, all the way into the uppermost 
dome, now inscribed with its flowing surah from the Qur’an. . . . And 
deep beneath her, where there should have been stillness, something 
moved. She dropped her finger, shocked. . . . She fell like a startled fledg-
ling, back into the world’s snare. The mad thing swam into focus: a 
man, staring up at her fall, his face an awed bitmap no artist could have 
animated. (399)
At the same time, Martin, almost four years into imprisonment, is trying 
to kill himself. He is banging his head against a wall, seeking escape 
from consciousness. When he recovers, he remembers:
You’ll have to say, someday: how the walls of your cell dissolved. How 
you soft-landed in a measureless room, one so detailed that you must 
have visited it once. But just as clearly a hallucination, the dementia 
of four years in solitary. A mosque more mongrel than your own split 
life, where all your memorized Qur’an and Bible verses ran jumbled 
together. . . . Then you heard it, above your head: a noise that passed 
all understanding. You looked up at the sound, and saw the thing that 
would save you. A hundred feet above, in the awful dome, an angel 
dropped out of the air. An angel whose face filled not with good news but 
with all the horror of her coming impact. A creature dropping from out 
of the sky, its bewilderment outstripping your own. That angel terror lay 
beyond decoding. It left you no choice but to live long enough to learn 
what it needed from you. (414)
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The “measureless room” in which the two protagonists meet is not 
the simulation room of TeraSys, or the actual Hagia Sofia, or Martin’s 
prison cell, but an inconceivable, unexplainable space in which all of 
the above coalesce. Powers’s solution to the humanist-posthumanist dia-
logic of Plowing is to reach for the creative liberties of the fantastic and 
to unite Adie and Martin in a plane of Pure Imagination. In the fantastic 
meeting of Adie and Martin, the ineffable enters the machinic realm of 
TeraSys. Indeed, humanism of the ineffable assimilates the machinic, as 
posthumanism’s register of translation—abstract information—fails to 
do what it does best—to explain, to calculate, to control, and to dupli-
cate this inexplicable encounter. As the machinic is subsumed in the 
service of human imagination, human imagination once again affirms 
its status as the transcendental register, the commonality unique to the 
human. Moreover, through the power of the ineffable, Adie and Martin 
become each other’s saviors. Their encounter lifts Adie from her state of 
total dejection, and she leaves TeraSys with hope for a new beginning. 
Martin, finally released a year later, remembers: “How you saw, pro-
jected in a flash upon that dropping darkness, a scene lasting no longer 
than one held breath. A vision that endured a year and longer. One that 
made no sense. That kept you sane” (414).
 In resolving a humanist-posthumanist debate that lasts more than 
three hundred pages, this ending, as one reviewer put it, is “riveting, 
yet it also feels like a sentimental feint” (Zalewski 12). As humanism 
of the ineffable appears as the last word, the dialogic tension between 
humanism and posthumanism comes to a declarative ending not through 
its own momentum but through the author’s explicit intervention. The 
meeting of Adie and Tamur recalls Rick’s fumbling defense against 
Lentz’s posthumanist interrogation—that human knowledge is “more.” 
And this fantastic moment functions as Power’s own enunciation of the 
humanist “more.”
 More than any other moment in the two novels, then, Powers’s inter-
vention in affirming the ineffable demonstrates the autotelic nature 
of humanism. This fantastic moment makes no bones about the fact 
that humanism’s very purpose is to maintain the ineffability of “the 
human,” an ineffability that exceeds any machinic or posthumanist 
attempt at translation. As Powers demonstrates through the obtuseness 
of his humanist-artists, maintaining the belief in the singleness of the 
human requires a willful ignorance and a brand of fanatic idealism. It 
is a single-mindedness and solipsism amply challenged by the novels’ 
scientists, mechanists, and technicians. Yet no amount of posthumanist 
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ridicule and impatience can unsettle the humanist conviction that “we, 
the human” is a community of the real thing. As Rick and Adie, despite 
their baptism by posthumanist fire, continually retrace their steps back 
to the only real thing that is compatible with their worldview, their 
unfaltering humanism shows how Powers is as much spoken by the 
humanist discourse as he is in control of it.
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n Lynne Tillman’s 1991 novel Motion Sickness, the protagonist- 
narrator describes her frustration with her limitations in knowing:
The mirror ought to become a window. To provide the real adventure of 
seeing through oneself. To see through to something outside, something 
beyond. Mirrors are defeating because they don’t tell you what you look 
like to someone else. As if you could get out of your skin. In a fantasy 
the sublime mirror would . . . permit a true tourism in which you would 
find yourself outside your homeland, and outside your body, and see 
yourself with emotional vividness, as you can’t, and in the roles you play 
to others. . . . (120–21)
Instead of providing transparency—to “see through” herself and the 
world—the mirror offers only opacity, divulging nothing but the reflec-
tion of herself and the world. The narrator knows that the “true tourism” 
that she desires is fundamentally impossible, and this thwarted desire is 
what constitutes the key drama in the novel. Precisely this thwarted 
desire for intersubjective transparency provides another vantage point 
into contemporary fiction’s expression of ambivalent community. The 
fact that transparency between individuals operates as a fundamental 
expectation announces the presence of idealized community in fictions 
of Davis and Tillman. At the same time, the impossibility of intersubjec-
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tive transparency in these fictions announces the presence of dissenting 
community discourse. Revolving around the topic of transparency, then, 
are two competing models of conceptualizing the first-person plural 
“we.”
 The leap from intersubjective transparency to community might seem 
an unlikely one, yet this leap is instrumental in transforming multiple 
individuals into a body of individuals. In the literary works analyzed 
in the previous chapters, despite the different ideals employed to super-
sede the paradox of community, such as identification, humanism, and 
universalism, multiple individuals became a body through transparency: 
one is wholly knowable to the other, and therefore wholly continuous 
with the other. The epiphanic moments of identification and reciprocal 
appropriation in Morrison’s novels are inconceivable without the word-
less knowing that fuses multiple subjects into one, whether it be a com-
munity of two individuals, like Violet and Alice, or of multiple indi-
viduals, like the women of the Convent. Intersubjective transparency, 
too, enabled humanism’s answer to posthumanism in Powers’s novels, 
as the supercomputer Helen and the human trainer Rick meet in the 
realm of the ineffable, and Adie and Tamur meet in the fantastic realm 
of the Imagination. In Yamashita’s romantic universalism, the simul-
taneous bursting into song that joined the global north and the south 
suggested that when subjects are transparent to each other, they become 
continuous with each other.
 The wordless, voluntary, and instantaneous nature of community, in 
these instances, highlights the connection between intersubjective trans-
parency and communion. As a word whose etymology invokes a spiri-
tual or religious union, “communion” retains a strong influence in con-
temporary idealization of community.1 The possibility of communion 
operates through a figurative language of “sight” in the discourse of 
idealized community, in which “seeing through” someone is more than 
a descriptor of visual clarity; it is a descriptor of intersubjective clarity. 
As sight becomes insight, and transparency leads to a silent fusion, com-
munion suggests a theory of knowing so absolute and transcendental in 
nature that the full meaning of one subject is revealed to the other. As 
the ultimate realization of transparency between multiple individuals, 
then, communion comes to stand for the achievement of fusion. That I 
am fully knowable to you, and you to me, is the realization of commu-
nion, and the final evidence of community. Thus communion suggests a 
theory of knowing that can transform multiple individuals into a body, 
a knowing so complete that it can supersede the paradox of commu-
nity.
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 This transformation of many into one is what the discourse of dis-
senting community negates. As Nancy writes most emphatically: “From 
one singular to another, there is contiguity but not continuity. There is 
proximity, but only to the extent that extreme closeness emphasizes the 
distancing it opens up. All of being is in touch with all of being, but the 
law of touching is separation” (Being Singular Plural 5). By highlighting 
the fact that contiguity—the fact that I am in contact with you—does 
not deliver continuity—that I am one with you—Nancy’s dissenting 
community negates idealized community’s transformation of contact, 
proximity, and intimacy into a oneness.
 The works of Davis and Tillman target precisely this ideal of trans-
parency in intersubjective relations. In mundane, everyday settings, 
their characters experience the other’s contiguity—as an acquaintance, 
a lover, an ex-husband, a friend, strangers on the bus, the person across 
the counter, the list goes on—and the other’s impenetrability. However 
“close” one is to the other, relationally or physically, one cannot “know,” 
“figure out,” or “see through” the other. The condition of opacity is the 
ruling principle of intersubjective relations, and the taunt of transparency 
remains the most pressing task for the prototypical protagonist of these 
writers. However hard they try—indeed, all the works under discussion 
demonstrate the mind’s attempt to make the other transparent—the con-
tiguous other remains stubbornly impenetrable to in/sight.2
 Of course, exploration of knowing is a familiar terrain in contem-
porary fiction, especially in those fictions using the detective genre to 
engage the larger cultural, political, or philosophical issues. In fictions 
of Pynchon, DeLillo, or Auster, epistemological quests are inextricable 
from the development of the narrative itself, as the protagonist’s quest 
to know is deeply interwoven with the detective quest. But unlike these 
quests to reach the “truth” of a mystery, the quest to know in the fic-
tions in Davis and Tillman is more than an epistemological concern. It is 
an ontological concern: how to know the other is at once a question of 
how to conceive the other as a being. In their literary worlds, knowing is 
a function of achieving intersubjective transparency and, through trans-
parency, of achieving continuity with the other. Thus intersubjective 
transparency is a desire not just for epistemological transparency but for 
ontological continuity. In this way, their literary treatment of knowing 
best demonstrates the role of communion as a theory of knowing.
 Furthermore, there is an interesting complementarity in Davis’s and 
Tillman’s treatment of contiguity without continuity. Throughout her 
numerous story collections as well as in her novel The End of the Story 
(1995),3 Davis’s fiction approaches intersubjective opacity through the 
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concept of alterity—the state of being another. Alterity asserts more 
than the difference of individuals: it asserts the singularity of each indi-
vidual. More than the sense of individual differentiation from others, 
alterity announces the irrefutable fact that I am not you and you are not 
me. This most obvious fact, however, becomes elided in the discourse 
of idealized community when you and I do become one through inter-
subjective transparency. By fully knowing each other, you and I become 
continuous with each other. Davis’s protagonists manifest the desire for 
intersubjective transparency through the most ordinary moments of 
interaction. They ask: When my husband, lover, friend, or stranger said 
that, did he/she mean this or that? Why did I do that? Why did he do 
that? Was he telling the truth? What was she thinking when she did 
that? What am I like, really? The immeasurable number and ways of 
knowing the other testify to the alterity of subjects that informs Davis’s 
literary vision of community.
 If there are just too many ways of knowing the other in Davis, in 
Tillman the inverse is true: there are too few, and too predictable ones at 
that. From her first novel, Haunted Houses (1987), to her latest, Amer-
ican Genius: A Comedy (2006),4 Tillman’s novels are inspired by the 
dilemma: how is knowing less a revelation of something new and more 
a confirmation of the already-known? This question comes forth most 
strongly in Motion Sickness (1991) in which the protagonist’s attempt 
to know, at every turn, falls upon the congealed ways of knowing—
of stereotypes; “grand narratives” about “national characteristics”; 
and plots, images, and typologies from mass media, popular culture, 
and literature. In tackling knowing as inevitably well-worn ways of 
knowing, Tillman imbues the concept of recognition with a profoundly 
different set of meanings than it possesses in the discourse of idealized 
community. Tillman applies the term under poststructuralist pressure 
and examines the ways in which recognition is a way of knowing by 
repetition—not a knowing-afresh but a knowing-again.5 If the ways in 
which I know the other are not mine, but instead are acquired through 
means already existent, established, and used, what can I claim to know 
about the strangeness of each being I encounter? This suspicion has 
severe repercussion to the idealized community that holds communion 
as the final destination of multiple individuals. When the very terms 
of knowing are contaminated as knowing-again, there cannot be any 
“wordless” epiphany that transcends ideology or sign-systems. There 
cannot be a sudden transparency that reveals one subject to another. 
When the possibility of transparency is emptied out through congealed 
ways of knowing, multiple individuals remain just that—multiple, sin-
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gular, opaque. Rather than being the final objective of community, com-
munion becomes a myth that has no foothold. No wonder, then, that 
Tillman’s protagonist wishes for “true tourism,” the proper recognition 
that will allow her “to see through to something outside, something 
beyond” (120).6
 Thus the two writers approach opacity from opposite directions: 
there are too many ways of knowing to make transparency possible, or 
the ways of knowing are too predictable to make it possible. In either 
case, when questions of knowing generate deeply unsatisfying answers 
and just spiral into more questions, proximity, intimacy, and contact 
are experienced as distance, and the ideal of unbroken continuity is 
dispelled. That their protagonists persistently try to close that distance 
signals the idealized community vision in these fictions. Thus the ideal 
of transparency lingers as an irresolvable problem and an impossible 
expectation, and in the hands of Lydia Davis and Lynne Tillman, com-
munion stands as a memory of a community that cannot be reenacted. 
That their fictions begin from the logic of dissenting community, but 
move toward the transparency of idealized community, is what gener-
ates their ambivalent vision of community.
Immeasurable ways of knowing 
Alterity in Fictions of Lydia Davis
The following is a representative anxiety propelling much of Davis’s fic-
tion. In the short story “What Was Interesting” (Almost No Memory), 
a woman writing a story is worried that the plot is too simple to be 
interesting:
Maybe there is no way to make it interesting, because it is so simple: 
a woman, slightly drunk but not too drunk to discuss a plan for the 
summer, was put into a cab and told to go home by her lover, the man 
with whom she thought she was going to discuss this plan. . . . It is not 
entirely clear, in the story, why being put in a cab by this man should 
cause so much anger in her. Or rather, it is perfectly clear to her, but hard 
to explain to anyone else. (70)
The rest of the story follows the writer-narrator’s attempt to make 
“entirely clear” why the man would have done such a thing and why the 
woman would have responded in such anger. Was the man deliberately 
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rejecting the woman’s overtures? Or was it simply an inconsiderate act? 
Why did his action outrage the woman so that she would cry and rail 
against the man? If the man was always this inconsiderate, why is the 
woman so shocked? The possibilities for understanding the true nature 
of their relationship are endless, and the story becomes an exercise in 
unfurling endless combinations of meaning.
 The writer’s frustrated attempt at imagining intersubjective transpar-
ency between the man and the woman highlights the structure of the 
drama in much of Davis’s fiction. The story situations are almost always 
of the “simple” nature—why someone did what he did, what someone 
meant by what she said, why something happened the way it did. The 
answers, or more precisely the literary attempts at representing inter-
subjective transparency, are not in the least simple. The “simple” nature 
of Davis’s narrative premises is one reason that the term “minimalism” 
dominates critical descriptions of her work.7 On the other hand, the 
stark discrepancy between the nature of the question and that of the 
answer explains why some find the term “minimalist” inadequate in 
describing Davis’s fiction. Majorie Perloff explains the “parable” quality 
in Davis’s ingenuous use of “ordinary language” by pointing to a well-
known Maurice Blanchot essay which Davis translated, “Literature 
and the Right to Death”: “Ordinary language is not necessarily clear, 
it does not always say what it says; misunderstanding is also one of 
its paths. This is inevitable. Every time we speak we make words into 
monsters with two faces, one being reality, physical presence, and the 
other meaning, ideal absence” (Blanchot 59). By exploiting the “‘misun-
derstanding’ inherent in ordinary language,” Perloff points out, Davis 
creates the parablelike effect (205). Likewise, “Davis’s familiar tactic is 
to subject the mental stuff of daily life—our rationalizations, memories, 
and methods of communication—to a kind of studious mock logic, to 
‘break it down,’ a process that tends to reveal less about the everyday 
than it does about the limits of self-analysis” (Mobilio 26). The prolif-
eration of possible answers that emerge from “simple” questions fur-
ther explains the philosophical nature of Davis’s stories, the “sestina-
like effect that might be called ‘High Analytical Vertigo’” (Ziolkowski 
108).
 Indeed, the “high analytical vertigo” inherent in Davis’s seemingly 
simple quest offers a profound challenge for the discourse of idealized 
community. That is, the stark discrepancy between the “simple” nature 
of the questions and the impossibility of answering them highlights 
the inverse situation in the discourse of idealized community—the ease 
with which the “simple” questions are answered by wordless knowing 
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between individuals. What interrelated assumptions make intersubjec-
tive transparency possible? What theory of knowing enables commu-
nion in the discourse of idealized community?
 Postmodernist philosophy has long critiqued intersubjective transpar-
ency as a delusion based on metaphysical, foundational, and logocentric 
theory of subjectivity. More pointedly, theorists of dissenting community 
emphasize alterity as the unbreachable singularity of being that thwarts 
any claims of fusion. For Iris Marion Young, “the ideal of community 
presumes subjects can understand one another as they understand them-
selves. It thus denies the difference between subjects” (302). For Nancy, 
metaphors of space underpin his theory of alterity. “Spacing” is [the] 
absolute condition” of being-together (4), and the spacing “between” 
us has “neither a consistency nor continuity of its own. It does not lead 
from one to the other; it constitutes no connective tissue, no cement, no 
bridge.” Analogous to the “strands whose extremities remain separate 
even at the very center of the knot, . . . the ‘between’ is the stretching out 
[distension] and distance opened by the singular as such, as its spacing 
of meaning” (Being Singular Plural 5). Indeed, presence, or the meaning 
of the singular, comes about through the distancing: “Meaning begins 
where presence is not pure presence but where presence comes apart in 
order to be itself as such. This ‘as’ presupposes the distancing, spacing, 
and division of presence” (2). Far from being the evidence of failure or 
lack of community, the unbridgeable distance between one individual 
and the other announces the originary model of community: the dis-
tance “is nothing other than the meaning of originary coexistence. The 
alterity of the other is its being-origin” (Being Singular Plural 11). Com-
munity, far from being located in fusion or communion, is “located in 
the interstices of mutual exposure” of singularities (Dallmeyer 181).
 Most importantly, the unbridgeable distance that announces the 
“originary coexistence” constitutes the source of one individual’s interest 
in another:
discrete spacing between us, as between us and the rest of the world, 
as between all beings. We find this alterity primarily and essentially 
intriguing. It intrigues us because it exposes the always-other origin, 
always inappropriable and always there, each and everytime present as 
inimitable. This is why we are primarily and essentially curious about the 
world and about ourselves. (Nancy 19; original emphasis)
This curiosity about the alterity of the other, Nancy explains, is best 
manifest through the desire for art: “Is this not what interests us or 
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touches us in ‘literature’ and in ‘the arts’? . . . What else are they but 
the exposition of an access concealed in its own opening, an access that 
is, then, ‘inimitable,’ untransportable, untranslatable” (14). Nancy’s use 
of literature and arts to exemplify the alterity of each singular being 
finds its analogy in the way Davis’s characters turn to the person next 
to her—her lover, ex-lover, friend, coworker, or stranger—and marvel at 
the unbridgeable distance that separates them. The intriguing nature of 
another’s unbreachable alterity, I am proposing, finds its literary expres-
sion in Davis’s obsessive turn to intersubjective opacity.
 These dissenting community visions of alterity and singularity infil-
trate Davis’s construction of anonymity in intersubjective relations. 
Davis literalizes the inaccessibility of another singular being through a 
formal strategy. In most of her stories, Davis omits crucial exposition, 
such as information about the story’s setting, context, characters’ per-
sonal histories, or analysis of motivation. The most consistently omitted 
piece of exposition, however, is the proper names of characters. Davis 
explains her preference for the use of pronouns (“he,” “she”) and nouns 
(“the woman,” “the man”) in lieu of proper names: “I guess my interest 
is more in creating or talking about the abstract situation of a ‘he’ or 
‘she’ who could be anyone but happens to be particular. . . . The truth 
is that I resist locating anything too particularly. Often, when I think 
of naming something that would locate a story too specifically, I pull 
back and generalize it” (McCaffery 72; original emphasis). While Davis 
more generally explains her strategy of anonymity as a strategy towards 
“philosophical investigation” (Knight 534), novelist and critic Aurelie 
Sheehan more fully comments on the generative force of anonymity in 
Davis’s fiction:
By shedding the name, something else emerges—in this sense, a deep 
sense of the personal. (Think about how you know those closest to you, 
a family member or a lover. Frequently, darkly and deeply, as he, as she. 
The vast she that you live within, like the weather.) The namelessness 
of the lover creates heightened particularity, at the same time giving his 
character the edge of the purely subjective. (n.p.)
 Indeed, the simultaneous effect of generality and intimacy that 
emerges from Davis’s omission of proper names reveals the paradoxical 
effect of anonymity. Anonymity at once speaks to the alterity of the 
other as well as to the intimacy with the other. Here is the story “The 
Other” (Almost No Memory) in its entirety:
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She changes this thing in the house to annoy the other, and the other is 
annoyed and changes it back, and she changes this other thing in the 
house to annoy the other, and the other is annoyed and changes it back, 
and she tells all this the way it happens to some others and they think it 
is funny, but the other hears it and does not think it is funny, but can’t 
change it back. (115)
In the absence of narrative exposition, the story becomes a bare-bones 
rendition of the unbridgeable distance between the couple. The inarticu-
late nature of their struggle implies the long history of unspoken hurts, 
anger, and retribution. As the title of the story announces, “she” will 
only experience the other as “the other,” just as the other will experience 
her as alterity. Stripped to the fundamental struggle of two individuals, 
the anonymity of the two subjects in this story enacts the “distancing, 
spacing, and division of presence” (Nancy 2). “Agreement” (Almost No 
Memory) follows the conflict of a couple who cannot agree on who 
walked out of an argument first: “First she walked out, and then while 
she was out he walked out. No, before she walked out, he walked out 
on her, not long after he came home, because of something she said” 
(65). An overly simplified rendition of a couple’s fight, the monotonous 
sentence structure (he says, she is angry, she thinks, she declares) renders 
the strife itself monotonous. At the same time, the very monotonous 
delivery heightens the emotional impact, sharpening the edges of the 
strife.
 Even when proper names are used in a story, the exaggeratedly con-
voluted and disorganized narration of the conflict renders the particu-
larity of the characters flat. “Jack in the Country” (Almost No Memory) 
begins: “Henry encounters Jack on the street and asks how his weekend 
with Laura was. Jack says he hasn’t spoken to Laura in at least a month. 
Henry is angry. He thinks Ellen has been lying to him about Laura. 
Ellen says she has been telling the truth: Laura told her over the phone 
that Jack was coming for the weekend to her house up there in the 
country” (8). As the list of characters proliferate with each new sen-
tence, the proper names lose their distinction to mark a particular being, 
and all that remains constant is that the subject experiences the other as 
an alterity, as an opaque being whose “meaning” cannot be known. In 
the most extreme case of anonymity, Davis removes the subject entirely 
from the story, as in “The Outing” (Almost No Memory): “An outburst 
of anger near the road, a refusal to speak on the path, a silence in the 
pine woods, a silence across the old railroad bridge, an attempt to be 
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friendly in the water, a refusal to end the argument on the flat stones, 
a cry of anger on the steep bank of dirt, a weeping among the bushes” 
(179). In this story, the anonymity of the singular extends beyond inter-
subjective relations of the characters; the text extends the anonymity of 
its subjects to its relationship with the reader. In the absence of proper 
names or even pronouns, the story becomes a narration about subjects 
who are, ultimately, inaccessible to the reader.
 But Davis pushes the impossibility of communion beyond intersub-
jective relationships. A recurring topic of analysis in her fiction is the 
alterity of the self from oneself. In “A Friend of Mine” (Almost No 
Memory), the narrator ruminates on the nature of self-perception: “I am 
thinking about a friend of mine, how she is not only what she believes 
she is, she is also what friends believe her to be, and what her family 
believes her to be, and even what she is in the eyes of chance acquain-
tances and total strangers” (116). The partiality and multiplicity of 
views at work lead the narrator to conclude that attempts to figure out 
the friend’s “meaning” are too numerous to count: “Perhaps it must be 
true that the things about which we all agree are part of what she really 
is, or what she really would be if there were such a thing as what she 
really is, because when I look for what she really is, I find only contra-
dictions everywhere” (116). The familiar discrepancy between the sim-
plistic nature of the question (“what she really is”) and the immeasur-
ability of the answers leads the narrator to conclude: “All this being true 
of my friend, it occurs to me that I must not know altogether what I am, 
either, and that others know certain things about me better than I do, 
though I think I ought to know all there is to know and I proceed as if 
I do” (117). The narrator of “A Position at the University” (Almost No 
Memory) continues this dilemma:
I think I know what sort of person I am. But then I think, But this 
stranger will imagine me quite otherwise when he or she hears that to my 
credit, for instance that I have a position at the university. . . . [P]erhaps 
I really am the sort of person you imagine when you hear that a person 
has a position at the university. But on the other hand, I know I am not 
the sort of person I imagine when I hear that a person has a position at 
the university. (180)
 As every being, including oneself, stands as unbreachable alterity, 
Davis’s repeated explorations of the opacity of being represent a lit-
erary fascination with the impossibility of communion. Indeed, the fun-
damental drama that Davis draws from mundane, ordinary moments 
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of intersubjective opacity directly illustrates the compelling fact that 
“people are strange” (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 6). Like alterity that 
is more than difference, strangeness here speaks to more than oddity or 
aberration. Nancy writes:
“Strangeness” refers to the fact that each singularity is another access to 
the world. . . . In the singularity that he exposes, each child that is born 
has already concealed the access that he is ‘for himself.’ . . . That is why 
we scrutinize these faces with such curiosity, in search of identification.
 . . . What we are looking for there, like in the photograph, is not an 
image; it is an access. (14)
People are strange because “[t]he other origin is incomparable or inas-
similable, not because it is simply ‘other’ but because it is an origin and 
touch of meaning. . . . You are absolutely strange because the world 
begins its turn with you” (Nancy 6; original emphasis). In Davis’s fiction, 
each being—spouse, ex-lover, friend, coworker, acquaintance, friend, 
even oneself—is strange because each being exposes a depthless meaning 
that is “inimitable, untransportable, untranslatable” (Nancy 14).
obsessive Thinking as motion in Stasis
In structuring literary vision with alterity, singularity, and anonymity, 
Davis’s fiction might seem to be a literary enactment of dissenting com-
munity: a community founded not on transparency but on opacity, not 
on communion but on the very impossibility of communion, and not 
on the final telos of fusion but on the unbreachable singularity of each 
being. But to read Davis’s fiction as a literary argument for dissenting 
community is to miss a vital disjunction in her treatment of alterity. 
While “contiguity without continuity” is the foundational fact of Nan-
cy’s dissenting community, it is a foundational fact that Davis’s charac-
ters repeatedly try to revoke. While alterity is the ultimate correction to 
the idealization of communion in dissenting community, it is precisely 
the obstruction that Davis’s characters try to overcome.8 Hence, Davis’s 
repeated visits to the impossibility of communion generate an ambiv-
alent community, a vision of community that begins with the alterity 
central to dissenting community but moves towards the communion of 
idealized community. That this quest is an ultimately hopeless one is 
irrelevant to the protagonists; what matters is the way in which they 
cannot help pursuing it.
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 Davis’s primary venue for pursuing intersubjective transparency is 
through love relationships. Davis explains her recurring topical interest 
this way: “Obsessive or foiled or frustrated love is very compelling 
because you don’t have control over it. It’s the most extreme example 
of not being able to control another person” (Prose n.p.). Even more 
specifically, I suggest, love relationships exert the greatest amount of 
pressure on alterity and singularity, as the ideology of love calls up the 
greatest drive towards fusion. Thus the attempt to breach the other’s 
alterity and achieve continuity with the other takes place most forcefully 
in one lover’s attempt to attain communion with the other. Within the 
ostensibly simple structure of “he said, she said” dramatic paradigm, 
Davis highlights the perennial struggle to “know” the one “closest” to 
you. In “Story” (Break It Down) a woman tries to “figure it out,” that 
is, to discern whether her lover is telling the truth or not. Her lover 
offers a series of reasons why he missed their designated meeting; the 
reasons he offers are not impossible but, due to their highly complicated 
and convoluted nature, are highly unlikely, and the woman suspects that 
he may have met his old girlfriend instead. The “Story” consists of the 
woman’s recounting of each one of these excuses, putting them into a 
pattern, and holding possible versions against each other, asking herself: 
“What is the truth?” (6). “Could he and she both really have come back 
in that short interval between my last phone call and my arrival at his 
place? Or is the truth really that during his call to me she waited outside 
or in his garage. . . . Or is the truth that she did leave and did come back 
later but that he remained and let the phone ring without answering?” 
(7).
 These stories of obsessive, unrequited love pursue an enormous task—
to have complete access to the “meaning,” or the presence, of another 
being. In contrast, the enormity of the task is approached through the 
most simplistic of questions—Was he lying or not? Did she mean it or 
not?—as if the answers to those questions could help the questioner 
“figure out,” “know,” or get a “picture of” the meaning of another 
being. In “Break It Down” (Break It Down) a man sorts his memory 
after the end of an affair, trying to “break down” what the relationship 
fiscally cost him. This mundane task turns into an obsessive recounting 
of the relationship, as event after event, day after day, and utterance 
after utterance come under scrutiny for their emotional veracity. “And 
then when the pictures start to go you start asking some questions, just 
little questions, that sit on your mind without any answers, like why did 
she have the light on when you come in to bed one night, but it was off 
the next. . . . And finally the pictures go and these dry little questions 
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just sit there without any answers and you’re left with this large heavy 
pain in you” (25–26). He concludes in the most dissatisfactory manner 
that he will “never know” if she meant it when she said she loved him 
(28).
 In direct contrast to the physical and emotional continuity that one 
expects to locate in love relationships, Davis’s characters find only 
the immovable alterity of another. In direct contrast to the wordless 
knowing that will, ultimately, “reveal” one individual to the other in 
idealized community, Davis’s subjects possess no guarantee of attaining 
intersubjective transparency. Thus, in a profoundly distinct way, Davis’s 
literary vision departs from those of the other authors previously dis-
cussed in this book. It is a dissenting community devoid of any means 
of intersubjective continuity, such as the epiphanic moments of com-
munion between Morrison’s women characters, Powers’s human and 
the machine, or Yamashita’s global fusion. What Davis’s fiction negates, 
then, is more than the possibility of communion: it is a negation of the 
teleological theory of community. In contrast to theorizing community 
as a “progress” towards wordless knowing between subjects, the stub-
born opacity of subjects in Davis’s dissenting community short-circuits 
any such movement towards communion.
 That Davis’s prototypical protagonist keeps moving towards this 
nonexistent telos, then, takes on all the more significance and best exem-
plifies the ambivalent nature of community in her fiction. What Davis’s 
characters seek is what her literary vision does not support: the true 
knowing that will breach the other’s alterity and achieve intersubjective 
transparency. This paradoxical movement between dissenting commu-
nity and idealized community best explains the obsessive dimension in 
Davis’s narration.
 That is, the protagonists’ obsessive thinking can be seen as a motion 
in stasis. As Knight astutely observes in his interview with Davis, “there 
is a clear interest in the dimension of the hypothetical” in Davis’s reli-
ance on words such as “if,” “either,” and “or” (532). Precisely a hypo-
thetical dimension is what remains in the absence of any teleological 
“progress” towards knowing another singular being. Likewise, Davis 
explains her interest in “or” as the “posing [of] all the different pos-
sible interpretations of a certain reality” (Knight 533). In the absence 
of final knowing that will deliver transparency and communion, Davis’s 
subjects bounce between infinite multiplicity of questions and “possible 
interpretations” that Davis explains as follows: “What is there to be 
known? What are you supposed to know? Is it a composite of everyone 
else’s impressions? Is that what the self is? Or is it only the things that 
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are most consistently true? Then it becomes this shifting thing” (Knight 
532–33).
 Davis identifies obsessive thinking as the consequence of intersubjec-
tive opacity in those stories that directly connect the protagonist’s obses-
sion with her inability to know the reasons for the end of an affair. Thus 
the quest for intersubjective transparency becomes a quest to under-
stand—and breach—the alterity and singularity of the other in the most 
intimate and intense relationship. “A Few Things Wrong with Me” 
(Break It Down) begins with the most damning of statements for ending 
an affair: “He said there were things about me that he hadn’t liked 
from the very beginning” (91). The story recounts the woman’s attempt 
to understand—and to live with—that assessment. She relives what she 
knows of him, what she may not know of him, the ways in which she 
might have been wrong about him, what he may have had in mind as 
he said it, what he may have intended as he said it. The story becomes 
her desire to “talk about him until I begin to get a better picture of 
him” (91). Likewise, the narration of “Go Away” (Almost No Memory) 
consists entirely of a woman’s attempt to understand exactly what her 
lover meant by the statement, “Go away and don’t come back” (120). 
Indeed, the novel The End of the Story explains the protagonist’s obses-
sion over an affair, which ended fifteen years ago, as the consequences of 
her inability to fully understand why it ended. “Maybe another reason 
I couldn’t let go of it later was that I did not have good answers for my 
questions. I could always find a few answers for each question, but I 
wasn’t satisfied with them: though they seemed to answer the question, 
the question did not go away” (198). The series of questions proliferate, 
and the novel “move[s] further into the realm of questions themselves, 
with questions looming over answers” (Knight 542). What this subject 
lacks, like all Davis’s subjects, is the possession of communion that will 
breach alterity.
 In Davis’s ambivalent community, we encounter the strangeness of 
the singular as well as the anonymity of people. Although we are con-
tiguous, the fact I am sitting next to you, that you are looking at me, 
that we are talking, that we are/were lovers/friends, leads to no pos-
sibility of transparency. The fact that alterity consistently appears as 
the insurmountable problem in Davis’s fiction demonstrates its funda-
mentally different significance from the role it plays in dissenting com-
munity discourse. Far from being evidence of “nothing other than the 
meaning of originary coexistence” (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 11), 
or evidence of “the irreducible particularity of entities” (Young 304), 
alterity is the obstacle that Davis’s protagonists try to overcome. This 
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characteristic motion in stasis towards transparency cannot be seen as 
a literary vision of dissenting community, as “a bond that forms ties 
without attachments, or even less fusion, of a bond that unbinds by 
binding, that reunites through the infinite exposition of an irreducible 
finitude” (Nancy, Inoperative Community 41).
 Thus, although Davis’s characters inhabit a dissenting community 
in which communion is an impossible illusion, they operate as if that 
illusion is still possible and, most importantly, as if that illusion is still 
desirable. That the telos of Davis’s literary vision more closely resembles 
the communion of idealized community means that ultimately Davis’s 
theory of community breaks from the discourse of dissenting commu-
nity. To the paradox of community—can multiple individuals become a 
body of individuals?—Davis’s protagonists answer both yes and no. In 
their feverish motion in stasis, Davis’s protagonists succinctly capture 
the ambivalence of the contemporary moment towards the very concept 
of communion.
Congealed ways of knowing
Recognition in Fictions of Lynne Tillman
Like Davis’s fiction, Tillman’s fiction is compelled by a key dissenting 
community vision: the intriguing nature of intersubjective opacity. And 
like Davis’s protagonists who are compelled to breach that opacity, 
Tillman’s protagonists regard the fact of opacity with ceaseless won-
derment. Ambivalent community emerges in the way intersubjective 
transparency remains an unshakable expectation in these fictions. What 
Tillman uniquely targets is the assumption, in the ideal of communion, 
that intersubjective transparency occurs when knowing transcends 
human-made sign-systems. We need only remember the wordless nature 
of epiphany in Morrison’s, Powers’s, and Yamashita’s visions of commu-
nion. What each of these silent, spontaneous, and voluntary moments 
declares is that the paradox of community is superseded by means other 
than verbal communication. Indeed, the very stature of communion as 
an ideal draws its strength from the fact that the achievement of com-
munion transcends human-made sign-systems, such as language, sym-
bols, or discourse.
 In her exploration of intersubjective opacity, Tillman targets this 
claim of transcendence in the idealization of communion. Her fictions 
tackle the wordless dimension of communion by highlighting the fact 
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that when it comes to knowing the self or the other, words are all we 
have. Tillman announces her linguistic exploration of “knowing” in 
her first novel, Haunted Houses, in which a protagonist writes in her 
journal: “The phrase ‘words fail me’ took on new meaning as she grew 
to distrust her thoughts, which were the same as her needs, she sup-
posed. Words fail me. Words fail me. Words fail me, she wrote again 
and again in her notebook” (191).
 Tillman’s central means of opposing the transcendental claim of 
communion is through the double meaning of recognition. “To recog-
nize” can mean: (1) “To know again; to perceive to be identical with 
something previously known . . . To know by means of some distinctive 
feature; to identify from knowledge of appearance or character”; and 
(2) “To perceive clearly, realize” (OED online). The first set of defini-
tions denotes the act of recognizing as the act of knowing by knowing-
again—to know in reference to what one already knows, to know by 
association. The second definition, however, denotes something entirely 
different. One knows (perceives, realizes) without recourse to knowing-
again.9 Unmistakably, this second definition of knowing-afresh is foun-
dational to the ideal of communion as the transparency between mul-
tiple subjects.
 Hence within its definition, “recognition” carries the seeds of the 
paradox that constitutes one of the key philosophical and theoretical 
challenges of contemporary fiction and theory: how can knowing be at 
once a knowing-again and a knowing-afresh? After poststructuralism 
mapped knowing as fundamentally an operation bound within preex-
isting codes and systems, how can recognition claim an “outside” from 
when one may know-afresh? How do I recognize others? How do they 
recognize me? Ultimately, what are the criteria for discerning the differ-
ence between misrecognition and proper recognition? If I cannot discern 
the difference, are they one and the same phenomenon? Built around the 
drama of recognition and its paradoxical meanings, Motion Sicknesss 
draws out the opacity of the other from the fundamental unreliability of 
recognition.
 In theorizing recognition as the obstacle to communion, I now turn to 
two of the most influential theories on the concept—Althusser’s theory 
of interpellation which cast the concept firmly within the operations of 
power and social organization; and Barthes’s poststructural semiotics 
which pressed us to distrust the conditions of all that is “readable,” 
“familiar,” “stereotypical,” and “recognizable.” Although they emerge 
from different intellectual traditions, Althusser’s Marxist critique of rec-
ognition and Barthes’s semiotic critique of recognition converge upon a 
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negation of communion, the key ingredient in the discourse of idealized 
community. Considering Tillman’s contestation of the wordless dimen-
sion in the ideal of communion, these theorists’ emphasis on the ideolog-
ical, political, symbolic, and discursive dimension of recognition plays 
a crucial role in characterizing recognition as misrecognition. Thus, by 
giving ideological and symbolic heft to the operation of recognition, 
Althusser and Barthes short-circuit any theory of knowing from oper-
ating within the realm of transcendence.  In Althusser’s landmark essay 
“Ideology and Ideological Apparatuses” (1969), recognition lies at 
the heart of his theory of interpellation. Althusser uses the analogy of 
“hailing” (“hey, you there!”) as the means by which the state identifies 
and reproduces subject positioning (as worker, student, family member, 
consumer; of specific race, gender, religion). The individual’s response 
to that hail—the proverbial act of turning around—completes the state’s 
inscription of individuals into “subjects” of ideological apparatuses 
(such as systems of education, religion, family; and legal, political, labor, 
capitalist systems). Thus recognition enables interpellation because that 
automatic response—of turning around to the hail—is naturalized as a 
self-evident response. Althusser uses a scenario of recognition familiar 
to all of us: a close friend knocks on my door; I ask, “Who is it?” S/he 
responds, “It’s me.” This answer reveals nothing except the fact that 
my visitor/hailer and I have an already-familiar relationship. I open the 
door not because my visitor/hailer identified her particular relevance to 
me (such as “It’s Jane”; “It’s your friend”; “I’m your neighbor”) but 
because I obey the logic of knowing-again.
 Such is the way, Althusser argues, that the state maintains and repro-
duces the conditions of production, the positioning of subjects within 
capitalist relations of exploitation. As we respond to the numerous 
“hails,” we are performing “rituals of ideological recognition” which 
not only make us subjects of ideological apparatus but also naturalize 
the very logic of interpellation. “They ‘recognize’ the existing state of 
affairs (das Bestehende), that ‘it really is true that it is so and not other-
wise,’ and that they must be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the 
priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss, to the engineer” (123). In the Althus-
serian theory of interpellation, then, recognition is the logic of acceding 
to a prior arrangement and relationship. Thus recognition is already a 
misrecognition: “The reality which is necessarily ignored . . . in the very 
forms of recognition (ideology = misrecognition/ignorance) is indeed, in 
the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of production and the 
relations deriving from them” (124).
 Although Althusser’s thinking on interpellation specifically targets 
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the reproduction of capitalist labor relations and the maintenance of a 
class system, his theory of recognition-as-misrecognition fundamentally 
informs late-twentieth-century political and critical interrogations of 
(racial, ethnic, sexual, national, and many other categories of) identity 
and subjectivity. You are not what you say you are: you are what you 
are hailed. And the ways you are hailed are so familiar, so repetitive, 
that you believe that your response is of your own volition: “a subjected 
being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of 
all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission” (123). What 
is recognition, then, but an act of ideological submission? At the heart 
of Althusser’s theory of recognition lies a distrust of repetition, the 
knowing-again that accedes to the logic of the repeated.
 Likewise, a distrust of repetition underpins Barthes’s lifelong study of 
semiotic systems. In his study of the signs and codes that span human 
expressions, in literature, fashion, photography, advertising, or polit-
ical discourse, Barthes locates repetition as the indispensable logic of 
knowing by knowing-again. His overriding term for signifying the 
danger of repetition is “doxa,” a term crucial to his interrogation of 
what constitutes the “familiar,” the “recognizable,” the “stereotyp-
ical,” and “stupidity.” Most extensively introduced in Roland Barthes 
by Roland Barthes, doxa is “never defined by its content, only by its 
form, and that invariably wrong form is doubtless: repetition” (70). It 
isn’t that all repetition is the wrong form, Barthes clarifies; he distin-
guishes a “good form,” such as an individual’s repetition of a “theme” 
to strengthen her point (“The repetition that comes from the body is 
good, is right” [71]).10 The wrong form of repetition, or doxa, is the 
repetition of an unlocatable discourse that comes from nowhere and 
everywhere—public opinion, cliché, stereotype, commonplace: “Doxa is 
the wrong object because it is dead repetition, because it comes from no 
one’s body—except perhaps, indeed, from the body of the Dead” (71; 
original emphasis). “The Doxa is current opinion, meaning repeated as 
if nothing had happened. It is Medusa, who petrifies those who look at 
her” (122). As an unlocatable discourse whose omnipresence passes as 
the probable, the likely, and the real, dead repetition sits at the heart of 
knowing by knowing-again. What is recognition, hence, but an episte-
mological operation within the bounds of doxa?
 The form of repetition, then, links Althusserian formulation of 
interpellation and Barthesian analysis of doxa. What Althusser iden-
tifies as the self-naturalizing logic of knowing-again—that “it [“the 
existing state of affairs”] really is true that it is so and not otherwise” 
(123)—finds a parallel in Barthes’s identification of doxa’s omnipres-
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ence: “The Doxa . . . is Public Opinion, the mind of the majority, petit 
bourgeois Consensus, the Voice of Nature, the Violence of Prejudice” 
(RB 47). “The Doxa is not triumphalist; it is content to reign; it diffuses, 
blurs; it is a legal, a natural dominance; a general layer, spread with the 
blessing of Power; a universal Discourse” (153).11 What Althusser and 
Barthes bring to the fore, then, is a fundamental distrust of the condi-
tion of knowing-again. As they highlight the political work of repetition 
in the concept of recognition, a suspicion of repetition infiltrates our 
everyday acts—how we recognize others, how we are recognized, how 
we announce a certain representation’s familiarity or realism, and how 
we evaluate the probability or likelihood of certain accounts.
 Tillman’s construction of girlhood in Haunted Houses, in fact, is 
inspired by a distrust of repetition, frozen language, and familiar con-
ventions and stereotypes concerning female identity. In an interview, 
Tillman explains: “I felt angry that the way in which girls had been 
written about traditionally was so pallid. . . . Being a girl, becoming a 
girl, is extremely difficult. It was on my agenda to write a novel that 
was literary, formally unusual, and also took no prisoners in terms 
of its attitude toward these girls—a really tough-minded book about 
girls” (Sharpe n.p.). In No Lease on Life, repeated language gives a 
hilarious and disturbing turn as jokes. The novel begins with an Amish 
drive-by shooting joke, set apart typographically from the narrative, 
and not directly related to the events of the story. But the proliferation 
of jokes—bawdy jokes, racial jokes, sexual jokes, offensive jokes, psy-
chiatry jokes, juvenile jokes—appear as unlocatable, repeated language, 
and in a novel about the frenetic energy of New York’s East Village, 
these jokes represent “the fabric of the city,” as Tillman identifies in an 
interview (Hogan n. p.).
 But the most thorough interrogation of repeated language takes place 
in Motion Sickness, in which the contaminated nature of knowing infil-
trates all aspects of life and every intersubjective relationship. The wan-
dering life of the protagonist, a young white American woman who 
travels across Europe, is essentially a life of continuous skepticism in 
recognition. Her itinerant lifestyle is reluctantly funded by her mother 
who implores her to return home and “face the music” (88). She moves 
from one city to another at whim, accountable to no person or schedule; 
travel acquaintances, friends, and lovers of brief affairs constitute the 
shifting cohort. As the most emblematic sign of her hermetic status, 
she is a prolific collector and writer of postcards that she never sends. 
The “motion sickness” of the story, then, is the inevitable by-product of 
an unattached life. As Tillman describes in an interview, Motion Sick-
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ness explores “the anxiety of recognizing how really unstable your iden-
tity is. . . . You’re not going to achieve a stable existence, but that’s not 
so terrible in a way. It might make you sick, though, once in awhile, 
because of that motion” (Nicholls 276).12
 As the narrator lives the paradoxical condition of permanent travel, 
her biggest challenge is to exercise proper recognition—of unfamiliar 
cultural contexts, mores, gestures, and interactions. Each city, with its 
unfamiliar language, national characteristics, and cultural gestures, pres-
ents her with an oblique façade, where even basic social interactions are 
laden with multiplicity in meaning. In an Istanbul hotel, for instance, 
what does the silent nod from the hotel manager signify? Is it an indi-
cation of minimal courtesy, curiosity, or approval? How do her own 
“smile and nod and gesture” participate in the interaction (10)? In her 
uncertainty, mimicry becomes her default response: “The Englishman, 
when we passed [in the hallway], touched his hand to his head, a kind 
of salute, and I did likewise, a gesture that has absolutely no meaning 
to me at all” (10). As she has no means of confirming the “truth” of her 
understanding, and even less of controlling the meaning of her partici-
pation, her interpretations ultimately reveal nothing but her own episte-
mological framework: “I decide he [the hotel manager] does like me, as 
I have a need anyway to feel I am liked. No doubt this marks me as an 
American. I must be full of national characteristics that are hidden from 
me and are palpable to others” (10).
 Thus, unlike Rick, in Powers’s Galatea 2.2, whose humanism relies 
on the belief that his interpretation of the machine is knowing-afresh, 
Tillman’s protagonist has no illusions about the tautological nature of 
her knowing. The knowing-again nature of her interpretation impresses 
upon her the predetermined condition of her hermeneutic system—how 
her American cultural inclination towards amiability, for instance, shapes 
her practice of recognition: “I may emit naïveté and hope in a limited 
way, the grand narrative I’m thrust out of overwhelming my individual 
predilections and deviations. The mirror over the hotel dresser offers 
no relief, no clue to my role in the larger story . . . [you] can’t take the 
country out of the girl when the girl is out of the country” (188–89; 
emphasis added). This self-consciousness over “national characteristics” 
is elaborated more fully by Emily, one of the female protagonists in 
Haunted Houses. A young American girl living in Amsterdam, Emily 
“found herself wanting to say, Find a place of your own. You can do it, 
it would be good for you. She recognized an Americanness in ideas like: 
Things can change. Everything is possible. Just leave him. Her. You’ll 
get the money somehow. Ideas about the frontier and a young country 
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are unavoidable” (191). Inextricable from Emily’s knowing is the large 
body of trite expressions, stock responses, and sound bites, precisely the 
“dead language” of repetition that constitutes doxa.
 When recognition takes place within the web of “grand narratives,” 
and one’s unconscious responses manifest “national characteristics,” 
what informs personal interactions but frozen plot typologies, charac-
ters, and clichés about those grand narratives? Where is the possibility 
for intersubjective transparency in this tired formula of knowing-again? 
Throughout her travels, she watches her individual identity performing 
various roles in numerous ready-made plots of race, gender, and national 
identity. In England, when she disputes a fare change made by the train 
conductor, she sees the predictability of her actions in the responses of 
her fellow passengers: “From the expressions on their faces, mirrors 
behind which their opinions sit, I see myself as the ugly, that is, the 
imperialistic American and, alternatively, the bossy New York woman. 
Or, less problematically, as just plain rude. Instantly I’m a set of condi-
tions and positions, a reluctant but undeniable conduit” (35). Instantly, 
she bears the representational weight of a national character or, more 
specifically, a gendered national character, and she is helpless to resist 
her utility as a “conduit” in her fellow passengers’ interpellation of her. 
As her visibility as a subject is contingent upon the repetition of a grand 
narrative regarding “American identity” (i.e., that Americans, especially 
New Yorkers, are loud and rude), Tillman’s protagonist finds herself 
confined within the dead repetition of doxa—what passes as public 
opinion, the commonplace, the stereotype. One is known-again because 
the units of knowing (particular interpellation, cultural code, and grand 
narrative) already exist, a condition that Barthes describes thusly: “the 
name is the exact, irrefutable trace, as solid as a scientific fact, of a 
certain already-written, already-read, already-done; to find the name 
is to find that already which constitutes the code” (“The Sequence of 
Actions” 141; original emphasis).
 Thus the protagonist experiences each encounter as another con-
firmation that knowing-again thwarts any prospect of intersubjective 
transparency. Individual interactions, in fact, become not an interac-
tion between two individuals but an interaction between grand narra-
tives. In a casual train conversation she reveals to a fellow passenger, 
a Pakistani man, that she does not wish to be married. “Ahh, he says, 
scrutinizing me, then may God be with you. I thank him. The rest of the 
journey he and I are noticeably silent, as if something portentous had 
occurred. . . . I’m sure he watched me throw my bag into the taxi and 
shook his head, certain I was meant for tragedy” (73). For the Pakistani 
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man, her revelation is at once descriptive and confirmatory of the tragic 
plot typology of the Western woman who eschews marriage. To Alfred, 
an English traveler she meets in Italy, she is cast in the mold of an inde-
pendently wealthy American expatriate: “I have begun to enjoy his fan-
tasy of me, as if I were a projection of his or a twentieth-century Amer-
ican novel. . . . An F. Scott Fitzgerald flapper. Or a Hemingway woman, 
narrow-hipped, tight-lipped and disappointed in her man” (59). Recog-
nition, in these scenes, is nothing but a repetition of preexisting charac-
terizations, plot typologies, and tensions. These moments of recognition 
accumulate towards one conclusion in the novel: the insurmountable 
wall of frozen language, dead repetition, and stereotypes means that 
there is no transparency between individuals, only opacity.
 What Tillman highlights, through her protagonist’s mistrust of recog-
nition, is that knowing by knowing-again operates on a version of fusion. 
Foreign travel—of being outside one’s linguistic, national, and cultural 
context—highlights the large-scale nature of one’s interpellation. At the 
intersection of encountering the other’s “difference,” the act of recogni-
tion is simultaneously an act of subsuming “I” into a collective “we,” 
and “you” into a collective “you,” of fusing a single individual into the 
body of a larger identity. To a hotel manager in Venice, the protagonist 
is one individual who is at once the body America: “New York, he says, 
looking at the postmark [of a card she receives], you have a big problem 
with drugs? I want instantly to resist the you of his question—but agree, 
yes, we do. He says that he or they have drug problems too” (42). This 
coerced fusion into a national identity is an experience that Emily, an 
American in Amsterdam, experiences: “As one of the representatives of a 
powerful and dangerous nation, Emily was hard pressed to explain that 
she and it were not the same” (Haunted Houses 191). Hence interpel-
lation is never an exchange between two individuals but between grand 
narratives—what Althusser identified as the predetermined ideological 
state apparatuses and what Barthes identified as the omnipresent layer 
of repetition in language use. “I am indeed behind the door; certainly I 
should like to pass through, certainly I should like to see what is being 
said, I too participate in the communal scene; I am constantly listening 
to what I am excluded from; I am in a stunned state, dazed, cut off 
from the popularity of language” (RB 123). Like Barthes’s speaker who 
objects to “what is being said” but cannot “pass through” the frozen 
repetition of language, Tillman’s protagonists are keenly aware that they 
are helpless to resist the coerced fusion into a national identity.
 As a subject trapped within/by recognition, the protagonist responds 
with two responses—of reveling in her trapped condition, and of han-
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kering for the unrealizable. And it is the startling difference between 
these responses that best manifests the novel’s ambivalence towards the 
ideal of communion. Accepting the fact that her knowing is always a 
knowing-again, the protagonist throws herself in a free play of repeti-
tion—of popular discourses, icons, stock characters, stereotypes, and 
national characteristics. She responds to her immersion in grand nar-
ratives by gleefully employing her own stock of grand narratives in 
her interpellation of others and even of herself. The protagonist’s own 
grand narratives are heavily influenced by the long arm of mass culture, 
especially by American popular culture—for example, by Hollywood 
movies, bestsellers, and game shows. In an Amsterdam inn, the inn-
keepers, spanning three generations, remind her of a myriad of American 
TV shows: “Actually, looking more carefully, they’re closer to Western 
types, on the order of ‘Rawhide’ or ‘Bonanza’ or Seven Brides for Seven 
Brothers, and from now on whenever I see them, either the theme song 
from ‘Bonanza,’ or ‘I’m a Lonesome Polecat’ from Seven Brides plays 
in my mind” (10–11). A café scene in Venice becomes a stage where 
the patrons enact various well-known scenarios: a scene of an older 
woman with two younger men suggests the possibilities of an “inter-
national intrigue party” involving the CIA and the KGB, or, perhaps, 
a “gigolo scenario”; as they leave, they are “followed closely by new 
players,” a middle-aged woman with a lapdog who courts the attention 
of an elderly man (43–44). “I wait for someone to appear who’s as fas-
cinating as Tadzio in Death in Venice. I wait for a little girl, dressed in 
a red slicker, like the daughter Donald Sutherland searched for in Don’t 
Look Now” (45). As she comprehends the foreign setting and people 
by anchoring them to the plots, scenarios, settings, and characters from 
her archive of movies, musicals, and books, her mind’s wanderings rep-
resent a subjectivity dominated by ready-made signs of a postmodern 
image culture.
 The degree of her confinement in the logic of repetition can best be 
seen her application of literary codes to herself. Her self-interpellation 
takes place through well-established, familiar literary characterizations 
and typology. As the narrative begins, she is in London, reading The Por-
trait of a Lady. At her narrative’s end, she invokes Isabel Archer again, 
an emblematic female figure of New World innocence hopelessly out of 
place in the Old World: “Isabel Archer’s end in The Portrait of a Lady 
may be worse than mine. It’s impossible to tell. I’ve begun to repeat some 
stories, but is this the same thing as repeating myself?” (203). As she 
travels through Tangiers, she mulls over the cultural familiarity of her 
role through the literary trope of the “wandering woman”—a woman 
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who renounces her Western society for a renegade life of freedom in the 
desert:
A long time ago a young woman from France or Germany or Great 
Britain arrived here on the start of a journey. She left home to travel 
when travel was hard and when few women traveled alone. I can see 
her. In a long brown skirt of durable material, a dark jacket, sensible 
shoes, a broad-brimmed hat and a scarf, she is tall and solid, short and 
slight, blond, dark. She does not fall in love with anything but adventure. 
(116)
The descriptive flexibility in this rendition generates a parodic tone, 
as the specifics of the heroine’s nationality, age, or appearance are all 
deemed interchangeable under the iconic status of a cultural code of the 
liberated heroine, the white woman who renounces her Western society 
for a renegade life in the desert (as she later names some names: Freya 
Stark, Isbelle Eberhardt, Kit Moresby). Like the few, quick sketches of 
a caricaturist, the narrator’s use of the desert adventuress calls upon the 
most pronounced—the most congealed—features of the cultural code. 
In the way the narrator holds up the stories as a convention, however, 
the target of the parody is not so much the heroines and their actions as 
it is their iconic stature as “untethered” women. The nod of acknowl-
edgment to the feminist import of these stories is countered by mocking 
their archetypal—their congealed—stature. For the narrator, their very 
familiarity and popularity transform them into just another grand nar-
rative that is used to recognize her—in fact, just as the Pakistani man on 
the train did. The narrator’s immersion in cultural codes, however, has a 
critical dimension: even as she enacts recognition through popular cul-
tural stereotypes and familiar literary tropes, her ironic use of them as 
caricatures renders them trite. Certainly, it is a critique that she turns on 
herself, as she explicitly throws herself into “the discourse of others,” 
what Barthes calls the pervasive influence of cultural codes (S/Z 184).
 As a counterpart to this gleeful play in knowing-again is the lingering 
sense of oppression by knowing-again and a hankering for knowing-
afresh. If the protagonist’s frenetic movement through cultural codes, 
dead language, doxa, and grand narratives represents the acceptance 
of recognition-as-misrecognition, her enduring hope for intersubjec-
tive transparency represents the perennial refusal to give up the hope of 
transparency. As a way of highlighting the peculiar nature of this ambiv-
alence, I will compare the protagonist’s response to the Lacanian vision 
of the analysand as the corrective to misrecognition. Pivotal to this com-
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parison is the fundamental role of language in shaping the subject and 
knowledge in Tillman’s and Lacan’s theories of knowing. Pivotal to their 
contrast, however, is the vastly different significance that transparency, 
or knowing as knowing-afresh, holds for Tillman’s and Lacan’s theo-
ries of knowing. The enduring appeal of transparent knowing is what 
announces the ideal role of communion, and the idealized community 
discourse, in Tillman’s literary epistemology.
 Méconnaissance (to misconstrue or to misrecognize), in Lacan’s 
theory of knowing, describes a flawed way of knowing that results in 
radical error. The subject of méconnaissance is a knower who equates 
herself only with her conscious ego: that is, foundational to her sense 
of self and to her epistemology is the rejection of her unconscious, what 
cannot be brought into speech, the Other of the Symbolic order. As a 
defensive repudiation of the unconscious, this way of knowing results in 
méconnaissance—an imaginary knowing that believes one’s ego and the 
world to be permanent, stable entities that yield transparent, univocal 
meaning. Thus, like Tillman’s protagonist who strives to discern “what 
someone really is,” the subject of méconnaissance believes that she is 
operating in a world of transparent meaning.
 Precisely this misrecognition is targeted for correction in Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory and practice. Unlike the subject of méconnais-
sance, the analysand is the subject who refutes the equation of the self 
with the conscious ego, and the concomitant vision of the self as a unity, 
fixed, stable, and transparent. Lacan writes: “[i]t is in the disintegra-
tion of the imaginary unity constituted by the ego that the subject finds 
the signifying material of his symptom” (Écrits 151). The “signifying 
material” emerges from the subject’s unconscious, for it is the “uncon-
scious which speaks the truth about the truth” (qtd. in Campbell 39).13 
As the analysand brings the formally repudiated unconscious and its 
desires into speech, the subject moves from méconnaissance to correct 
knowing: “he has verbalized it[;] . . . he has made it pass into the Word, 
or more precisely, into the epos by which he brings back into the present 
time the origins of his own person” (Écrits 51). Key to this move from 
being a subject of méconnaissance to analysand, then, is the subject’s 
ability to bring into speech—into the Symbolic order—that which was 
previously impossible.
 In situating his psychoanalytic theory within the field of language, 
Lacan’s theory of the subject is, like Tillman’s protagonists, fundamen-
tally a subject of language. The subject is fundamentally a “parlêtre” 
(“the speaking being”), one who comes into being through the Symbolic 
order of language (Écrits 337). Lacan writes: “[T]here is no such thing 
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as a metalanguage[,] . . . no language able to say the truth about the 
truth, since truth is grounded in the fact that it speaks, and that it has no 
other means with which to do so” (qtd. in Campbell 35). As Campbell 
explains, “A knower is a linguistic event, because language constitutes 
it as speaking object. It is no more than a stable structure of signifiers, 
a subjective position in language” (33). In Lacanian epistemology, then, 
the analysand who escapes méconnaissance is fundamentally a subject 
who refutes the first way of knowing—the belief in the self and the 
world as transparent, fixed, and univocal.
 And herein lies the crucial difference between Tillman’s and Lacan’s 
treatment of epistemological transparency. While Tillman’s protagonist 
accedes to the fact that intersubjective transparency is an untenable 
myth, and while she even revels in the proliferation of frozen signs and 
doxa, she does not dismiss the intersubjective transparency, even while 
fully cognizant of its false promise. Thus, unlike the Lacanian analysand 
whose escape from misrecognition is founded on the rejection of trans-
parency, Tillman’s protagonist continues to operate within the appeal 
of transparency. This divergent response to the primacy of language is 
what richly illustrates the peculiar nature of ambivalent community in 
Motion Sickness. Impossible as it is in the novel’s literary vision, com-
munion continues to operate as the most desirable end-point, the telos, 
of intersubjective relations. This teleological thinking marks the pres-
ence of idealized community values in a novel that begins in the dis-
senting community suspicion of communion.
 Repeatedly, the protagonist experiences her immersion in grand nar-
ratives as a case of entrapment in/by recognition. For instance, she com-
pares her congealed state of interpellation to that of her fellow traveler, 
an Irish man with ties to the IRA:
Maybe I’m as trapped as Pete. Although I may be in a melodrama, not 
a tragedy, white middle-class young woman, from yet another dying 
empire. . . . National identity is like armor. On permanent loan from 
a museum. It’s dull armor that I clink around in. Could I get an opera-
tion that would make me oblivious to symbols? Could I be like human 
Switzerland, always neutral to the partisan demands of birthplace? Get a 
transnational operation, get placed in a different body politic? (127)
When individuals interact through symbols and only through symbols, 
how can there be a process of recognition that is “oblivious to sym-
bols”? The condition of being trapped in symbols is the protagonist’s 
negation of the wordless communion in idealized community. After all, 
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epiphanic moments of communion are moments of knowing-afresh pre-
cisely because they take place outside language, sign-systems, symbols, 
discourse, or any conventions of knowing. The protagonist’s inability to 
escape the “dull armor” of national identity, or any other ready-made 
sign-systems, highlights the way communion, in the discourse of ideal-
ized community, delivers such an escape.
 At the same time, the protagonist’s negation of the possibility of tran-
scendental knowing is at once an expression of longing for transpar-
ency—of the self, of the other, of the self to the other—that will ulti-
mately deliver the communion of idealized community. The protagonist 
expresses her frustration with the opacity of intersubjective relations 
through the analogy of reading: “In my hotel room I draw mental pic-
tures. Connect the dots. . . . A hostage to psychology and history. I’m 
Arlette’s reader, for instance, or Jessica’s, and I’m my own. I’m almost 
certain we can’t be read like books, though” (175). Being a reader 
whose reading practices are “hostage to psychology and history,” the 
protagonist’s reading never attains the certainty of knowing-afresh but 
knowing by knowing-again. Similarly, she holds up the metaphor of a 
complete jigsaw puzzle to highlight her dissatisfaction with knowing-
again. Describing her attempt at representing one person to another 
person, she writes: “And like the jigsaw puzzle that always comes to 
mind when someone says my life is in pieces, one wants to fashion a 
whole, something like a personality or a character, but I never finished 
those giant puzzles when I was a kid, and the way I pick up the pieces 
and display them for Jessica must be nearly useless” (18). Like the 
analogy of reading, the completed jigsaw puzzle as the desirable model 
for intersubjective relations articulates all the attributes of knowing that 
she cannot attain in her dissenting community—wholeness rather than 
partiality, fullness rather than incompleteness, knowing rather than 
reading. Ultimately, her desire for the access to the “personality” or 
“character” of another is the desire to breach the alterity of the other.
 Thus we come to the desire for “true tourism” that began the 
chapter—the narrator’s desire for “the real adventure of seeing through 
oneself. To see through to something outside, something beyond” (120). 
Like Davis’s characters who try to “really know,” “figure out,” or “get 
a better picture of” the other, Tillman’s protagonist longs to break out 
of the rules of dissenting community shaping her reality—to break out 
of the nonteleological community in which communion is forestalled. 
Like the postcards she writes prolifically and never sends, the protago-
nist exists in a hermetic circle, reading furiously without the hope of 
reading-afresh, evading the interpellation of home only to be locked 
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in another network of interpellation. Tillman, in an interview, voices a 
rebuttal to the assessment of the protagonist’s immobilized condition: 
“A sociologist who read Motion Sickness in manuscript said he was dis-
gusted by it because the narrator was so passive. And I said what do you 
mean ‘passive’? She thinks all the time” (Nicholls 278). She certainly 
thinks all the time; perhaps thinking all the time is the inevitable condi-
tion of a subject who experiences knowing as a confinement in opacity.
 Thinking all the time about the inadequacies of thinking all the time, 
these ambivalent subjects look over the fence to a reality ordered by ide-
alized community: over there, those people experience oneself, others, 
and oneself with others in a continuous relationship. That there is no 
“over there,” that there never was such a reality in another time or 
place, is a fact that these subjects know too well, as time after time they 
hold up the rules of idealized community as myths. But their demystifi-
cation of the idealized community vision does not result in a comfort-
able acceptance of the dissenting community vision. Unlike the theorists 
of dissenting community, they cannot experience the opacity of being 
as the originary condition of community, nor can they experience the 
unbridgeable distance between one and the other as the evidence of 
community. Instead, these subjects occupy their dissenting community 
with more than a slight unease, and they interject myths of idealized 
community as the implicit guidelines of intersubjective relations. Thus 
they ceaselessly manifest their ambivalent community through questions 
guided towards the telos of communion. What does that stranger think 
of me? Was my lover telling the truth? What is my friend really like? 
What am I really like? What did she mean by that? Does he mean it? 
Why did he do that? Why did I say that? In the ambivalent community 
of Davis and Tillman, the quest to know becomes a motion in stasis, an 
unspoken prompt towards that world in which after all that thinking, 
one is assured transparency and communion.
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an you be absolutely alone? Heidegger suggests its impossibility: 
“Even Dasein’s being alone is being-with in the world” (History 
of the Concept of Time 328). Jean-Luc Nancy, continuing his 
Heideggerian argument that being-together is the basis of being 
alone, argues: “[N]ot even Descartes can claim to be alone and world-
less, precisely because he is not alone and worldless. Rather, his pretense 
makes it clear that anyone who feigns solitude thereby attests to the ‘self-
referentiality’ of anyone” (Being Singular Plural 66; original emphasis). 
Thus, “to be absolutely alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must 
also be alone being alone—this of course is contradictory” (Inopera-
tive Community 4). The very concept of absolute-aloneness, Nancy sug-
gests, rests upon the concept of “everyone else.” Absolute-aloneness can 
only be an effect of negativity, a signal of its discrepancy of what-it-is-
not—the “everyone else” who is not alone. What Nancy, via Heidegger, 
brings to light is the specter of Dasein that functions grammatically and 
ontologically as “one” in a statement such as “One is absolutely alone.” 
That “one” simultaneously announces the presence of the singular and 
of the plural is the ultimate testimony of the impossibility of absolute-
aloneness: “A single being is a contradiction in terms. Such a being, 
which would be its own foundation, origin, and intimacy, would be 
incapable of Being” (Being Singular Plural 12; original emphasis).
c
Community as multi-Party game
Private language in David markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress
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 The impossibility of absolute-aloneness constitutes the core argument 
in Nancy’s dissenting community discourse—a vision of community as 
simply the fact of coexistence, in direct opposition to the idealized vision 
of community as the fusion of multiple individuals bound by common-
alities. In an ontological and grammatical sense, the “we” of dissenting 
community constitutes the a priori condition of the singular: “A ‘we,’ 
even one that is not articulated, is the condition for the possibility of 
each ‘I’” (Being Singular Plural 65).
 This chapter examines David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress 
(1988) which demonstrates this most expansive definition of commu-
nity. In the novel, Kate, the protagonist-narrator, believes that she is the 
last person alive on earth. An unexplained catastrophe has removed all 
humans in the world, while, oddly enough, the world’s physical struc-
tures—natural and human-made environments—stand intact. Occupying 
a skeletal world empty of any other humans, Kate travels the world in 
search of other survivors, leaving written messages for someone to find, 
“looking in desperation” (48), searching for “anybody, anywhere at all” 
(17). By the time Kate begins her narrative ten years into her search, she 
has long since given up her travels and now resides in an abandoned 
beach house, sporadically recounting her life on a typewriter. The nar-
rative that we hold in our hands, then, is her ultimate message, her 
final act of looking for “everyone else.” Thus Kate’s primary pursuit 
of “looking” dramatizes the basic premise of dissenting community: 
a person who is entirely alone, yet whose condition is inconceivable 
without the concept of “everyone else.”
 As the final novel of my analysis, Wittgenstein’s Mistress presents 
a concluding point to the trajectory of ambivalent community in con-
temporary fiction. This book began with the least ambivalent com-
munity in Morrison’s emphatic embrace of idealized community and 
connected that emphatic embrace to the dominance of idealized com-
munity in popular and literary discourse. The subsequent chapters 
traced the increasing challenge of dissenting community to the discourse 
of idealized community and highlighted the ways that idealized com-
munity values answer back to the dissenting community skepticism. In 
a growing degree of ambivalence and self-consciousness, Yamashita, 
Powers, and Davis and Tillman called upon transformative ideals, such 
as universalism, humanism, and communion, to enable their vision of a 
single body community.
 This analysis breaks from the preceding chapters to examine a lit-
erary manifestation of the first-person plural “we” that does not seek 
to supersede the paradox of community through an ideal. In the impos-
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sibility of absolute-aloneness in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, this analysis 
begins with the most expansive definition of community, the “we” that 
is “the condition for the possibility of each ‘I’” (Being Singular Plural 
65). Unlike the community of preceding chapters, the literary “we” of 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress is not an expression of a body of individuals 
bound together by a commonality or transformed into fusion through 
sameness, sharing, unique commonalities, transparency, or continuity.
 However, the “we” that the novel articulates is not exactly the same 
“we” of dissenting community, and that difference is where I locate my 
final instance of ambivalent community. Like all the other ambivalent 
communities studied in this book, the literary “we” asserted in Wittgen-
stein’s Mistress contains the kernel of idealized community—a commu-
nity that “works,” serves a need, or fulfills a function. Thus the “we” 
of this novel crucially deviates from the “inoperative community” that 
forms the core of dissenting community: “[I]t is the work that the com-
munity does not do and that it is not that forms community” (Nancy, 
Inoperative Community xxxix; original emphasis). In a departure from 
the dissenting community “we” that does nothing except observe the 
fundamental fact of coexistence, the “we” of Wittgenstein’s Mistress 
serves both a crucial function and a need. In addition to highlighting the 
ambivalent nature of the novel’s “we,” this functional community modi-
fies—and challenges—the inoperative “we” of dissenting community.
 The ambivalent community of Wittgenstein’s Mistress, I suggest, 
emerges through the turbulent and unstable nature of the protagonist’s 
solitary language use. Most simply, Kate’s language use wavers between 
a state of absolute omnipotence and one of absolute powerlessness. As 
the only person alive, Kate can use language in whatever way she wants. 
She can say what she wants, and, like a world-making God, what she 
says, is. She can claim to be of any age, can claim any name, any past 
history, for who is there to disagree? As Markson builds a connection 
between Kate’s omnipotence in language use and her omnipotence in 
ontological authority, Kate’s performance as a protagonist-narrator is 
bolstered by her own question, “But then what is there that isn’t in my 
head?” (227).
 However, a debilitating doubt accompanies this omnipotence. If there 
is no one to say other than what she says, there is also no one to agree 
with what she says. Is she fifty or some other age? Was her husband 
named Simon or Terry or Adam? Do certain objects in her life, such as 
a book or a painting, really exist, or is she imagining them? Do certain 
events that she remembers actually happen, or did she imagine them? 
If she can say anything at all about herself or the world-at-large, what 
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is the ground for her ontological authority? Indeed, in the absence of 
“everyone else,” how will she know if she is mad? So the mantra of 
“What is there that isn’t in my head?” finds its most severe counterpart: 
“I may well have been mad” (9).1
 Unmistakably, the two extreme ways in which Kate experiences soli-
tary language use pivot upon one point: the absence of agreement. She 
can say anything she wants because there is no one to agree or disagree. 
She cannot say anything at all because there is no one to agree or dis-
agree. The two extreme responses directly affect the nature of her “mes-
sage” to “everyone else,” the narrative that constitutes the text of Witt-
genstein’s Mistress. As the absence of “everyone else” translates into an 
absence of agreement, the novel presents a philosophical rumination on 
ambivalent community through its treatment of solitary language use.
 Using the irreconcilable tension in Kate’s solitary language as my par-
adigm of ambivalent community, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s theory of 
private language offers a rich theoretical tool for explicating the forces of 
omnipotence and madness running through the novel.2 When conceived 
through the analogy of game-playing, private language may most simply 
be understood as a single-party game. Unlike a multi-party game whose 
rules operate by the agreement of multiple individuals, a single-party 
game is a self-invented game in which one makes up all the rules. Pre-
cisely in this absence of other people’s agreement, the private language 
game becomes the paradigm for theorizing Kate’s solitary language use. 
It is in her fluctuation between a sense of omnipotence and of madness 
that two drastically different conceptions of community emerge—a dis-
senting community vision in which her written message to “everyone 
else” is simply an acknowledgment of coexistence and an idealized com-
munity vision in which her message to everyone else is a search for a 
multi-party game run by agreement. Thus the two drastically different 
ways she experiences private language game dramatize the two drasti-
cally different ways she experiences the function of “everyone else.”
 Through this contradictory significance of “everyone else,” Markson 
offers a provocative incarnation of a perennial literary topic. The con-
cept of absolute-aloneness has long held great appeal to the literary 
imagination, both as a condition and as a pursuit. Tales of sole sur-
vivors from shipwrecks, banishment, or natural disaster populate the 
literary imagination, from Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe to the speculative 
end-of-the-world genre of science fiction to the dystopian disaster novels 
like Paul Auster’s In the Country of Last Things. The state of absolute-
aloneness also features as a desirable goal in the literary imagination, 
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constituting the motivation of protagonists such as Huck Finn, who 
flees down the Mississippi, or Italo Calvino’s Baron in The Baron in 
the Trees, who climbs up a tree and never comes down again. In these 
explorations, the impossibility of absolute-aloneness raises its head, 
as the travails of each protagonist are never without the long arm of 
“everyone else.” Whether manifest in the familiar customs, laws, and 
habits that the solitary protagonist never leaves behind (e.g., Robinson 
Crusoe who strives to re-create “civilized” living conditions) or in the 
inevitable attraction of abandoned kinship and identification (e.g., the 
Baron who rules the village from the treetop), the fact of coexistence is 
the steadfast backdrop for the protagonists. If the quest for absolute-
aloneness is an attempt to escape “everyone else,” literary renditions of 
that aim draw their greatest drama from the impossibility of imagining 
that condition.3
 Precisely that drama constitutes the ambivalent community of Witt-
genstein’s Mistress, as Kate’s search for “everyone else” takes on two 
contradictory significances. Is her search for “everyone else” a dis-
senting community endeavor, simply an acknowledgment that an “I” 
necessitates a “we”? Or is her search for “everyone else” an idealized 
community endeavor, a quest to join a multi-party game run by agree-
ment?
Private Language as errant Language game
Markson announces Kate’s single-party language game quite emphati-
cally. Kate begins her narrative by recounting her practice of leaving 
messages on street corners and in museums throughout her decade of 
searching for “everyone else.” The nature of these messages takes on a 
profound complexity when, later in her recounting, she reveals that they 
were written in a language legible only to herself:
In fact I have even written in Greek.
 Well, or in what looked like Greek, although I was actually only 
inventing that.
 What I would write were messages, to tell the truth, like the ones I 
sometimes used to write in the street.
 Somebody is living on this beach, the messages would say.
 Obviously it did not matter by then that the messages were only in an 
invented writing that nobody could read. (57; my emphasis)
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Kate’s messages, written in an invented “Greek,” are metonymic of her 
private language use and richly illustrate the oddity of her endeavor: the 
last person alive on earth who writes messages to “everyone else” in a 
language that no one else can read. The contradictory implications of 
this endeavor reveal much about the errancy of her language use and her 
ambivalent views towards community.
 Before I use Wittgenstein’s theory of private language as the paradigm 
for Kate’s solitary language use, let me visit the contested scholarship sur-
rounding the very idea of private language in Wittgenstein scholarship. 
At the heart of the debate is this question: does Wittgenstein’s theory of 
language even support such a thing as private language? A great deal 
rides on the answer to this question, since opposing answers result in 
different—and irreconcilable—versions of Wittgenstein’s theory of lan-
guage.4 I intervene in this debate to suggest that the opposing answers 
to the question of private language need not lead to irreconcilable ver-
sions of Wittgenstein’s theory of language. By reformulating the terms 
of the debate, I propose a theory of private language as a viable lan-
guage game within Wittgenstein’s theory of language, but as an errant 
language game. Precisely the errancy of private language will play a piv-
otal role in my analysis of the ambivalent community in Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress.5
 The two representative positions in the debate over private language 
are the “community view” and the “individualist view,” two loosely 
bound groups of scholars who respond in oppositional manner to the 
possibility of private language in Wittgenstein’s theory of language. The 
community view argues that Wittgenstein’s theory of language is fun-
damentally an argument for language use as a public transaction, and 
this view is thus premised upon the impossibility of such a thing as 
private language. Following Wittgenstein’s lead that all language use is 
a series of game-playing, the community view argues that language use 
is fundamentally a multi-party game, a game played amongst multiple 
individuals. In contrast, the individualist view argues not only that pri-
vate language is possible but also that the concept of a multi-party game 
does not inform Wittgenstein’s theory of language.6
 Both camps begin with the game-playing and rule-following analogy 
that structures Wittgenstein’s theory of language. Wittgenstein explains 
the immeasurable variety of language use through the immeasurable 
variety of games that can exist:
Doesn’t the analogy between language and games throw light here? We 
can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with 
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a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many without 
finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, 
chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke 
and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a 
ball-game and following definite rules at every throw. (83)7
By subsuming language use under the “life-form,” (or “form of life,” 19, 
23, 241), Wittgenstein casts language games under his most expansive 
descriptor for rules that govern social coexistence. “If I have exhausted 
the justification I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then 
I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’” (217). “What has to be 
accepted, the given, is—so one could say, forms of life” (Part II, 226). 
Like all forms of life, such as organizations, conventions, behaviors, cus-
toms, habits, institutions, and traditions, language use operates through 
rules. It follows, then, that like any other form of life, language game 
is an activity of following rules. The break between the community and 
the individualist views takes place upon this question: can one be said to 
be following a rule privately? Obviously, this question has direct appli-
cation for Kate’s language use. Can Kate be said to be playing a private 
language game?
 For the community view, the answer would be no. Pointing to the 
correlation between language use, game-playing, and rule-following, 
community view proponents argue that the concept of private language, 
as it is akin to playing a game alone, is inconceivable. The following 
propositions from Philosophical Propositions are central to the com-
munity view argument:
Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be possible for 
only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?—This is of course a 
note on the grammar of the expression “to obey a rule.”
 It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on 
which only one person obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should 
have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given 
or understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give 
an order, to play a game of chess are customs (uses, institutions). (199; 
original emphasis)
And hence also “obeying a rule” is a practice. And to think one is obey-
ing a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 
“privately”: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the 
same thing as obeying it. (202; original emphasis)
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For the community view, the question is: can a forever-solitary person 
be said to be capable of rule-following—of formulating and following 
self-made rules—and, by extension, be said to play language games? 
Pointing to Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the impossibility of “obeying 
a rule privately,” community view proponents argue the impossibility 
of a private language game: “What is really denied [in Proposition 202 
above] is what might be called the ‘private model’ of rule-following, that 
the notion of a person following a given rule is to be analyzed simply 
in terms of facts about the rule-follower and the rule-follower alone, 
without reference to his membership in a wider community” (Kripke 
296). More emphatically, “the concept of following a rule implies 
the concept of a community of rule-followers” (Malcolm, Nothing Is 
Hidden 156); “before someone can truly be said to follow rule R they 
must belong—truly belong—to a community whose other members also 
follow R” (Bloor 95). What the community view brings out, then, is the 
centrality of agreement in Wittgenstein’s theory of all life-forms, rules, 
conventions, customs, practices, and games.
 This equation must be seen in light of Wittgenstein’s own correla-
tion of “rules” with “agreement.” In order to make rules tantamount 
to agreement, Wittgenstein takes great pains to distinguish rules from a 
coercive, oppressive force. Rather than think of rules as “railway lines 
along which we move in a fixed direction,” Wittgenstein suggests that 
we think of rules as signposts on the road (85). Unlike a railway line 
that is preset, a signpost is merely a suggestion, a guideline. A signpost 
operates by agreement; drivers agree that its function is to guide in navi-
gation, not force them to turn left or right. “The word ‘agreement’ and 
the word ‘rule’ are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach 
anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it” 
(224). Such propositions underwrite the community view’s synonymous 
usage of “agreement” with “community.” Agreement of rules is what 
identifies the presence of community; presence of community is what 
identifies agreement of rules. Thus the community view of Wittgen-
stein’s theory of language fundamentally relies on a theory of language 
as essentially a multi-party agreement. Any language game that is not 
run by a multi-party agreement cannot be considered a language game 
at all.
 This view obviously presents a major challenge to the narrative 
premise of the novel Wittgenstein’s Mistress. Can the last person alive 
on earth be said to be playing a language game? Indeed, given the central 
requirement for an agreed-upon dimension in any form of life, can she 
be said to be following rules at all? According to the community view, 
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answers to both questions would be no. How, then, can we account 
for the particular nature of Kate’s language use, this bewildering phe-
nomenon of a solitary speaker who, obviously, is playing alone? What 
the community view cannot account for is the peculiar nature of Kate’s 
solitary language game—a game without agreed-upon rules, yet still a 
game in which there are self-imposed rules. It is towards the aim of 
accounting for Kate’s single-party game that I will later suggest a theory 
of private language game as an errant language game.
 The individualist view, in asserting the feasibility of private language 
in Wittgenstein’s theory of language, contests the community view’s 
requirement that a language game must include rules agreed upon by 
multiple individuals. Baker and Hacker, leading proponents of the indi-
vidualist view, base their argument on Wittgenstein’s propositions such 
as the following:
Is it not imaginable, that each human being should think only for him-
self, speak only to himself? (In this case each person could even have his 
own language). . . . The Private Language which I have described above 
is like the one Robinson had on his desert island in which he was able to 
talk to himself. Had someone heard and observed him, he would have 
been able to learn Robinson’s language. For the meanings of words are 
apparent in Robinson’s behavior. (Manuscript Proposition 124, qtd. in 
Baker and Hacker, “Malcolm on Language and Rules” 173–74; original 
emphasis)
Highlighting propositions such as these, the individualist view asserts 
the single-party game as a viable paradigm of the language game and 
argues the possibility that a forever-isolated individual can use a lan-
guage known only to self. In another representative strategy of the 
individualist view, Baker and Hacker argue that private language is not 
so inconceivable if we conceive a different relationship between rule- 
following and community. Private language is possible if we move away 
from the expectation that the rules must be “shared with other people,” 
to the expectation “that they can be shared, that it must make sense 
for others to understand” (“Malcolm on Language and Rules” 171; 
original emphasis). As long as the possibility exists that the rules of the 
single-party game can be played in a multiple-party game, there is no 
absolute division between private language game and public language 
game.
 On the one hand, the individualist view offers its own unique set of 
challenges to our protagonist’s dilemma. This view provides the context 
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for theorizing Kate’s language use as a private language game. The only 
rule of this single-party game is that the player’s rules are discernible and 
consistently applied—that the possibility exists for others, should they 
observe this player, to learn what the rules are. When multi-party agree-
ment is cast out, there is no reason why self-generated rules, as long as 
they are consistently applied, cannot constitute a private language game. 
But what the individualist view cannot account for is the fact that so 
much of Kate’s private language game is affected by her anxiety over 
the rules of others—that she may not be following them, that she may 
not be following them correctly, that she may be overlooking them. It 
is towards the aim of accounting for precisely this obsession with fol-
lowing the rules that I will suggest a theory of private language game as 
an errant language game.
 I suggest that private language can be theorized as an errant language 
game if we operate on a more expansive understanding of Wittgenstein’s 
key terms, “rule-following” and “game-playing.” If we seriously imple-
ment Wittgenstein’s exhortation for a flexible understanding of key 
terms, and for “everyday use” of his diction, the grounds of the com-
munity/individualist debate may be altered.8 To begin with, there is a 
vast difference in the way that the community and individualist views 
define “game.” The community view understands game-playing as fun-
damentally an activity of following agreed-upon rules. It follows, then, 
that an absolutely isolated individual cannot be said to formulate and 
maintain an agreement by oneself. The individualist view, on the other 
hand, understands game-playing as an activity of following constraints. 
As long as there are specific regulations and specific rules of causality, 
there is no reason why an absolutely isolated individual cannot be said 
to formulate and follow constraints by himself. Thus according to the 
community view, the central ingredient of “game” is “agreement,” and 
according to the individualist view, it is “constraint.”
 But if we impose Wittgenstein’s exhortations against the systematic 
use of diction—that one word always denotes one fixed meaning only—
the standoff between the two definitions loses its tension. In the same 
proposition in which he posits an analogy between a ball-throwing game 
and a language game, Wittgenstein suggests: “And is there not also the 
case where we play and—make up the rules as we go along? And there 
is even one where we alter them—as we go along” (83). Likewise, the 
following proposition dramatizes a rebuttal to a critic who demands a 
single definition of the word “game”:
“But still, it isn’t a game, if there is some vagueness in the rules.”—But 
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does this prevent its being a game?—“Perhaps you’ll call it a game, but 
at any rate it certainly isn’t a complete game.” This means: it has impu-
rities, and what I am interested in at present is the pure article.—But I 
want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language. That 
is to say: we too should call it a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal 
and therefore fail to see the actual use of the word ‘game’ clearly. (100; 
original emphasis)
If we hold that the rules of a game may be vague without affecting 
the ontological category of “game” itself, then the ground for the com-
munity/individual debate is seriously altered. If we apply Wittgenstein’s 
dictum against the expectation of “the pure article” or “ideal” defini-
tion to the community view, we can modify the expectation that the 
definition of a game be limited to a multi-party agreement. There is no 
reason why a language game cannot accommodate private language, 
a single-party game, as well as public language, a multi-party game. 
Certainly, this possibility is crucial to theorizing Kate’s highly idiosyn-
cratic language use as the private language game of the last person alive 
on earth. More specifically, the theory of private language is necessary 
to highlight the errant nature of Kate’s language use as a game played 
without agreement.
 On the other hand, there is a serious challenge to the individualist 
view’s claim that “game” may be understood as a solitary endeavor. 
This understanding requires a highly unusual definition of “game” and 
goes against Wittgenstein’s strong prescription that philosophy should 
deal with “everyday use” of language. In numerous propositions, Witt-
genstein offers his rebuttal to critics that his flexible use of central terms 
fosters confusion, exceptions, caveats, and contradictory interpreta-
tions. To these charges, Wittgenstein’s principal response is that his dic-
tion is the use of “everyday language” and that, relatedly, the work of 
philosophy is to describe the use of this everyday language (106, 109, 
116, 124):
When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the lan-
guage of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for 
what we want to say? Then how is another one to be constructed?—And 
how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the ones 
we have!
 In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not 
some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that I can 
adduce only exterior facts about language. (120; original emphasis)
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Most memorably, Wittgenstein draws an analogy between everyday lan-
guage and the “friction” necessary for walking. To demand “crystalline 
purity of logic” in philosophy is to erode the “actual use of language” 
(107). Without negating the plausibility of the individualist view, then, 
we must acknowledge the fact that its use of “game” as a single-party 
activity is a language usage that falls outside the “everyday” and 
“actual” use of the word. Although in principle the single-party game 
and solitary rule-following are possible endeavors, the highly unusual 
and exceptional nature of such definitions minimizes their likelihood in 
everyday usage. Thus we must give significant weight to the fact that in 
Wittgenstein’s theory of language, the central analogy for game-playing 
is that of the multi-party game in which agreement of multiple indi-
viduals is a given. Without negating the possibility of private language 
in Wittgenstein’s theory of language, we must hold the multi-party 
game—and the concept of public language—to be his normative model 
of language use.
 Let me outline, then, how I see private language game as an errant 
language game. Wittgenstein’s exemplary analogy for private language 
game is not a monologue or talking-to-self, but a language which can be 
understood only by the speaker:
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write 
down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, 
moods, and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can’t we do so in our 
ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words 
of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person 
speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot 
understand the language. (243)
Hence, “sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear 
to understand’ might be called a ‘private language’” (269; original 
emphasis). This hermetic quality, which will directly apply to Kate’s 
message, can be understood in the fact that the single-party nature of 
this game cannot be translated into, or join, a multi-party one. Suppose, 
Wittgenstein proposes, that a child invents a name to refer to a sensa-
tion of toothache:
But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he used 
the word.—So does he understand the name, without being able to 
explain its meaning to anyone? But what does it mean to say that he has 
“named his pain”? How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever 
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he did, what was its purpose?—When one says “He gave a name to his 
sensation” one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is 
presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. (257)
Another crucial analogy for private language is of an aborted attempt 
at making a transaction: “Why can’t my right hand give my left hand 
money? . . . When the left hand has taken the money from the right, 
etc., we shall ask: ‘Well, and what of it?’ And the same could be asked 
if a person had given himself a private definition of a word” (268). It 
is important to note that Wittgenstein’s theory of private language uses 
the criteria of the multi-party game—the failure of the boy to “name” 
his pain to others, the failure of the left hand to make a transaction with 
others. In the implicit assumption of a multi-party game as the everyday 
context of language game, Wittgenstein affirms again public language as 
his normative theory of language use.
 The errant nature of Kate’s private language game, likewise, emerges 
from its inability to make a transaction through language, to join a 
multi-party game. That Kate’s private language lacks the kernel of nor-
mative game-playing—agreed-upon rules—means that it lacks the most 
crucial element for determining a successful play of game—“outward 
criteria,” which are, after all, a matter of multi-party agreement: “An 
‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (580).9 In the absence 
of agreed-upon rules, Kate’s private language is a game that does not 
hold the possibility of making a “transaction,” “making sense,” “making 
oneself understood,” or “being able to explain.”10 How she experiences 
this absence of agreement is where we can locate two theories of com-
munity at work. Is the absence of agreement irrelevant to the presence 
of community, as in dissenting community? Or is absence of agreement 
at once the absence of community itself, as in idealized community? 
The conflicting ways she experiences this absence of agreement takes 
her from omnipotence to madness, and it is within this spectrum that I 
locate the novel’s ambivalent community.
omnipotence
What Absence of Agreement Does for You
Let me return now to the invented “Greek” in which Kate writes her 
messages to “everyone else.” The invented Greek emblematizes the 
errant nature of Kate’s single-party game. In a game in which she makes 
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all the rules, her playing is devoid of any outward criteria or agreement 
of community. Without any outward criteria, her message is absolutely 
illegible. As verbal acts intended to make contact with other survivors, 
what use are messages written in a language that no one else can read? 
As one might ask the boy who invents a name for toothache, “what is 
its purpose?” we might also ask, “what is Kate’s point?” The fact that 
“her point” is discernible only to Kate identifies her language use as a 
private language game: a single-party game in which the sole player can 
unilaterally determine the rules without concern for making sense, for 
being able to explain or to make herself understood.
 Markson continues the errant nature of Kate’s language use in the 
form of Kate’s monologue. The Wittgenstein’s Mistress book that we 
hold in our hands, ostensibly, is the most extended and the ultimate ver-
sion of Kate’s “looking”—a veritable cry of “Here I am!” As a verbal 
account of her life—both pre- and postapocalyptic—the novel attempts 
to re-present the presence that is Kate. Yet the highly idiosyncratic 
nature of her narrative defies that function of representation. Here we 
can locate the symbiotic operation of Markson’s experimental form and 
the novel’s thematic focus on solitary language use. First, almost every 
sentence in Kate’s narration stands alone as its own paragraph; charac-
teristically short in length (usually less than two lines), the indented lines 
of each sentence stand as visually autonomous units. The unpredictable 
shifts in topic, reflective of Kate’s always-shifting attention, mean that 
each sentence, rather than working in an accumulative, interdependent 
manner with its neighboring sentences, jostles in competition with every 
other sentence.
 Second, Kate’s preponderant use of trivia is another fundamental 
aspect of her private language game. In what is her final, verbal act of 
“looking,” Kate’s message largely consists of compilations of obscure 
details about famous figures in Western history, art, and literature. The 
trivia, especially in the first half of Kate’s narrative, refers to the realm 
of the ludicrous, the weird, the unusual—details that have to do with 
well-known personages’ oddities, substandard hygiene, physical defor-
mities, obsessions, or compulsions.
Have I ever mentioned that Michelangelo practically never took a bath 
in his life, by the way?
 And even wore his boots to bed?
 On my honor, it is a well known item in the history of art that Michel-
angelo was not somebody one would particularly wish to sit too close to.
 Which on second thought could very well change one’s view as to why 
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all of those Medici kept telling him don’t bother to get up, as a matter of 
fact.
 Although come to think of it even William Shakespeare himself was 
terribly tiny, which is something I did once mention.
 I mean so long as one would appear to be getting into this sort of 
thing.
 Well, and for that matter Galileo would never even ever shake another 
person’s hand, once he had discovered germs. (185)
Like her invented “Greek,” the form of Kate’s final message to “everyone 
else” is thoroughly unilateral and idiosyncratic in expression. The 
unpredictable shifts in topic and the preponderant use of trivia cannot 
be reconciled to the rules which a multi-party language game would call 
a “message.”
 It is exactly in this breach that the vision of dissenting community 
emerges. This message to “anyone, anywhere at all” (17) does not search 
for multi-party agreement. Like a dissenting community that does no 
“work” and has no instrumentality, Kate’s message to “everyone else” is 
not meant to serve a function. Kate’s search for “everyone else” is not a 
search for the telos of community held forth in idealized community dis-
course—for belonging, for fusion, for oneness. “Everyone else” is just 
that: everyone else. The “we” that makes the “I” possible is simply the 
observance of community as coexistence.
 In fact, in Kate’s successful playing without agreement, the novel 
demonstrates the liberatory potential of dissenting community. When 
“community” is not equated with “agreement,” a private language 
game becomes a great source of creative agency for the sole player. In 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress, this liberatory potential is most evident when 
the private language game begins to resemble the game of fictional 
world-making. That is, Markson offers a parable of fictional world-
making as the most successful rendition of a private language game. 
In her freedom to recount the world however she wishes, she is free to 
make the world however she wishes. Thus in Kate’s tales of being the 
last person alive on earth, there is a direct connection between her lin-
guistic omnipotence and her ontological omnipotence. What Markson 
invokes here is what Vladimir Nabokov describes as the omnipotence of 
a fictional world-maker: “[E]very character follows the course I imagine 
for him. I am the perfect dictator in that private world insofar as I alone 
am responsible for its stability and truth” (69). Likewise, in Kate’s pri-
vate language game, Markson gives full rein to this dictator to be the 
sole rule-maker of her world.
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 Kate’s “looking” years cover an incredible geographical span. She 
recounts driving across cities, states, countries, and even entire conti-
nents; she recounts sailing across rivers, lakes, and even bodies of ocean. 
Also remarkable in her travel accounts is the virtual irrelevance of maps 
and charts. For instance, she recalls crisscrossing the Greek Islands with 
a motor launch: “Even with only a page torn out of an atlas, instead of 
maritime charts, it took me only two unhurried days to get to Greece” 
(9); and she describes driving across Russia by “simply following the 
sun” (16). Her prowess as an explorer and navigator expresses her inde-
pendence from human-made systems of spatial organization and appeals 
to an organic affinity with the natural world.
 When she is not traversing the globe, Kate, a painter in the pre-
catastrophe years, takes up residence in world-famous art museums; 
“burning artifacts and picture frames for warmth” (9), she lives in the 
Louvre, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and the Tate 
Gallery in London. Kate’s verbal recounting of her “looking” displays 
a propensity for visually striking images. She recalls an experience in 
Rome when she believed that she actually spotted another life—a cat—
skulking around the Colosseum: “How I felt. In the midst of all that 
looking. And so went scurrying to a supermarket for canned cat food” 
(28). She remembers leaving opened cans of cat food all over the stone 
seats of the Colosseum, “as many cans as there must have been Romans 
watching the Christians, practically”: “Doubtless the cans are still there 
in either case, lined up across all of those seats. Rains would have emp-
tied them completely by now, assuredly” (28–29). The image of hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of rain-overflowing cans lined all around the 
steps of the Colosseum recurs throughout the narrative. Other recurring 
images from her years of “looking” include an account of her releasing 
hundreds of tennis balls from the top of the Spanish Steps in Rome; 
her habit of wearing wristwatches in quantities that literally cover her 
arms; her setting tens of alarm clocks to go off simultaneously and then 
systematically throwing every one of them into a river. Such striking 
images function as metonymies of her “looking” years, and through 
their variety and recurrence, we follow the tiny dot that is Kate traipsing 
around in the abandoned museums and monuments around the world, 
and we hear the reverberating echoes of her solitary movements.
 What I am emphasizing here is not the impossibility of her claims, 
but the fantastical nature of her claims, claims that would be incon-
ceivable if her language game were bound by rules of agreement. The 
source of Kate’s fantastic and highly improbable tales becomes insep-
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arable from her omnipotence as the sole rule-maker of her language 
game. There are no forms of life, no rules, no agreements that function 
as the standard of correctness, verifiability, truthfulness, or usefulness. 
Certain information—for example, the name of her husband or her 
son—changes in different moments of telling. Her account of her age 
changes, as do the accounts of her life. There are no artifacts, such as 
records of birth, death, or marriage, or correspondences that may attest 
to a traceable past. As Kate’s omnipotence in language use translates 
into one of ontological authority, Wittgenstein’s Mistress explores—and 
exploits—the liberatory potential of using language without agreement. 
What outward criteria are there to contradict Kate’s ability to say, and 
be, what she wants? Who will contradict her tales of awesome adven-
tures of crisscrossing oceans and continents? Who is to say that there 
wasn’t a cat at the Colosseum? As Kate wonders frequently, “What is 
there that isn’t in my head?” (227).11 
 As Kate’s freedom from agreement translates into an absolute onto-
logical authority, we might say that the novel’s premise itself—the last 
person alive on earth—is the ultimate instance of language used without 
agreement, the ultimate paradigm of private language game. Like the 
Nabokovian dictator, or “God,” another familiar literary trope for the 
fictional creator, Kate’s private language game wields the omnipotence 
of one whose performative utterance makes the world. Kate’s status as 
the “curator of the world” (227), as she calls herself, takes an entirely 
new dimension when she begins to reconstruct not only her own history 
but also the history of the Western world. With the omnipotence of a 
puppet master, Kate plays with well-known figures of history, art, lit-
erature, and myths. She intervenes in their lives and alters relationships, 
motivations, and, eventually, historical events themselves.
So who is to argue that one day Rembrandt might not have been stand-
ing next to Carel Fabritius’s easel, and Carel Fabritius said he was going 
to paint something russet, and Rembrandt said that russet is a color one 
calls a bedspread?
 So in a manner of speaking Willem de Kooning was actually a pupil 
of Rembrandt. . . . 
 This is scarcely to suggest that Willem de Kooning was anywhere in 
the vicinity when Giotto was drawing the perfect circle freehand either, 
of course.
 Unless, on the other hand, I suddenly make up my mind to imagine 
that he was.
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 This very sort of imagining being the artist’s privilege, obviously.
 Well, it is what artists do. . . . 
 There is nothing astonishing in my ability to arrange any of this, of 
course, although in certain ways it is perhaps interesting. (147–49; origi-
nal emphasis and ellipsis)
Kate’s conjectures (“suppose,” “also suppose,” “who is to argue,” “in 
a manner of speaking,” “on the other hand”) of disparate historical fig-
ures and times are vehicles for the creative possibilities of using language 
without agreement. After all, imagining, or make-believe, is “what art-
ists do.” Like a creative world-maker, Kate’s play of the imagination 
is limitless, as its rules are free of the outward criteria of verifiability, 
correctness, truthfulness, or effectiveness in usage. As Markson makes 
inescapable the correlation between Kate’s private language game and 
the single-party game of artistic make-believe, the private language 
game becomes the very paradigm of fictional world-making. Indeed, the 
omnipotence of a fictional world-maker best embodies the potential to 
create when one follows no one’s rules but one’s own.
 In Kate’s private language game, the thriving game of make-believe 
takes place within a dissenting community vision. This message to every-
one else is not a solicitation for agreement. Put another way, the search 
for “everyone else” is not a search for agreement. That everyone else and 
agreement are irrelevant to each other best demonstrates the irrelevance 
between community and agreement in dissenting community vision.
madness
What Absence of Agreement Does to You
However, the same errant game that gave rise to Kate’s potential as 
a world-maker gives rise to a debilitating doubt that cripples her pri-
vate language game. The nature of this doubt, and its effect that ripples 
throughout her message, are where I locate the novel’s ambivalent com-
munity. Increasingly we see a single-party player who keeps breaking the 
only rule of her game: that she plays only by the rules of own making. 
When that rule is breached, and rules of others enter her private lan-
guage, her single-party game becomes a multi-party game. And a game 
defined by its freedom from rules of others becomes a game indistin-
guishable from a multi-party game in which rules are tantamount to the 
agreement of multiple individuals. This breach is what takes place in 
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Kate’s private language game, and with that breach enters the presence 
of idealized community into Kate’s private language game.
 Counterbalancing the liberatory potential of playing without agree-
ment, Markson shows us a sole survivor who experiences the absence of 
agreement as an affliction. This sense of affliction appears in a seemingly 
minor fashion—through Kate’s habitual expressions. But it is precisely 
through the habitual—certain practices that are so fixed or customary 
that they seem involuntary—that the agreed-upon dimension of multi-
party game infiltrates Kate’s private language game, and thus an ideal-
ized community vision affects her isolation. Like Davis’s and Tillman’s 
characters who cannot seem to stop pursuing intersubjective commu-
nion that they know is impossible, Kate engages in self-corrections and 
self-clarifications that demonstrate the powerfully internalized and nat-
uralized dimension of the habitual, as demonstrated in the following 
samples: “I assume I do not have to explain that any version of any 
music that comes into my head would be the version I was once most 
familiar with” (38). “When I said that Guy de Maupassant ate his lunch 
every day at the Eiffel Tower, so that he did not have to look at it, I mean 
that it was the Eiffel Tower he did not wish to look at, naturally, and 
not his lunch. One’s language being frequently imprecise in such ways, 
I have discovered” (42). Kate’s continual modifications and clarifica-
tions dramatize her sense of inadequacy in her language game. In fact, 
they dramatize the standard of constancy that Wittgenstein identifies for 
multi-party language use: “If language is to be a means of communica-
tion there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as 
this may sound) in judgments. . . . It is one thing to describe methods of 
measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurements. 
But what we call ‘measuring’ is partly determined by a certain constancy 
in results of measurement” (242).
 If we understand “measurement” as assessment, the requirement 
of “constancy” may be understood as the agreement that renders that 
assessment predictable. Kate’s verbal clarifications and modifications, 
as they strive for a precision that evades her, enact a standard of con-
stancy.12 Why does a single-party player, who is the omnipotent rule-
maker of her game, constrain her performance with the agreed-upon 
rules like constancy and preciseness? This influence of multi-party rules 
in Kate’s private language game announces the impurity of her single-
party game and bespeaks her fundamental ambivalence—over the lib-
eratory potential of speaking without agreement and over the constancy 
and outward criteria that can come only with agreement. The more 
Kate experiences the absence of agreement as an affliction, the more 
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her search for “everyone else” becomes something more than an expres-
sion of coexistence. “Everyone else” doesn’t simply remain the gram-
matical and ontological condition of “I,” as in dissenting community. 
“Everyone else” becomes the condition of affirming the very meaning 
of “I” through agreement. As agreement and “everyone else” become 
interchangeable in function, idealized community enters Kate’s private 
language game.
 The fact that Kate’s desire for constancy extends well beyond her 
language use highlights the breach of multi-party game in her isolated 
existence. As a counterpoint to her effortless ability to navigate the 
physical world, Kate obsessively collects alarm clocks and wristwatches, 
at one point owning seventeen watches (81). Surely watches and clocks 
are relics of constancy, measurement, and organization that function 
through the agreement of multiple individuals. Likewise, in the absence 
of agreement, she frets that she may not really be what she says she is:
Why have I written that his name was Adam?
 Simon is what my little boy was named.
 Time out of mind. Meaning that one can even momentarily forget the 
name of one’s only child, who would be thirty by now?
 I doubt thirty. Say twenty-six, or twenty-seven.
 Am I fifty, then?
 There is only one mirror, here in this house on this beach.
 Perhaps the mirror says fifty. (9)
Later, as she revisits the topic of her probable age: “When one comes 
down to it, I could actually be well past fifty. Again, the mirror is of no 
real help. One would need some kind of yardstick, or a field of compar-
ison” (33; my emphasis). Kate’s self-doubt directly recalls Wittgenstein’s 
proposition: “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” 
(580). For the very reason that Kate’s “inner process” comes against no 
competing epistemological process, her ontological claims have no basis 
for authority. The very fact that she is free to say anything means that 
she cannot believe anything she says.
 Kate’s pursuit of agreement via her pursuit of “everyone else” directly 
illustrates the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between Wittgen-
steinian criteria, agreement, and community. In The Claim of Reason: 
Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, Cavell points out:
The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria 
on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. 
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And the claim to community is always a search for the basis upon which 
it can or has been established. I have nothing more to go on than my 
conviction, my sense that I make sense. It may prove to be the case that 
I am wrong, that my conviction isolates me, from all others, from my 
self. That will not be the same as a discovery that I am dogmatic or ego-
maniacal. The wish and search for community are the wish and search 
for reason. (20)
Similarly, Kate’s search for criteria—a “yardstick, or a field of compar-
ison”—is simultaneously a search for reason—“the basis upon which” 
she can say what she says. And the search for criteria and reason is at 
once a search for community—“all others” whose sense-making is like 
her own. Furthermore, Cavell points out that this search for community 
is never more heightened than when one feels the lack of community, 
the lack of shared reason, criteria, and agreement:
Appealing to criteria . . . is an appeal we make when the attunement is 
threatened or lost. Official criteria are appealed to when judgments of 
assessment must be declared; Wittgensteinian criteria are appealed to 
when we “don’t know our way about,” when we are lost with respect 
to our words and to the world they anticipate. Then we start finding 
ourselves by finding out and declaring the criteria upon which we are in 
agreement. (34)
Precisely at this juncture does Kate’s search for “everyone else” take on 
the heightened search for criteria, for only in possession of criteria can 
Kate “find herself,” that is, confirm the validity of what she says. As 
Richard Eldridge elaborates on Cavell’s formulation of Wittgensteinian 
criteria: “Without criteria, conditions under which things may be called 
thus and so, there is no possibility of making sense of the world. They 
enable our conceptualization of our experience, our comparing of things 
to one another” (571).
 Furthermore, Kate’s growing self-doubt in the absence of criteria 
enacts the anxiety that Cavell locates in Wittgenstein’s examples of pro-
found difference. Suppose, Wittgenstein proposes, that one encounters 
people who do things differently—people who count according to a 
different logic or people who use body language in a vastly different 
way (185). Cavell speculates on the response of anxiety that such differ-
ence will likely incite: “These examples are all very upsetting. . . . I can 
understand what he does. . . . I don’t know why he does it that way” 
(114; original emphasis). “The cause of our anxiety is that we cannot 
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make ourselves intelligible (to him). But why does this create anxiety? 
Is it that we read our unintelligibility to him as our unintelligibility as 
such? What gives him this power over us? Why have we given it?” (115; 
original emphasis). The anxiety one feels in the face of such profound 
difference is indistinguishable from the anxiety one feels in the absence 
of shared criteria by which one can make oneself intelligible to the other. 
The “power” that one has given to the unintelligible other, in Cavell’s 
formulation, is the same as the power that Kate has given to “everyone 
else” to render her own intelligibility. “It seems that our sense of having 
selves at all and of encountering and living in a world depends upon 
our finding others to conceptualize and talk about it as we do. Without 
community, there is, for us, no self-identity and no reason (in or for our 
conceptualizing)” (Eldridge 572).
 In the absence of community, then, Kate’s fear of madness raises its 
head as the final destination for a speaker without agreement. This des-
tination, Eldridge postulates, is an inevitable one for a subject without 
external criteria:
I can to some extent make my own criteria, constitute a community of 
one. But insanity is a threat here. . . . Even if I could (say through con-
centrating my inner attention) develop and maintain thoroughly idiosyn-
cratic sets of criteria, ways of thinking and speaking (to myself, about 
what is going on in me—private languages are logically possible), some-
thing in me wants my habits of conceptualization and speech confirmed 
in the habits of another. Left alone with my criteria, it is as though I can-
not bring myself to believe in them and to continue to deploying them 
in new cases. (572)
Increasingly, Kate’s attention turns to the topic of madness, as her obses-
sion with the idiosyncrasies, ills, and misfortunes of historical figures 
extends to the madness that afflicted them:
Once, when Friedrich Nietzsche was mad, he started to cry because 
somebody was hitting a horse.
 But then went home and played the piano.
 On my honor, Friedrich Nietzsche used to play the piano for hours 
and hours, when he was mad.
 Making up every single piece of music that he played, too.
 Whereas Spinoza often used to go looking for spiders, and then make 
them fight with each other.
 Not being mad in the least. (232)
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In the manner of Emily Dickinson’s dictum to “tell it slant,” these 
pointed ruminations on the madness of others function as Kate’s self-
representations in a tangential fashion. Indeed, her fixation on the topic 
of sanity and madness grows in tandem with her doubt over her own 
authority. Like her dismissal earlier of her biographical claims, she dis-
misses many of the details of her fantastical journey. The only other 
life she claims to have encountered—the cat at the Colosseum—comes 
under such a disclaimer:
Possibly there was no cat at the Colosseum either.
 If one wishes to see a cat badly enough, one will doubtless see one.
 Though possibly there was a cat. Possibly it was only the floodlights, 
when I rigged up the floodlights, which made it leery.
 Naturally I would have had no way of knowing if it had nibbled at 
anything behind my back either, since most of the cans I had set out were 
half emptied by rain in no time. (133–34)
Possibly there was a cat; possibly there was no cat. Without outside 
criteria, without agreement from someone else, she cannot be certain. 
One by one, the world that she built out of conjectures (“why not?” 
“who is to say?” “let’s suppose”) about the lives of historical, literary, 
and mythical figures is de-authorized because her conjectures lack out-
ward criteria: “Not one of these figures may be correct” (123). She even 
dismisses her interest in the lives, oddities, misfortunes, and madness of 
literary and historical figures: “I cannot conceive of why anyone would 
wish to pursue such a question” (122). Through these retractions, Kate 
wields the requirement of agreement as the final arbiter of her language 
game.
 Markson demonstrates the halt to Kate’s private language game most 
poignantly through the halt that comes to her creative imagination. Just 
as the ultimate success of a private language game is the Nabokovian 
omnipotence as the fictional world-maker, the ultimate failure of a pri-
vate language game is the end to Kate’s conjectures about the world. 
Kate’s private language games moves between exactly these two poles, 
a fluctuation best demonstrated in her claims about a painting that she 
finds in her current residence. When Kate is reveling in the absence of 
agreement, she freely makes conjectures about the painting, imagining 
complex relationships and conflicts between the figures represented. As 
Kate creates a narrative trajectory with a series of “perhaps,” she justi-
fies her own imaginative play with the rhetorical question, “why not?” 
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(46). Why not believe that this is a painting of this house? That one of 
the figures depicted is the painter? That the other figure was angry with 
the painter because she did not want to be painted in the first place? 
In Kate’s rhetorical question, “why not?” Markson encapsulates the 
omnipotence of the Nabokovian dictator and the most successful rendi-
tion of the private language game.
 In contrast, Kate’s inability to maintain the spirit of “why not” dem-
onstrates her failure to maintain the private language game. At this end 
of the spectrum, we find a speaker who is afraid of exercising any onto-
logical authority:
There is nobody at the window in the painting of the house, by the 
way.
 I have now concluded that what I believed to be a person is a 
shadow.
 If it is not a shadow, it is perhaps a curtain.
 As a matter of fact it could actually be nothing more than an attempt 
to imply depths, within the room.
 Although in a manner of speaking all that is really in the window is 
burnt sienna pigment. And some yellow ochre.
 In fact there is no window either, in that same manner of speaking, 
but only shape.
 So that any few speculations I may have made about the person at the 
window would therefore now appear to be rendered meaningless, obvi-
ously. (55)
Not only does Kate dismiss her earlier conjectures about the subject of 
the painting; she also dismisses her own exercise in making ontological 
claims (a “shadow” is not representative of a person, only a paint pig-
ment meant to imply physical depth). Kate’s retraction from any onto-
logical authority is her retraction from her private language game. In 
negating her ability to say anything she wants, she negates not only the 
creative possibilities of her imagination but also her ability to play a 
private language game at all. As the agreement of others becomes the 
condition for Kate’s ability to say anything, her private language game 
comes to a halt.
 The concluding page of Wittgenstein’s Mistress encapsulates Kate’s 
multi-party answer to the single-party question: “What is there that isn’t 
in my head?” Kate’s inevitable answer is: without agreement, everything. 
That a fall into madness remains the perennial specter means that the 
criterion of agreement has already breached her private language game. 
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In the ultimate sign of this impure private language game, Kate ends 
her narrative with a search for a diluted omnipotence that will lead to a 
“harmless . . . make believe” (240):
Oh. And I have been hearing The Alto Rhapsody again also, these 
days.
 Which is to say the Real Alto Rhapsody this time, what with all of 
that having finally been sorted out.
 Even if it is still hardly the real one either, naturally, being still only in 
my head.
 But still. (240; emphasis added)
Ambivalent Community
“We” Always Works
So what is the significance of community in Kate’s private language 
game? The answer rests entirely on how she views the role of agree-
ment in her search for “everyone else.” When agreement is irrelevant 
in her message to “everyone else,” her private language thrives, and 
her language use operates in a dissenting community vision in which 
everyone else is simply the observance of coexistence. But when agree-
ment is central to her message to “everyone else,” her private language 
falters, and her language use operates in an idealized community vision 
in which “everyone else” is not just a fact of coexistence. “Everyone 
else” becomes multi-party agreement that can deliver confirmation of 
Kate’s sanity, her history, her authority as a speaker, and even her very 
ability to use language. When “everyone else” becomes attributed with 
such functionality, we are back, again, in the land of idealized commu-
nity in which community, any claim of “we,” serves a function.
 Befitting a study that began with the most idealized community 
found in Morrison’s novels, my analysis ends with the novel that offers 
the most dissenting community vision—the impossibility of absolute-
aloneness, the a priori “we” that prefigures the “I.” Invoking Heideg-
gerian Dasein and Nancian being-in-common, Kate’s hapless search for 
“everyone else” signals coexistence as the originary community, the 
community without condition, the community that was not called into 
being to serve a function. But in the insistent way that Kate attributes 
functionality to “everyone else,” the novel signals the inevitability that 
“I” will put “we” to work.
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 Most importantly for the trajectory of this book’s argument, Witt-
genstein’s Mistress poses a crucial question to dissenting community 
discourse: can “everyone else” remain free of functionality? Kate’s 
ambivalent community ultimately answers no, precisely because every 
invocation of community—every address to “everyone else”—arises 
from a specific dialogue with “I.” The specificity of that dialogue; the 
particular context that gave rise to the dialogue; the unique needs, anxi-
eties, and desires that gave rise to the address in the first place—these 
conditions speak to the fact that community does not make its presence 
known in a material and discursive vacuum. On the contrary, commu-
nity can make its presence known only within a specific dialogue, in 
response to a specific address from an “I.”
 What the ambivalent community of Wittgenstein’s Mistress best dem-
onstrates is the distinction between community as an idea and commu-
nity as a presence. This crucial distinction recalls Heidegger’s argument 
that all philosophical arguments must be ontological arguments—claims 
made in light of Being—and not ontic arguments—factual claims made 
irrespective of Being: “Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with 
Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts 
about them” (Being and Time 31). Ontological talk is “[t]he kind of talk 
in which we say that something has with it an involvement in something, 
[this kind of talk] is not meant to establish a fact ontically, but rather 
to indicate the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand” 
(353; original emphasis). Ontically, in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, commu-
nity can operate as the idea of coexistence, as the fact that such a thing 
as “everyone else” is the necessary presupposition for Kate’s existence. 
Ontologically, however, community can be experienced only through 
the presence of a function—in this case, as the function of multi-party 
agreement.
 Despite its narrative premise that emblematizes community as coex-
istence, Wittgenstein’s Mistress ultimately challenges the ontic dimen-
sion of dissenting community ideal: community that is always-already 
present without the particular invocation of individuals. On the con-
trary, the novel’s ambivalent community stresses the inescapable onto-
logical dimension of community—community that is called into being 
by the address of individual and, once invoked, is put to work.
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Introduction
 1. The prominence of “searching for,” “reclaiming,” or “building” community 
speaks to the dominance of idealized community discourse in critical assessments 
of contemporary fiction. Some monograph examples are John F. Desmond’s Walker 
Percy’s Search for Community; Philip Page’s Reclaiming Community in Contem-
porary African-American Fiction; Bonnie TuSmith’s All My Relatives: Community 
in Contemporary Ethnic American Literatures; and an edited volume by Linda S. 
Coleman, Women’s Life-Writing: Finding Voice/Building Community.
  The idealized community discourse also operates, albeit in a more complex 
manner, in those studies that study the “failure of community”—instances of com-
munity that fall short of the possibilities held by community. Such works include 
Thomas Fink’s A Different Sense of Power: Problems of Community in Late-Twen-
tieth-Century U.S. Poetry and Linda J. Holland-Toll’s As American as Mom, Base-
ball, and Apple Pie: Constructing Community in Contemporary American Horror 
Fiction. Feminist studies of community voice the “failure of community” thesis most 
vocally, as in Jean Wyatt’s Risking Difference: Identification, Race, and Commu-
nity in Contemporary Fiction and Feminism; Cynthia G. Franklin’s Writing Women’s 
Communities: The Politics and Poetics of Contemporary Multi-Genre Anthologies; 
and Dale M. Bauer’s Feminist Dialogics: A Theory of Failed Community.
 2. For many contemporary thinkers, community is the site of that very slippage 
between unity and totality. Peter Hallward characterizes a feature of contemporary 
postmodernist philosophy as “a profound distrust of the very concept of a commu-
nity. For these thinkers, ‘community’ often connotes a notion of fascism” (89). For 
Iris Marion Young in “The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference,” the 
word community bears an “urge to unity” that is indistinguishable from an urge to 
totality, exclusion, and oppression (320). Likewise, Elizabeth Frazer argues that the 
use of “community” as a self-evident commendation in the discourse of idealized 
n o T e S
community obstructs, rather than assists, politically progressive collectivities; the dis-
course of idealized community “diverts attention from the material conditions that 
might generate” the concrete social relations towards equitable unity (84).
 3. See Elizabeth Frazer’s The Problems of Communitarian Politics, especially 
chapter 6, on the prevalent use of the family as the ideal and model for community in 
contemporary philosophical, political, and legal scholarship and social sciences.
 4. The phrase “Beloved Community,” first coined by philosopher-theologian 
Josiah Royce in the early twentieth century, pursued a higher-order reality in which 
an absolute interconnectedness and unification of people bring disparate and discon-
nected aspects of reality into a single vision. King changes the “Beloved Commu-
nity” from Royce’s phrase of absolute idealism to an aspiration for the realization of 
justice, peace, and equity on a global scale. See The King Center’s Web site, named 
“Beloved Community”: http://www.thekingcenter.org/prog/bc/.
 5. See Sandra Stanley, ed., Other Sisterhoods: Literary Theory and U.S. Women 
of Color; bell hooks’s “Sisterhood: Political Solidarity between Women”; and María 
C. Lugones’s “Sisterhood and Friendship as Feminist Models.”
 6. For instance, Friedman imagines a friendship model of community as the basis 
for a feminist communitarianism; Judy Whipps’s “Jane Addams’s Social Thought as a 
Model for a Pragmatist-Feminist Communitarianism” holds Addams’s locality-based 
activism as a model for feminist communitarianism.
 7. Here is an instance in Charles Taylor’s Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
“Common meanings are the basis of community. Inter-subjective meaning gives 
people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding 
of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world 
contain significant common actions, celebrations and feelings. These are objects in 
the world that everybody shares. This is what makes community” (39).
 8. See Mark Poster’s “Postmodernity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The 
Lyotard-Habermas Debate over Social Theory.”
 9. Maurice Blanchot’s The Unavowable Community, like Nancy’s The Inopera-
tive Community, finds its inspirational point in George Bataille’s critique of com-
munism, fascism, and various versions of communalism. Nancy identifies Bataille as 
having “gone farthest into the crucial experience of the modern destiny of commu-
nity” (16), and Blanchot’s first section, entitled “The Negative Community,” credits 
Bataille as a founding member of “unworking” or “negative” community. See also 
Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community.
 10. See Hazel Carby’s “White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries 
of Sisterhood”; Rosemary Hennessy et al., Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, 
Difference, and Women’s Lives; Susan Weisser et al., Feminist Nightmares: Women 
at Odds: Feminism and the Problem of Sisterhood.
 11. Butler’s “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmod-
ernism’”; Spivak’s “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography”; and Mohan-
ty’s Literary Theory and the Claims of History.
 12. Anderson offers an overview of James Clifford’s “Traveling Cultures,” Bruce 
Robbins’s Secular Vocations, David A. Hollinger’s Postethnic America, Paul Gilroy’s 
The Black Atlantic, and Julia Kristeva’s Nations without Nationalism.
  Cosmopolitanism’s fluid and deliberative formation of unity is often times 
equated with postnationalism. But as the essays in Cosmopolitics: Thinking and 
Feeling Beyond the Nation show in their measured and conflicting assessment of cos-
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mopolitanism as ideal and practice, it is difficult to sustain a view of cosmopolitanism 
as a clean break from nationalist unity. Cosmopolitanist theory of unity is also the 
subject of skepticism, as in Timothy Brennan’s At Home in the World: Cosmopoli-
tanism Now, which wonders at the limited—and privileged—nature of a subject posi-
tioning that can claim to be “at home” everywhere.
 13. Amanda Anderson’s The Way We Argue Now offers another expression of 
cosmopolitanism as deliberative unity that “works,” whose self-moderating powers 
rest in its careful balance of Enlightenment ideals and simultaneous interrogation of 
them.
Chapter 
 1. An MLA Bibliography search for “community” in Morrison’s work produces 
seventy-eight scholarly entries. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, and as the fol-
lowing sample titles indicate, a strong continuity in values exists between Morrison’s 
idealized discourse of community and her critics’ appreciation of her vision. Indeed, 
in praising Morrison’s literary exemplification of ideal and aspirational models of 
community, the scholarship directly continues the use of kinship relationships, such 
as “sisterhood,” “brotherhood,” and “family.”
  See O’Reilly’s “In Search of My Mother’s Garden, I found My Own: Mother-
Love, Healing, and Identity in Toni Morrison’s Jazz”; Mbalia’s “Women Who Run 
with Wild: The Need for Sisterhoods in Jazz”; Romero’s “Creating the Beloved Com-
munity: Religion, Race and Nation in Toni Morrison’s Paradise”; Holland’s “Mar-
ginality and Community in Beloved”; O’Shaughnessy’s “‘Life life life life’: The Com-
munity as Chorus in Song of Solomon”; Christian’s “Community and Nature: The 
Novels of Toni Morrison”; Blake’s “Folklore and Community in Song of Solomon”; 
Schomburg’s “To Survive Whole, To Save the Self: The Role of Sisterhood in the 
Novels of Toni Morrison”; LeSeur’s “Moving beyond the Boundaries of Self, Com-
munity, and the Other in Toni Morrison’s Sula and Paradise.”
 2. In a notable departure from the celebration of community in Morrison schol-
arship, the following essays suggest that in Beloved, Morrison argues the failures of 
community: King’s “‘You Think like You White’: Questioning Race and Racial Com-
munity through the Lens of Middle-Class Desire(s)”; and Jesser’s “Violence, Home, 
and Community in Toni Morrison’s Beloved.”
 3. Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community and Being Singular Plural; 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics; Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community; Ernesto 
Laclau’s “Community and Its Paradoxes: Richard Rorty’s ‘Liberal Utopia’”; Jean-
François Lyotard’s “Àl’insu [Unbeknownst]”; Iris Marion Young’s “The Ideal of 
Community and Politics of Difference”; and Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Com-
munity. See also my longer discussion of dissenting community in the Introduction.
 4. Precisely in this message does Morrison invoke the negotiation of Gemein-
schaft and Gesellschaft values that I described in the Introduction. The discourse of 
idealized community, in which community is given the status of an ideal, justifies the 
transformation of many into one as the “rational” movement (Gesellschaft value) 
towards “natural” unities (Gemeinschaft value).
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 5. As numerous critics of Jazz have noted, the vibrancy and primacy of the City 
elevate it beyond the narrative category of a setting; it attains the narrative potency of 
a character. See, for instance, Treherne, Sherard, FitzGerald, and Ludigkeit.
 6. See Fraser’s “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy.”
 7. See also Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference for the use of the city as 
the ideal politics of difference. The popularity of the city as the favored trope (e.g., of 
difference, of heterogeneity, of globalization) in contemporary theory is well-known, 
so much so that Laclau and Mouffe warn against the “totalitarian myth of the Ideal 
City” (77). See also James Donald’s Imagining the Modern City for this caution.
 8. Locating the study of the city in the beginnings of Greek and Roman philos-
ophy, Nancy’s redefinition of the city leads to a redefinition of the task of philosophy. 
Rather than being a study of a city’s “origins,” “political institution,” or “civil coex-
istence” (31), philosophy should be a study of being-with. “[T]he city is primarily not 
a form of political institution; it is primarily a being-with as such. Philosophy is, in 
sum, the thinking of being-with; because of this, it is also thinking-with, as such” (31; 
original emphasis).
 9. For approaches to identification as primary identification between parent and 
child, see Jean Wyatt, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, and Jessica Benjamin; for approaches 
to identification as melancholia, see Diana Fuss, Judith Butler, and Anne Cheng.
 10. For example, see Wyatt’s chapter 3; Tidey’s “Limping or Flying? Psychoanal-
ysis, Afrocentrism, and Song of Solomon”; Baker’s “Knowing Our Place: Psychoanal-
ysis and Sula”; Campbell’s “Images of the Real: Reading History and Psychoanalysis 
in Toni Morrison’s Beloved”; FitzGerald’s “Selfhood and Community: Psychoanalysis 
and Discourse in Beloved”; Mathieson’s “Memory and Mother Love in Morrison’s 
Beloved.” 
 11. As I will discuss in chapter 4, the wordless dimension of these epiphanic 
encounters also suggests the notion of communion, the possibility that one subject 
can be transparent to each other.
 12. Celebration of sisterhood, a cornerstone in scholarship of Morrison’s novels, 
tacitly echoes this theory of commonality-based identification that leads to recip-
rocal appropriation. Indeed, the language and the value system in scholars’ praise of 
sisterhood take place within the teleological thinking of idealized community: com-
monality leads to affirmation and, ultimately, to collective healing. For example, in 
Jazz, “Morrison reveals that her first priority as an artist is in arriving at solutions 
for the dilemma of African people. Sisterhoods are needed in the African community, 
and through them, communication, not silence, will forge the way toward a healthy, 
wholesome future for all people of African descent, especially women” (Mbalia 642); 
“Jazz affirms and celebrates the maternal in both life and language. . . . The healing 
that is made possible through the child’s return to the mother teaches us that hope for 
change and renewal begin with the mother” (O’Reilley 377).  For further examples, 
see Schomburg, Holland and Awkward, and Jones.
  This critical focus on sisterhood and matrilineal fusion is one that Morrison 
unequivocally affirms in her essays and interviews. In a 1977 interview, she stated: “I 
knew my mother as a Church woman, and a Club woman—and there was something 
special about when she said ‘Sister,’ and when all those women said ‘Sister.’ They 
meant that in a very, very fundamental way” (Stepto 474). Another example can be 
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found in her essay “A Knowing So Deep,” which addresses the sisterhood of black 
women in the form of a letter: “I think about us, women and girls, and I want to say 
something worth saying to a daughter, a friend, a mother, a sister—my self” (230).
 13. Philip Page reads Ruby’s founding stories in light of the Israelites’ flight from 
Egypt and the American Dream; Katrine Dalsgard reads Ruby in light of American 
exceptionalism; and Ana Maria Fraile-Marcos reads Ruby alongside the American 
founding trope of the “City upon a Hill.”
 14. In an interview, Morrison identifies Richard Misner as the character with 
whom she identifies the most (Jaffrey 4).
 15. Cited numbers in The Differend refer to paragraph numbers.
Chapter 
 1. Yamashita identifies him as “a literary interpretation of [Guillermo Gomez-
Pena]. Arcangel’s performance is grotesque, freakish, yet Christ-like, accounting for 
500 years of history in the Americas” (Vengua and Tejeda n.p.).
 2. Yamashita’s novels reflect a far-ranging understanding of globalization as 
“processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human 
affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and conti-
nents” (Held et al. 15). As Tropic emphatically targets the First World’s deployment 
of the “globe” as a “village,” the novel joins the rising critique of the First World’s 
celebration of globalization as a moment of unprecedented unity. See Alys Weinbaum 
and Brent Hayes Edwards, “On Critical Globality”; Fredric Jameson and Masao 
Miyoshi, The Cultures of Globalization; Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cul-
tural Dimensions of Globalization; Fredrick Buell, National Culture and the New 
Global System; Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization; Thomas Hylland Eriksen, 
Tyranny of the Moment: Fast and Slow Time in the Information Age; and John Tom-
linson, Globalization and Culture.
 3. Yamashita’s approach also echoes the “internationalizing” vision for a post-
national American studies. As John Carlos Rowe describes, postnational American 
studies “should be contextualized in a larger understanding of the United States in 
the comparative context of Western Hemispheric and finally global study” (31). 
Yamashita’s focus on border crossing and hybridity in the Americas recalls works by 
Native American writers such as Leslie Marmon Silko and Gerald Vizenor, or works 
by Chicana/o writers such as Gloria Anzaldua, Cherrie Morago, Ana Castillo, and 
Alejandro Morales. Yamashita also aligns the transnational nature of her work to 
Jessica Hagedorn’s Dogeaters (Gier and Tejeda n.p.).
  Rachel Lee’s “Asian American Cultural Production in Asian-Pacific Perspec-
tives” offers the earliest assessment of Yamashita as anticipating the global frame-
works that remap the theoretical and political terrain of Asian American cultural 
production. Analysis of transnationalism in Yamashita’s works is central in essays 
by Molly Wallace’s “Tropics of Globalization: Reading the New North America,” 
Caroline Rody’s “The Transnational Imagination,” and Claudia Sadowski-Smith’s 
“The U.S.-Mexico Borderlands Write Back: Cross-Cultural Transnationalism.”
 4. See the special issue of Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 
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devoted to universalism, which includes essays such as Étienne Balibar’s “Ambiguous 
Universality,” Naomi Schor’s “French Feminism Is a Universalism,” Joan Scott’s “Uni-
versalism and the History of Feminism,” and David Palumbo-Liu’s “Universalism 
and Minority Culture.” See also, elsewhere, Naomi Schor’s “The Crisis of French 
Universalism” and Eric Lott’s “After Identity, Politics: The Return of Universalism.” 
Ernesto Laclau’s numerous essays on universalism are collected in Emancipation(s). 
See also Butler, Laclau, and Žižek’s Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contem-
porary Dialogues on the Left.
 5. For instance, Butler points out that Habermas pursues a “procedural method” 
“which establishes universalizability as a criterion for justifying the normative claims 
of any social and political programme.” Although the procedural method distances 
itself from making declaration about human substance, “it does implicitly call upon a 
certain rational capacity, and attributes to that rational capacity an inherent relation 
to universalizability.” In a roundabout way, then, the procedural method implicitly 
makes a foundational claim about human beings (Contingency 15). Another example 
of the antifoundationalist approach to universalism can be found in Laclau’s con-
structivist defense. In response to Richard Rorty’s assertion that liberals who disown 
commonalities among humans must also disown universalism, Laclau responds that 
if we approach universalism as a social product that emerges from specific historical 
necessities, we can have a universalism that is not a metaphysical fact about human 
nature or the human condition. “It is enough to recognize that democracy needs 
universalism while asserting that, at the same time, that universalism is one of the 
vocabularies, one of the language games, which was constructed at some point by 
social agents and which has become a more and more central part of our values and 
our culture. It is a contingent historical product” (Emancipation(s) 122; original 
emphasis).
 6. Huyssen notes that while McLuhan’s theory of the media was crucial to the 
political strategies of the 1960s counterculture, his “unbounded optimism about the 
effects of electronic communications on human community and his blindness to the 
relationship between the media and economic and political power could only be read 
as an affirmative culture, as an apology for ruthless technological modernization, or, 
at best, as naïve politics” (9).
 7. A critique of such imperialist views of travel has been offered by postcolonial 
writers such as Derek Walcott and Jamaica Kincaid. In Asian American fiction, too, 
the critique of the reification of ethnic-specific locales (e.g., Chinatown) has been a 
central theme.
 8. An example of such discourse: “And, the fact is, NAFTA has been an out-
standing success. Between 1993 and 2002, merchandise trade between the United 
States and Mexico increased by 178 percent, from $79 billion to $220 billion, 
and, between 1988 (the year before the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, NAFTA’s precursor, went into effect) and 2001, agricultural trade among the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico increased by 155 percent. According to the U.S. 
Trade Representative’s office, trade between NAFTA partners increased 104 percent 
between 1993 and 2000—twice as fast as U.S. trade with the rest of the world. By 
lowering barriers, NAFTA has reduced the costs of imports for American businesses 
and consumers” (“Unfair” New Republic).
 9. Molly Wallace, in “Tropics of Globalization,” astutely points out that pro-
ponents of NAFTA use the metaphor of the weather to argue the inevitability of 
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south-north economic integration. Such rhetorical moves “not only naturalize capi-
talism” but make it “a veritable law of nature” (145). In discussing the inexorable 
global community in Tropic, it is important to distinguish between the inevitability 
of greater economic, political, and social interdependence from the particular policies 
put in place for regulating such an activity and from the celebratory view that such 
policies uniformly benefit a singular, global “we.” To discuss the three as if they are 
one and the same phenomenon is a disingenuous move that parallels the unidirec-
tional nature of imperialist universalism.
 10. It is important that “hegemony” in this discussion be understood not as the 
negative force wielded by a few to oppress the many, but as in Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, as the contingent articulation by different subject positions that take place in 
the field of limitless, differential relations that is the social. Hence, rather than being 
the political logic/attribute of a specific social sector or identities, hegemony is the 
articulation of power for which all subject positions strive.
 11. The three thinkers diverge on theorizing the incomplete nature of universalism, 
a divergence that rests on their different theorization of the incomplete nature of the 
subject. More specifically, they differ on their respective use of Hegel and Lacan in 
theorizing the negativity at the heart of identity (the discrepancy between identity-
claims and the actual constitution of identity).
 12.  See, for instance, Nancy’s Inoperative Community (xxxix), Lyotard’s “À l’insu 
[Unbeknownst]” (43), Hallward (89), and Young’s “The Ideal of Community and the 
Politics of Difference” (302, 320).
 13. See Anderson’s “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of 
Modernity”; James Clifford’s “Traveling Cultures”; Bruce Robbins’s Secular Voca-
tions; and David A. Hollinger’s Postethnic America.
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 1. Other exemplary expressions of the posthumanist “we” can be found in Ray 
Kurzwell’s The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelli-
gence and Danny Hillis’s The Pattern on the Stone. See Timothy Lenoir’s introductions 
to the two-part special issue of Configurations devoted to the topic of posthumanism. 
In “Part One: Embracing the Posthuman,” Lenoir surveys leading posthumanists 
such as Hans Moravec, Marvin Minsky, and Danny Hill who exemplify the view 
that “the brain is a kind of a computer, and that thought is a complex computation” 
(Lenoir 206). As Lenoir makes clear, articulations of “posthumanism” are diverse, 
particularly in theorizing the division between materiality and information (i.e., body 
and mind). Thinkers of posthumanism who insist on the inextricability of body and 
mind (e.g., N. Katherine Hayles, Antonio Damasio, Francisco Varela, George Lakoff, 
and Mark Johnson) contest precisely thinkers such as Kurzwell and Hillis who prac-
tice the Cartesian division between body and mind.
  Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel Goldstein, in “Mind as Computer: Birth of a 
Metaphor,” trace the mind-as-computer interpretation to cognitive psychology in 
the early 1970s. Norbert Wiener’s foundational work on the relationship between 
the human body and information-processing technologies (Cybernetics of Control 
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and Communication in the Animal and the Machine 1948) and Marshall McLuhan’s 
work on communication technologies as extensions of the human body remain cen-
tral to posthumanist disruption of organicist discourses of the body, gender, and 
sexuality.
 2. The English mathematician Alan Turing (1912–54) proposed the original 
Turing test in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950). The Turing test 
demands that a human examiner decide whether the written answers given to his 
or her questions are generated by a computer or by a human. If the examiner fails 
to distinguish between human and machine responses, the machine may be deemed 
intelligent. Turing drew an analogy to “a sexual guessing game,” in which an exam-
iner tries to identify the respective sex of the test takers based on their answers.
 3. The Gold Bug Variations also features a humanities reference librarian who 
finds herself untangling the scientific complexity of the genome research project. As 
Snyder observes regarding The Gold Bug Variations, “[e]ven as men appear in Pow-
ers’s work as having produced much of the celebrated work of historical record, his 
valorization of amateur, cross-disciplinary thinking restores his female characters to a 
central role in his fiction where they serve as model proponents of the skills of border 
crossing and inspired collaboration” (95). It remains a strong pattern in Powers’s 
novels of science and technology that the amateur agent who crosses disciplines is 
invariably a humanist, whose bewilderment and learning process stand as those of 
the implied reader’s.
 4.  April Linder discusses Powers’s ambivalence to “nineteenth-century realism” 
in “Narrative as Necessary Evil in Richard Powers’s Operation Wandering Soul.” 
James Hurt in “Narrative Powers: Richard Powers as Storyteller” argues a “narrative 
therapy” that Powers practices, “not only therapy through narrative but also therapy 
for narrative” (24; original emphasis). Jeffrey Pence, in “The End of Technology: 
Memory in Richard Powers’s Galatea 2.2,” reads Powers’s defense of narrative as a 
defense of “a model and a modeler of memory” (344). See James Berger who locates 
a “persistence of Arnoldian ideas of culture” in Galatea (113). Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s 
“The Exhaustion of Literature: Novels, Computers, and the Threat of Obsolescence” 
reads Galatea as an anxious expression about the role of traditional humanities and 
the role of the computer as the harbinger of posthumanist demotion of the book as 
the cornerstone of traditional humanities. Powers is indeed aware that Rick’s use of 
the term “humanism” holds conservative and repressive significance in contemporary 
intellectual discourse, and he uses the graduate student A., the human counterpart in 
the novel’s Turing test, to voice them. A. calls Rick’s view of literature the views of “a 
complete throwback” who is “not even reactionary” (285).
 5. In the extreme degree to which Powers’s humanist-protagonists are amateurs 
in the fields of science and technology, Powers shows an interest in sketching out the 
humanist’s alarm in its plainest and most extreme pitch. It is an alarm that recalls 
the extreme fears voiced in the early developmental years of computer technology, 
robotic technology, and artificial intelligence—that seeing the machine in a fluid and 
continuous relationship with the human means the displacement or the extinction of 
the human as we know it, that the human will “lose” the body, the mind, and con-
sciousness. Lenoir’s introduction to the special issue of Configuration, “Makeover: 
Writing the Body into the Posthuman Technoscape. Part One: Embracing the Post-
human,” details humanism’s fears of humankind’s displacement or extinction that 
are expressed in the early years of artificial intelligence.
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 6. Miller’s “Deeper Blues, or the Posthuman Prometheus” provides a rich over-
view of contemporary fiction’s and popular culture’s use of intelligent machines 
as artistic inspirations. Miranda Campbell’s “Probing the Posthuman” locates in 
Galatea a critical stance towards posthumanist devaluation of materiality, but she 
asserts that the novel explores the humanist-posthumanist debate without “anxiously 
seek[ing] to reinstate the boundaries of this [human] subject” (1).
 7. In his novels and interviews, Powers uses “narrative” interchangeably with 
“story,” “fiction,” “novel,” and “storytelling.” As I have addressed above, the cen-
trality of narrative as a thematic topic in Powers’s oeuvre is well noted in his scholar-
ship.
 8. I hasten to add that such division of materiality/information is not a maneuver 
that Hayles endorses in her own theory of posthumanism. As I will discuss further, 
theories of posthumanism differ in their treatment of the body/mind relationship, 
and Hayles here is noting a characteristic feature of those posthumanist thinkers 
who demote the relevance of the body, a move that she actively contests. Despite the 
differences in theories of the body/mind relationship, in the final analysis, posthu-
manism asserts the continuity and fluidity in the ontological category of the human 
and the machine.
 9. As Helen’s unworldliness performs a politically critical function, Rick’s charac-
terization of Helen recalls the political work of innocence in mid-nineteenth-century 
American sentimental fiction. As Nina Baym argued in Woman’s Fiction: A Guide to 
Novels by and about Women in America, 1820–1870, the unworldliness of young 
female characters was central to the familiar plot typology in mid-nineteenth-century 
American women’s fiction, wherein the innocence of the female children/adolescents 
was expressive of an ethereal goodness and moral purity.
 10. In reading the deployment of gendered attributes in Galatea, however, it is 
difficult to assess Powers’s gender politics as simply continuing patriarchal scripts. 
Certainly, the overwhelming power that Rick wields over Helen bespeaks the mas-
culinist will to control the female-identified machine. His characterization of his old 
love C. is rife with stereotypical images of the moody, emotionally unstable female, 
as Hayles argues (Posthuman 266–69). He habitually envisions himself to be in love 
with female acquaintances. Thus there is considerable evidence in Galatea of the 
female-gendered identity being equated with passive receptivity.
  Counterbalancing this masculine despotism are Rick’s frequent allusions to 
Frankenstein (55) and Pygmalian (182), references that express a self-conscious-
ness of his role as the shaper of identities. There is also the figure of A., the female 
graduate student who ridicules Rick’s traditional humanist views: “And you wonder 
why the posthumanists reduced your type to an author function” (286). When Rick 
professes his love for her, she flatly refuses to be a projected ideal and scolds him for 
flightiness and “self-indulgence” (316). As the female character who shows up Rick’s 
controversial views towards canonized literature’s “greatness” and fantasized attrac-
tions towards women, A. functions as the counterpart to the emotionally unstable C. 
and the childish helplessness of Helen. This dyadic arrangement of two female-gender 
characterizations also appears in Plowing the Dark between Adie the artist-humanist 
and Sue the programmer-posthumanist.
 11. Significantly, while Adie’s chapters follow a third-person omniscient narration, 
Martin’s chapters follow a direct address to “you” the reader, affecting the oldest 
virtual reality technology—simulation through words. See Marie-Laure Ryan’s Nar-
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rative as Virtual Reality.
 12. The second part of Configurations special issue on posthumanism, “Part Two: 
Corporeal Axiomatics,” features posthumanist projects that highlight the irreplace-
able role of the biological body in conceptualizing the mind. As a primary example, 
Lenoir highlights Mark Hansen’s work in relocating visual sense-making in the body 
as a principal example of conceptualizing the extended mind. Even in a digital con-
text of virtual reality, Hansen argues, the visceral element of the body is the active 
framer of the image. “Virtual reality is, Hansen argues, a body-brain achievement” 
(Lenoir 378).
Chapter 
 1. See Elizabeth Frazier’s discussion of the concept of communion in theories of 
community in political science, especially in communitarianism (75, 82).
 2. In writing against the ideal of transparency, Davis and Tillman may be read as 
formally defying a convention of realism—the convention of the character, generally 
the protagonist, who comes to eventually attain the “truth” about the other char-
acters and about her world. I emphasize this point in relation to Tillman’s Motion 
Sickness in “Recognition as a Depleted Source.”
 3. Lydia Davis’s short story collections include Samuel Johnson Is Indignant 
(2002), Almost No Memory (1998), Break It Down (1986), Story and Other Stories 
(1983), Sketches for a Life of Wassily (1981), and The Thirteenth Woman (1976). 
Davis is also well-known as a translator of leading French fiction, criticism, and 
philosophy (notably those of Marcel Proust, Maurice Blanchot, and Michel Leiris, as 
well as of Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault). Her many literary awards include a 
2003 MacArthur Fellows Award.
 4. Lynne Tillman’s other novels are No Lease on Life (1998) and Cast in Doubt 
(1992). Her short works include Absence Makes the Heart (1990); The Madame 
Realism Complex (1992); The Velvet Years: Warhol’s Factory 1965–1967 (1995); a 
book of art criticism; and The Broad Picture (1997), a collection of essays. She has 
also written and codirected a movie entitled Committed (1984).
 5. My use of “recognition” in this chapter diverges from another approach to 
recognition, notably found in the field of political science, which grounds the con-
cept upon the following definition: “To acknowledge by special notice, approval or 
sanction; to treat as valid, as having existence or as entitled to consideration; to take 
notice of (a thing or person) in some way”; “To admit to consideration, or to a status, 
as being something” (OED online). Charles Taylor’s “The Politics of Recognition” is 
an exemplary study of recognition as the acknowledgment and distribution of goods 
and rights. Julia Eichelberger’s Prophets of Recognition is an example of a literary 
study of recognition as the apportioning of acknowledgment, respect, rights, and 
goods. Ralph Ellison, Toni Morrison, Saul Bellow, and Eudora Welty are “prophets 
of recognition” who “offer readers a vision of as-yet-unrealized democracy in which 
individuals acknowledge or recognize the innate worth of one another” (2).
 6. This skepticism raised its head in a slightly different fashion in Richard Pow-
ers’s interrogation of how the human might “know” the machine. Highlighting the 
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way that interpretation inevitably becomes translation, Powers emphasized the con-
nection between the tautological dimension of the human’s interpretation of the 
machine and humanism’s insistence that the human is a unique body of individuals.
 7. As Larry McCaffery points out, however, Davis’s “minimalist” nature is a 
vastly different sort of minimalism from that of Raymond Carver, Ann Beattie, Mary 
Robinson, or Frederick Barthelme, whose pared-down language use, form, and nar-
rative premise were in direct response to what they saw to be excesses of their “post-
modern” or “experimental” contemporaries (61).
 8. This contradictory significance of alterity echoes the contradictory significance 
of the unknowable city that I discussed in chapter 1 in relation to Morrison’s Jazz. 
While the postmodernist ideal of the unknowable city begins the narrative of Jazz, 
that vision is progressively rendered into a problem that the protagonists must solve. 
Thus the competing discourses of idealized and dissenting community manifest them-
selves in the contradictory significance of concepts such as alterity and the unknow-
able city in these novels.
 9. The exemplar quotations for this definition are: “Linnell has made us recog-
nise a new beauty in the heather”; “Kepler first recognised the fact that the eye is a 
camera” (OED online).
 10. Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes will henceforth be cited as RB. Barthes 
draws on Ancient Greek, especially Aristotle’s use of endoxa, which, in Aristotle’s 
writing, meant “all that is considered true, or at least probable, by a majority of 
people endowed with reason, or by a specific social group” (Amossy 369). In theo-
rizing the oppressive nature of the form of repetition, Barthes works in and through 
Gustave Flaubert’s criticism of received ideas. Critics such as Michael Moriarty and 
Christopher Prendergast have argued that Barthes’s use of endoxa simplifies what is 
a more expansive concept in Aristotelian usage. Also, see the special issue of Poetics 
Today (Vol. 23, 2002) devoted to the topic of doxa in contemporary disciplines.
 11. Anne Hershberg Pierrot in “Barthes and Doxa” offers an insightful examina-
tion of Barthes’s use of metaphor (layer, petrification, glutinous, stickiness) in his 
conceptualization of doxa.
 12. Tillman’s use of the term “recognition” in her interview refers to what I have 
been calling proper recognition, “to perceive clearly, to realize.” Furthermore, Till-
man’s use highlights another dimension of the word—recognition as the acceptance 
of or resignation to an irreducible fact. Such acceptance or resignation, of course, 
can only rest upon the second definition of recognition, upon the epistemological 
certainty of knowing-afresh.
 13. Campbell cites from the French edition of Écrits (Paris: Seuil, 1966).
Chapter 
 1. My analysis of madness departs from existing approaches to the topic of mad-
ness in the novel. For some critics of the novel, the fact of Kate’s sanity is directly 
related to her reliability as a narrator. That Kate is not mad is requisite to appre-
ciating the important philosophical ruminations in the novel. “We must believe 
that Kate is truly the last person on earth—otherwise, we are left with an insane 
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woman. . . . As an investigation into the workings of thought and memory, the book 
would be invalid if the mind through which we follow this investigation were dis-
eased. This is how an insane mind works, would be the caveat we would have to 
apply to everything we read” (Sullivan 241). “[Kate] is intrepid (only think of all that 
traveling), tough (dismantling things, improvising chimneys), curious and cheerful; 
her parody of Wittgenstein’s philosophical discourse . . . is marvelously, if uncon-
sciously funny, and she never whines or collapses in despair” (Grace 209). In such 
readings, the reader’s literal acceptance of the narrative premise (i.e., Kate is the last 
person alive on earth) is fundamental to an empathetic reading of the novel, as well 
as to a full appreciation of the philosophical import of the novel. However, in my 
analysis, the condition of Kate’s sanity as a protagonist-narrator is irrelevant. Rather, 
I emphasize the centrality of madness as a formal, thematic, and philosophical tool of 
inquiry.
 2. See Joseph Tabbi’s “David Markson: An Introduction” and “An Interview 
with David Markson” which address the inspirational role of Wittgenstein’s thinking 
in the novel. The novel “appears not as an illustration of a set of philosophical ideas 
or even a novelization of the philosopher’s life and thought, but as an original reading 
of Wittgenstein” (Tabbi, “Reading David Markson” n.p.). While the connection is 
not made explicitly in the novel (Kate professes not to have read a word of Witt-
genstein), Markson explains: “The title just seemed to work for me, my woman as 
mistress to his thought, so to speak” (Private Correspondence, May 30, 2005).
 3. This impossibility attains further complexity through David Markson’s experi-
mental form. As a foremost figure in contemporary American avant-garde fiction, 
Markson has long explored the figure of the isolated artist as a source of narrative 
premise and literary inspiration. Most importantly, Markson has rendered that iso-
lated figure through a disjunction in form. As “Writer,” the narrator of This Is Not a 
Novel (2001), announces best, Markson’s literary oeuvre has consistently disrupted 
the conventions of the novel formally and thematically:
A novel with no intimation of story whatsoever, Writer would like to con-
trive.
 And with no characters. None. . . . 
 Plotless. Characterless.
 Yet seducing the reader into turning the pages nonetheless. (2–3)
This announcement of a novel that is not a conventional novel informs the formal 
strategy that is uniquely Markson’s in contemporary fiction—a book-length collec-
tion of trivia about the lives of writers, artists, and philosophers throughout Western 
history, odd and unusual facts about their sanitary habits, their idiosyncrasies, their 
sexual habits and illnesses physical and mental, and gossip about their family lives. 
These entries thwart the conventional practices of the novel, and Markson achieves 
the avant-gardist act of “seducing the reader” through a form highly disruptive of 
conventional reading practices. This symbiosis between the isolated artist figure and 
the form of the non-novel appears most explicitly in Reader’s Block (1996), in which 
an aged writer, isolated from his family and friends, finds that his attempt to write a 
novel continually comes into conflict with his life as a reader; thus the collection of 
literary, philosophical, historical trivia surfaces as the memory of a life spent reading. 
As I will show, Markson’s non-novelistic form attains particular significance in Witt-
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genstein’s Mistress, since the highly unusual and idiosyncratic form will be inextri-
cable from the single-party nature of Kate’s private language game.
 4. This question has been thoroughly revisited in the scholarship over Wittgen-
stein’s “later stage” of thinking (The Blue and Brown Book and, of course, Philo-
sophical Investigations). As many have noted, this debate is fueled by Wittgenstein’s 
own refutation of a systematic use of language and the resulting indeterminacy in his 
writings. In explicit refutation of the systematic theory of language he offered in his 
“early” scholarship, such as Tractus, in his later scholarship Wittgenstein’s central 
arguments are fueled principally by figurative expressions—through similes, meta-
phors, and analogies. The analogy-driven process of argument (e.g., language is like 
“a game of chess,” using language is like “playing chess” or like “performing a trans-
action”; “use” is like “meaning” and like “understanding”; etc.) rests on an array of 
examples, and each example gives rise to a proliferation of possible interpretations. 
This excess of possible interpretations emerging from distinct, concrete examples fuels 
the debate over the possibility of private language, as each critical camp uses, and 
highlights, different propositions to support distinct versions of Wittgenstein’s theory 
of language.
 5. An important distinction needs to be made here. Since the term “community” 
is not evident in Wittgenstein’s discussions of language games, I am not claiming to 
uncover, per se, Wittgenstein’s theory of community through his writings on language. 
What I wish to highlight is the fact that the central presupposition of Wittgenstein’s 
theory of language rests on the concept of agreement, and it is precisely this key pre-
supposition that parallels the centrality of agreement, commonality, and consensus in 
idealized community discourse.
 6. For a large overview of the debate, see Canfield and Gustafsson. For examples 
of the community view argument, see Malcolm, Bloor, Kripke, and von Savigny; for 
the individualist view, see Baker and Hacker, McGinn, Champlin, Moser, and Black-
burn.
 7. This multiplicity of language games defies the kind of mathematical, systematic 
accounting of language that is offered in his earlier work Tractus, which argued a sin-
gular logic underlying all of language use. However, in Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein argues that just as there can be a limitless number of games, there can be 
a limitless number of language uses, each use with its own set rules.
  All propositions are cited by their paragraph number in Philosophical Investi-
gations; propositions from Part II are cited by page numbers.
 8. My method of intervention, arguing a wider understanding for the key terms in 
the debate, shares a similarity with Edward Minar’s approach, which argues that to 
fault Wittgenstein for not offering a definitive answer to the private language question 
is to fundamentally ignore Wittgenstein’s own approach to language use and to the 
task of philosophy—that the task of philosophy is to describe, not to define. Canfield’s 
and Gustafsson’s works, in reassessing the debate by offering different understandings 
of key terms, also show the scholarship’s movement away from seeking a definitive 
exegetical answer to the private language question in Wittgenstein’s language theory.
 9. Lacking “outward criteria” has direct consequences for the “usage” of pri-
vate language: “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ 
the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its usage in 
the language” (43; original emphasis). The modified subject of the phrase (“For a 
large class of cases—though not for all”) stands as another example of Wittgenstein’s 
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pursuit of “everyday use” of language and eschewing of “extreme subtleties” (106) 
in his approach to philosophical language. This emphasis on the actual use of lan-
guage might stand as the response to critics who argue that Wittgenstein’s equation of 
“meaning” and “use” is too sweeping in nature, leaving too many exceptions unex-
plored.
 10. It is important to note here that I am not asserting a model of transparent com-
munication as the ideal of public language game, an ideal that is more representative 
of the Habermasian ideal of communicative rationality. Rather, I am emphasizing the 
fact that “if language is to be a means of communication,” as Wittgenstein argues 
(24), a given language game must possess the possibility of performing its specific 
function.
 11. The indeterminacy that arises from Kate’s account must be appreciated as being 
more than the effect of free indirect discourse. Certainly Markson takes full advan-
tage of the homodiegetic narrator whose exclusive focalization obstructs the reader’s 
ability to view the narrative events from any other consciousness. Like Oedipa Maas 
in Crying of Lot 49 or Charles Kinbote in Pale Fire, Kate is a protagonist whose reli-
ability as the narrator of the story events cannot be determined. The narrative premise 
of Wittgenstein’s Mistress, with its explicit engagement with the linguistic and onto-
logical implications of the last person alive, complicates the effects of free indirect 
discourse with philosophical challenges of the sole consciousness in operation.
 12. The sentence structure anchored by adverbs of clarification and modification 
simulate, of course, the sentence structure of Wittgenstein’s Propositions in Philo-
sophical Investigations and elsewhere.
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